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Viewing cable 07MANAGUA40, ALN EXAMINES ITS ROLE AS NEW DEMOCRATIC FORCE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MANAGUA40 2007-01-09 19:06 2011-06-21 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Managua
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #0040/01 0091906
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 091906Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8577
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000040 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM NU
SUBJECT: ALN EXAMINES ITS ROLE AS NEW DEMOCRATIC FORCE 
 
REF: MANAGUA 2724 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4 (b and d) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: During a recent Embassy-hosted lunch, 
Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) deputies-elect (headed by 
Eduardo Montealegre) and leaders of the alliance parties 
discussed strategy, the future of the ALN, Eduardo 
Montealegre's role in the party and the need for 
consolidation.  Montealegre aired his views on the future of 
the party and the deputies expressed their differing 
perspectives on working with the Liberal Constitutional Party 
(PLC) while Arnoldo Aleman maintains control.  The deputies 
agreed with the Ambassador that the ALN must work on internal 
unity and maintaining alliances among the constituent 
parties, as well with regional party organizations and civil 
society, to protect Nicaraguan democracy.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) The Ambassador opened a December 22 lunch with the 
ALN by congratulating the party leaders on proving that they 
are the new democratic force in Nicaragua.  He emphasized the 
United State's determination not to abandon Nicaragua and 
pledged continued support for the ALN and all democratic 
forces who represent Nicaragua's future.  The Ambassador then 
queried Montealegre about the party's plans for the future 
and how the United States could reinforce them. 
 
Future of the ALN 
- - - - - - - - - 
 
3.  (C) Montealegre stated that he will work to honor his 
campaign promises to defend human liberties and help 
Nicaragua's most needy.  He believes that the ALN is the 
major legitimate representative of democracy in the country 
and that the party needs to get this message out, especially 
to rural areas.  The deputies agreed that the ALN must 
develop a stronger presence in rural and remote areas and 
that this effort should be a focus for the 2008 municipal 
elections.  Montealegre commented that outreach efforts in 
these areas should be channeled through local radio stations. 
 (The PLC currently dominates local radio in the north and 
was also very successful in particularly remote areas like 
the South Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAS).)  Current ALN 
deputy and evangelical leader Delia Arellano stated that the 
ALN should pursue social projects, perhaps working with local 
churches.  Not only would such a focus help fulfill campaign 
promises, but would serve as a strategy to raise awareness 
and gain new supporters for the ALN.  Liberal Salvation 
Movement leader Eliseo Nunez Sr. stressed the need for the 
ALN to work with small and medium-size NGOs and asked for 
U.S. help in gathering a list and contacting the NGOs. 
 
4.  (C) Besides concerns about consolidating power, 
Montealegre and ALN members are grappling with the issue of 
how to deal with the PLC and what role they will play in the 
National Assembly.  ALN deputies hold differing opinions on 
working with the PLC -- whether to ignore them, co-opt them, 
or engage them on serious issues.  ALN deputy Yamileth 
Bonilla stated that working with the PLC or attempting to 
co-opt their deputies is not viable while Aleman remains in 
power.  Other deputies feel that it is possible to sway 
certain PLC deputies who are disappointed by the election 
results and disillusioned with the party.  (Comment: An 
alternative option previously discussed with ALN leaders 
would be to convince PLC deputies unhappy with Aleman's 
leadership to form a caucus of independent Liberal deputies. 
End Comment.) 
 
5.  (C) Bonilla had previously told polcouns that the ALN 
would seek the presidency or the first secretary position on 
the National Assembly's new Board of Directors.  She also 
reported that the ALN was lobbying to chair the Defense and 
Government committees and to obtain other positions in the 
Municipal, Education and Health committees.  Montealegre 
confirmed the ALN's interest in the committees, but commented 
that the party "can't give up its soul" to gain the 
presidency or first secretary slot.  He stated that instead, 
the ALN should "be the outsider," fighting against the status 
quo. 
 
Party Alliances 
- - - - - - - - 
 
6.  (C) The ALN is an alliance comprised of several parties 
and movements, some elements of which have indicated they 
might separate.  One of the major threats to the ALN was from 
a principal component of the Alliance -- the Conservative 
Party (PC).  PC president Azalia Aviles had previously 
reported to polcouns that, according to PC statutes, the 
party deputies must form their own caucus in the National 
Assembly if possible.  The PC has five deputies-elect, enough 
to form  a caucus.  During the lunch with the Ambassador, 
Aviles reported that PC party members during their last 
meeting had decided "not to vote" on establishing their own 
caucus; at least for the time being, they are tabling the 
decision.  (Comment: The Conservative Party has many 
adherents in the elite classes and enjoys considerable 
financial and human resources.  Nevertheless, the party does 
not command popular support outside of a few geographic 
areas, such as Granada.  They would never have been able to 
increase their representation in the National Assembly from 
one to five deputies without the ALN.  Aviles appears to 
realize that fact, but other influential PC leaders continue 
to push for separation.  End Comment.) 
 
7.  (C) The Ambassador commented that the ALN must work on 
maintaining internal unity and hold off on trying to draw PLC 
deputies to ally with the ALN.  If the ALN is a cohesive, 
unified alliance of parties, it will be a much more 
attractive and powerful draw to disenchanted PLC deputies. 
 
Eduardo's Role - Striking a Balance between Lawmaker and 
Future Presidential Candidate 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
8.  (C) ALN deputy Maria Eugenia Sequeira added that the ALN 
needs a strong leader to hold the Alliance together and that 
Montealegre must establish himself as that leader.  She 
commented on the need for Montealegre to balance his work in 
the National Assembly with getting out to rural areas to 
campaign for the ALN.  The other deputies seemed to agree 
that Montealegre should limit his appearances in the National 
Assembly to key issues and key votes.  Sequeira suggested 
that he work closely with President Bolanos, who will also 
have an Assembly seat, noting that Bolanos can be the 
outspoken "rabble-rouser" on key issues and Eduardo can adopt 
a more "statesman-like" role. 
 
Ley Organica 
- - - - - - - 
 
9.  (C) Montealegre informed the Ambassador that he had 
already met with the FSLN on the Ley Organica (Ways and Means 
law for the National Assembly -- reftel) and that they were 
willing to get rid of some of the more controversial 
articles, including parts of article 53.  Article 53 grants 
the National Assembly the authority to summon anyone to 
appear before them and provide information, and carries the 
threat of prison if the person fails or refuses to appear. 
Montealegre added that the original intent had been to limit 
the article to former and current government officials. 
(Note:  Although Montealegre made little mention of the MRS 
during the lunch, he did note that Edmundo Jarquin's strong 
statements against the Ley Organica had received extensive 
press coverage.  End Note.) 
 
U.S. Role 
- - - - - 
 
10. (C) Montealegre commented on the need for funding and 
training of National Assembly staff and asked about possible 
assistance from the United States.  APRE President Miguel 
Lopez Baldizon echoed the need for training in "political 
management."  He wants to establish a think tank that would 
help the new opposition compete against the FSLN government 
and is also interested in establishing a degree or 
certificate program in "political management."  The 
Ambassador suggested that we are looking for ways to re-focus 
our democracy assistance funds. 
 
11.  (C) Liberal Independent Party leader Indalecio Rodriguez 
inquired about the possibility of extending Millennium 
Challenge Corporation (MCC) projects to the northern 
departments, near the Nicaragua-Honduras border.  The 
Ambassador responded that there may be an opportunity to add 
on to the existing project and that the north would be a key 
area.  Several of the deputies questioned the Ambassador 
about the possibility of the MCC pulling out of Nicaragua. 
Most seemed to think that if the MCC departed Nicaragua, 
Chavez would provide financing to finish the projects.  The 
loss in funding then would not be a concern for the FSLN, but 
the message such a move would send to the rest of the world 
and the effect that would have on continued investment in 
Nicaragua could be profound. 
 
12.  (SBU) Nicaraguan Attendees: 
 
Eduardo Montealegre - ALN President 
Azalia Aviles - PC President 
Yamileth Bonilla - ALN Deputy 
Delia Arellano - ALN Deputy and evangelical leader 
Miguel Lopez Baldizon - APRE President 
Eliseo Nunez Sr. - MSL President 
Indalecio Rodriguez - PLI President 
Maria Eugenia Sequiera - ALN Deputy 
Oscar Sobalvarro - PRN representative 
TRIVELLI