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Viewing cable 07MANAGUA182, HUMAN RIGHTS NGO TERMS ORTEGA GOVERNMENT "WORST

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MANAGUA182 2007-01-23 18:37 2011-06-21 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Managua
VZCZCXRO6023
PP RUEHLMC
DE RUEHMU #0182/01 0231837
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231837Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8731
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0908
RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAGUA 000182 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/USOAS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2017 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PINR KDEM NU PREL
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS NGO TERMS ORTEGA GOVERNMENT "WORST 
NIGHTMARE SCENARIO" 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Members of the Permanent Human Rights 
Council (CPDH) believe that the turn the Ortega government 
has taken since it assumed power is the "worst-nightmare 
scenario."  They recently warned the Ambassador that 
President Ortega will not leave office for at least ten years 
unless Nicaragua's democratic forces unite to block him, and 
argued that civil society must take the lead in countering 
Ortega's rush to consolidate power.  The CPDH will continue 
its cases filed before the IAHCR against Ortega and a number 
of other Sandinista leaders for their alleged atrocities 
committed against Nicaragua's indigenous population during 
the 1980s and will also file the cases before the Spanish 
courts.  Ortega will do his utmost to keep the liberals and 
other opposition forces divided.  After all, these divisions 
allowed him to win the election, and if they continue, will 
facilitate his plans.  End Summary. 
 
"Worst Scenario" Came to Pass 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
2.  (C) On January 19, CPDH VP Carlos Huembes, Board member 
Raymond Genie, and Executive Director Marcos Carmona met with 
the Ambassador, USAID director, and Poloffs to discuss views 
on the current political situation and how it affects human 
rights.  Genie lamented that with Ortega's election and his 
clear efforts to consolidate his power from the start of his 
term in office meant that the "worst nightmare" had come to 
pass.  He warned that Sandinista National Liberation Front 
(FSLN) President Daniel Ortega will not leave office for at 
least ten years unless Nicaragua's democratic forces unite to 
block him. 
 
Civil Society Must Take the Lead 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
3.  (C) Huembes remarked that the opposition parties are weak 
and divided.  He asserted that these parties have not 
seriously contested Ortega's efforts to expedite a number of 
revisions to Law 290, which if passed, will play into 
Ortega's desired objective, an authoritarian state.  Thus, 
civil society must take the lead in countering Ortega's rush 
to consolidate power. 
 
4.  (C) Responding to the Ambassador's query regarding which 
of Ortega's actions are most serious, Genie cited the risk 
that the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) will fall into the 
FSLN "trap" of constitutional reforms.  If the ALN enters 
into this "game," it could lose, as the FSLN will make sure 
the game advantages Ortega, warned Genie.   Huembes lamented 
that the ALN and the Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) are 
jockeying for the FSLN's favor, while they should instead be 
trying to unite against Ortega's party.  He indicated that 
the crux of the problem is PLC leader/convicted money 
launderer Arnoldo Aleman's dependence on Ortega and his fear 
that Ortega will pop him back in jail if PLC lawmakers do not 
cooperate with the FSLN's legislative agenda.  If enough of 
the PLC deputies oppose Ortega, he would no longer enjoy a 
simple majority (47 votes) and certainly not a qualified 
majority (56 votes) required for constitutional reforms. 
Genie was at a loss, however, how to break Ortega's hold on 
Aleman. 
 
5.  (C) (Comment: If one combines the votes of FSLN and PLC 
Assembly deputies, plus three others who could also vote for 
the FSLN (ALN's Salvador Talavera and MRS' Juan Ramon Jimenez 
and Mario Valle), the FSLN could achieve the 2/3 majority. 
On the other hand, the opposition would probably require a 
few votes from the FSLN-associated Convergencia to even 
achieve a simple majority, as we can expect some of the PLC 
deputies to remain loyal to Aleman.) 
 
Media Also on the Front Line 
- - -  - - - - - - - - -  - - 
 
6.  (C) The Ambassador raised the special vulnerabilities of 
the media and the education sectors.  Huembes, who shared 
these concerns, commented that the media has been fairly 
active in questioning Ortega's recent actions, including 
PLC-affiliated Radio Corporacion.  The risk is that as the 
"intimidation factor" escalates, the media will become 
increasingly reluctant to speak up, underscoring the need for 
strong support for the opposition media to counter these 
fears.  Genie warned that Cuban and Venezuelan educators and 
military advisers are already starting to arrive and could 
quickly change the panorama. 
 
Oxfam in Ortega's Orbit? 
- - - - - -  - - - - - - 
 
7.  (C) Expanding on the subject of civil society, Carmona 
estimated that about 96% of Nicaragua's NGOs are 
pro-Sandinista, many existing on paper only (this is also 
true for non-Sandinista NGOs).  Of the 470 or so who benefit 
from foreign aid, about 98% are Sandinista, claimed Carmona, 
who noted that clearly the liberals are disadvantaged in this 
field.   He then alerted us to Ortega's appointment of 
Valdrack Jaentschke  (former Sandinista-sympathizing 
coordinator of the UNDP's Atlantic Coast programs), to lead 
the Foreign Ministry's office that controls the disbursements 
of donor funds (largely European) to NGOs that are likely to 
support Ortega's agenda.  Further, Oxfam -- which he claimed 
has been designated by the Scandinavian countries to 
coordinate some $10 million of their assistance to Nicaragua 
-- is sympathetic to Ortega. 
 
CPDH to Continue Cases before IAHCR, Approach Spain 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
8.  (C) Moving on to CPDH's plans, Carmona assured the 
Ambassador that it will continue its cases filed before the 
Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHCR) against Daniel 
Ortega and a number of other Sandinista leaders for their 
alleged atrocities committed against Nicaragua's Atlantic 
Coast indigenous Miskito population during the 1980s.  He 
explained that these continued efforts will dispel Sandinista 
campaign allegations that the CPDH's defense of the Miskitos 
was purely a political ploy to discredit Ortega. 
 
9.  (C) Carmona added that the CPDH intends to bring the 
cases before the Spanish courts, probably by March; the CPDH 
is currently working with a Spanish lawyer to prepare the 
litigation.  Carmona added that some CARICOM member states 
have also shown an interest in helping the Miskitos.  The 
biggest challenge will be financial backing; while the 
Taiwanese used to contribute through the Foreign Ministry, 
now that it is in the hands of the Sandinista government, the 
Taiwanese must find another way to support CPDH's efforts, 
explained Carmona. 
 
Unions Can Also Play a Role 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
10.  (C) Huembes, who is also a leader of CTN, one of 
Nicaragua's unions unaffiliated with the FSLN, suggested that 
labor and union power could also help counter Ortega's 
excesses.  He remarked that a number of FSLN-affiliated 
unions had recently received a letter from FSLN lawmaker 
Gustavo Porras (who owns a number of small private clinics) 
"instructing" these unions that out of loyalty to President 
Ortega they must refrain from striking or collective 
bargaining.  The Ambassador offered to meet with independent 
unions and suggested that Huembes contact the AFL-CIO 
regional representative in Guatemala to seek his guidance. 
At the close of the meeting, the CPDH presented a plaque in 
recognition of the Ambassador's contributions to defending 
human rights in Nicaragua. 
 
Comment 
- - - - 
 
11.  (C) We can be certain that Ortega will do his utmost to 
keep the liberals and other opposition forces divided.  After 
all, these divisions allowed him to win the election, and if 
they continue, will facilitate his plans.  Huembes' 
description of the letter ordering labor unions to refrain 
from striking is a flashback from the 1980s Sandinista era 
and suggests that his mindset has not substantially changed. 
 
 
TRIVELLI