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Viewing cable 07MANAGUA181, BONILLA: LIBERALS MUST MEND THEIR DIFFERENCES OR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MANAGUA181 2007-01-23 17:00 2011-06-21 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Managua
VZCZCXRO5917
PP RUEHLMC
DE RUEHMU #0181/01 0231700
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231700Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8728
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0905
RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAGUA 000181 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KDEM NU
SUBJECT: BONILLA: LIBERALS MUST MEND THEIR DIFFERENCES OR 
LOSE NICARAGUA TO ORTEGA 
 
REF: MANAGUA 0175 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) lawmaker 
Yamileth Bonilla, who heads the National Assembly's Foreign 
Affairs Committee, believes that President Ortega's efforts 
to consolidate his power only days after assuming office have 
shocked the ALN and rival Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) 
into realizing they must either work together or Nicaragua 
will suffer an Ortega regime for at least ten years.  Bonilla 
recently told us that ALN and PLC lawmakers are negotiating 
to downplay their differences and focus instead on their 
shared goal to slow Ortega's apparent rush to change 
Nicaragua's political model.  These modest signs of ALN-PLC 
rapprochement are encouraging, but we can expect the 
Sandinistas and those PLC lawmakers still unequivocally tied 
to Aleman will attempt to derail these efforts.  We will 
continue to encourage opposition lawmakers to seek common 
ground and will reach out to Convergencia legislators and 
FSLN dissidents.  End Summary. 
 
Ortega Shock Therapy Prompts Liberal Rapprochement 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - 
 
2.  (C) ALN National Assembly lawmaker Yamileth Bonilla -- 
who on January 19 was elected president of the Assembly's 
Foreign Affairs Committee -- told PolCouns later the same day 
that President Ortega's rush to consolidate his power only 
days after assuming office has seriously shaken up the ALN 
and the rival Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC).  Bonilla, 
who remarked that the two estranged liberal parties have 
awakened to the harsh reality that either they work together 
or Nicaragua will suffer an Ortega regime for at least ten 
years, opined that PLC caudillo/convicted money launder 
Arnoldo Aleman's influence on the PLC appears to be waning. 
Ortega's evident intentions to alter the course of 
Nicaragua's history along the path of an authoritarian 
Chavez-style regime has been a "shock therapy," for the 
liberals, opined Bonilla. 
 
3.  (C) Bonilla remarked that before Ortega's inauguration, 
Aleman exercised almost total control of PLC lawmakers. 
However, when Ortega assumed office and immediately showed 
his true intentions, many PLC deputies realized that Aleman's 
reliance on Ortega had caused him to sell his party and 
Nicaragua to the Sandinistas.  PolCouns recounted our 1/17th 
meeting (septel) with PLC deputies Maximino Rodriguez (PLC 
caucus leader), Jose Pallais, and Victor Duarte, noting that 
the PLC deputies admitted that "liberal divisions and egos" 
had enabled Ortega to win the election and conceded that 
their differences with the ALN are petty in comparison to the 
threats posed by Ortega.  Rodriguez had also reported that he 
and other PLC deputies are meeting with ALN lawmakers to seek 
a common legislative agenda to offset Ortega's aggressive 
power grab. 
 
4.  (C) Bonilla, who was pleased with our engagement with PLC 
lawmakers, related how earlier in the day she and other ALN 
deputies had met with several of their PLC counterparts -- 
including Maximino Rodriguez, Jose Pallais, Enrique Quinonez, 
Francisco Aguirre Sacasa, Freddy Torrez, and Carlos Noguera. 
The PLC deputies reported that 19 of their members are 
willing to work with the ALN to block Ortega's efforts to 
consolidate his power through legislative reforms, including 
not approving Ortega's goal to "fast track" the passage of 
reforms to Laws 290 and 228.  Rather, they will insist on 
dispatching the proposed revisions to either the Assembly's 
Defense or Judicial Committee for review, she said.  Bonilla 
added that the PLC and ALN jointly hold the majority in both 
committees and can therefore exercise considerable influence 
over the final draft and that she had "persuaded" ALN 
leader/former presidential candidate Eduardo Montealegre to 
support sending the proposed revisions first to committee 
when the Assembly discusses the laws on January 24. 
 
5.  (C) On the subject of Law 290, which covers the 
authorities and duties of the Executive, PolCouns commented 
on the dangers posed by President Ortega's plan to establish 
national "advisory councils" and "community councils" that in 
essence will serve as parallel government structures. 
Through Ortega, the national councils will impose their 
policies on the ministries, while the community councils will 
"guide" the National Assembly, possibly replace the 
traditional role of civil society, and could end up receiving 
the lion's share of development assistance to the detriment 
of non-Sandinista NGOs.  Bonilla, who agreed with this 
assessment, added that she will raise it with ALN caucus as 
well as the other lawmakers representing the other opposition 
parties. 
 
ALN and PLC Focus on Shared Agenda, Confidence Building 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
6.  (C) Expanding on the efforts of ALN and PLC lawmakers to 
minimize their differences to counter Ortega, Bonilla 
explained that the negotiators of both parties are trying to 
set aside the old game of picking off each others' followers 
and instead are focusing on creating a common legislative 
agenda.  While she was hopeful that eventually the two 
liberal parties will form a more formal alliance, perhaps to 
the point of running together for the 2008 municipal 
elections, she acknowledged that for now, the ALN and PLC 
must avoid falling back into the "blame game," and rather, 
strive to build mutual confidence through their shared 
interests. 
 
7.  (C) PolCouns recounted that ALN caucus leader Maria 
Eugenia Sequeira had described to her on January 18 how PLC 
deputy/Assembly Board secretary Wilfredo Navarro had 
"betrayed" the PLC caucus' decision earlier that day to 
oppose the fast-tracking of Laws 290 and 228.  During a 
meeting of the FSLN, ALN, and PLC caucuses with President 
Ortega later in the day, Navarro had "offered up" his party's 
support to vote on the laws the following day.  Sequeira 
opined that Navarro was acting on Aleman's instructions in 
response to Ortega's orders.  Bonilla, who offered a similar 
readout on the incident and noted that Navarro was one of the 
PLC deputies who blocked a number of ALN efforts late last 
year to reengage the PLC outside of Aleman's orbit, then 
shared her frustration over "personal differences" with 
Sequeira.  PolCouns urged Bonilla to set aside these 
differences, as both lawmakers are valuable leaders who can 
each contribute to the daunting task ahead. 
 
But Diverge over Delaying Constitutional Reforms 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
8.  (C) Bonilla explained that earlier in the day the ALN 
caucus had voted with the FSLN to delay the implementation of 
a number of constitutional reforms, which would erode the 
power of the Executive and establish new independent 
regulatory agencies, as part of her party's effort to "break" 
or at least "weaken" Aleman's pact with Ortega.  While she 
recognized that FSLN lawmakers assurances they will "support" 
future Assembly deliberations on Constitutional reforms -- 
including ALN's proposal to end presidential reelection and 
to require a presidential candidate must win at least 50 
percent of the popular vote to win the election on the first 
round -- are tenuous and could instead open a "Pandora's box" 
to a full-fledged constitutional assembly to Ortega's liking. 
 However, at this juncture, any effort to erode the FSLN-PLC 
pact should take precedence, asserted Bonilla. 
 
The Numbers Game 
- - - - - - - - - 
 
9.  (C) Calculating out loud, Bonilla concluded that the sum 
of the ALN's 23 votes (Montealegre and former President 
Bolanos), 19 PLC votes, plus the Sandinista Renovation 
Movement's (MRS) three votes  total 45, just short of the 47 
required for a simple legislative majority.  PolCouns noted 
that with this arrangement, the FSLN plus its allies would no 
longer enjoy a 2/3 majority (56 votes), but it would still 
maintain a simple majority in the Assembly.  PolCouns 
inquired whether any of the Assembly Convergencia lawmakers 
allied with the FSLN might consider voting against the FSLN 
on the proposed reforms to Laws 290 and 228 and other 
legislation, for example Augustin Jarquin or Miriam Arguello. 
 Bonilla, who related that Jarquin and Arguello appear to be 
"uneasy" over Ortega's push to ram through questionable 
legislation and are dissatisfied with the fact he is not 
appointing Convergencia members to his government, agreed 
that Convergencia lawmakers are worth approaching. 
 
Comment 
- - - - 
 
10.  (C) These fledgling signs of ALN-PLC rapprochement are 
encouraging, but as in the past, we can expect that the 
Sandinista and PLC lawmakers unequivocally tied to Aleman 
will once more attempt to derail these efforts.  In addition 
to the seemingly growing divisions in the PLC camp, the ALN 
must contend with its own internal rivalries.  And, 
opposition parties must develop alternatives to the 
Sandinistas' growing network of NGOs offering tangible 
solutions to Nicaraguan communities.  We will continue to 
encourage ALN, PLC, and MRS deputies to seek common ground 
and to develop a campaign for a democratic model based on 
good governance, justice, and accountability.  We will also 
reach out to Convergencia legislators and maintain our 
dialogue with FSLN dissidents like Alejandro Martinez Cuenca. 

TRIVELLI