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Viewing cable 07MANAGUA157, REGIONAL AMBASSADORS SHARE THOUGHTS ON ORTEGA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MANAGUA157 2007-01-19 22:35 2011-06-21 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Managua
VZCZCXRO3455
PP RUEHLMC
DE RUEHMU #0157/01 0192235
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 192235Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8693
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 1565
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0088
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 0461
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 4222
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0208
RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAGUA 000157 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KDEM NU
SUBJECT: REGIONAL AMBASSADORS SHARE THOUGHTS ON ORTEGA 
GOVERNMENT 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 0140 
 
     B. MANAGUA 0106 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4 (b and d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: Ambassadors to Nicaragua from Spain, Mexico, 
Chile, Brazil, and Colombia are concerned that the 
authoritarian tendencies and lack of experience of many 
officials in the Ortega administration, combined with the 
"destabilizing" influence of Venezuelan President Hugo 
Chavez, may negatively influence regional cooperation and 
bilateral relations.  They also believe that Ortega's first 
actions suggest he may intend to "transform" Nicaragua's 
democratic system and replace it with one more in line with 
Venezuela's authoritarian, populist regime.  Several also 
agree that as long as the Liberals are divided politically, 
they cannot form an effective opposition, thereby allowing 
the Sandinistas to manipulate and dominate the National 
Assembly.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) Subsequent to his meeting with Central American 
ambassadors to discuss the initial actions of the Ortega 
administration (ref A), the Ambassador hosted a breakfast on 
January 18 for a group of ambassadors from other regional 
countries and Spain, whose governments could influence the 
direction of the new government.  The following ambassadors 
attended the breakfast: 
 
- Brazil: Victoria Alice Cleaver, Ambassador 
- Chile: Natacha Molina Garcia, Ambassador 
- Colombia: Melba Martinez Lopez, Ambassador 
- Mexico: Columba Marisela Calvo, Ambassador 
- Spain: Jaime Lacadena e Higuera, Ambassador 
 
3. (C) Most of the ambassadors were concerned about the 
populist rhetoric of the inauguration (ref B) and President 
Ortega's attempts during his first days in office to ram 
through laws increasing the power of the presidency.  Several 
ambassadors, led by Columba Calvo of Mexico, bemoaned the 
disorganization of the inauguration events and the numerous 
protocol faux pas committed by its Sandinista organizers. 
Calvo and Colombian ambassador Melba Martinez commented that 
the Sandinistas lack experience running a government, and 
that the scarcity of qualified officials could impact the 
efficiency of regional programs, such as Plan Puebla-Panama. 
Calvo, Martinez, and Lacadena openly wondered about the 
future of bilateral relations with Nicaragua. 
 
4. (C) Ambassador Victoria Cleaver of Brazil recounted her 
experience at the ceremony organized by the National 
University of Engineering (UNI) to grant Chavez an honorary 
doctorate.  The ceremony started four hours late, but 
Cleaver, who was exhausted from enduring the chaotic 
inauguration the day before, was prevented from leaving 
"early" by security personnel until she insisted.  It was an 
offense that she will not soon forget. 
 
5. (C) Chilean Ambassador Natacha Molina tempered the 
discussion by noting "the behavior of eight days does not 
necessarily establish a pattern."  She commented that the 
Sandinistas were correct to make poverty eradication their 
first priority and stated that Chile has the experience and 
expertise to assist Nicaragua in this regard.  Ambassador 
Trivelli responded that Sandinista officials so far seem to 
be hastily assembling dozens of pet projects and initiatives, 
but these efforts are not coordinated in a coherent and 
efficient manner. 
 
6. (C) Ambassador Cleaver expressed her doubt over whether or 
not Nicaragua would be able to avoid becoming a satellite of 
Venezuela.  She noted that Brasilia has suffered a 
"Venezuelan invasion" and "we are not even taking money from 
Chavez."  Cleaver commented on Brazil's role as a moderating 
influence over Chavez' ambitions in the region, and opined 
that her government may be able to pull Ortega towards the 
moderate left.  Ambassador Martinez responded that her 
government shares these concerns and is worried that Chavez 
may destabilize Central America through Nicaragua, further 
opening the door to drug trafficking and the movement of 
terrorists. 
 
7. (C) Ambassador Trivelli asked the group to comment on the 
state of the opposition and any steps we could take to 
reinforce the democratic forces.  Ambassador Lacadena stated 
that so far, only the tiny Sandinista Renovation Movement 
(MRS) has vocally opposed Ortega's actions.  He opined that 
former MRS presidential candidate Edmundo Jarquin could play 
an important role analyzing the policies and actions of the 
Sandinista Front (FSLN), but unfortunately he holds no 
official position within the MRS or civil society.  Lacadena 
agreed that certain deputies in the Liberal Constitutional 
Party (PLC) may be willing to pull away from PLC leader and 
convicted ex-President Arnoldo Aleman to form an alternative 
leadership that would cooperate with the Nicaraguan Liberal 
Alliance (ALN). 
 
8. (C) Comment: Lacadena is well-known and has influence with 
the Nicaraguan political class.  He seems willing to continue 
pre-election efforts to bring the Liberals together and was 
receptive to a suggestion by Ambassador Trivelli to encourage 
former El Salvadoran President Calderon Sol to return to 
Nicaragua and help pull the PLC away from Aleman.  The 
ambassadors agreed that the FSLN will continue efforts to 
keep the Liberals divided and pre-empt concerted opposition 
in the National Assembly.  The left-leaning Brazilian and 
Chilean governments have the opportunity to influence Ortega 
and possibly convince him that their democratic left model is 
a better option than falling under Chavez' orbit of 
influence.  Those ambassadors did seem to warm to the 
suggestions that their governments take small steps in that 
direction, e.g., providing technical assistance on biofuels 
(Brazil) and perhaps sponsoring an economic conference on 
poverty reduction via liberalization (Chile). 
TRIVELLI