Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07MANAGUA140, CENTAM AMBASSADORS CONCERNED ABOUT NICARAGUA'S

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07MANAGUA140.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MANAGUA140 2007-01-18 23:43 2011-06-21 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Managua
VZCZCXRO2127
PP RUEHLMC
DE RUEHMU #0140/01 0182343
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 182343Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8666
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0060
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 0066
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAGUA 000140 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM NU
SUBJECT: CENTAM AMBASSADORS CONCERNED ABOUT NICARAGUA'S 
ROLE IN REGIONAL AFFAIRS 
 
REF: MANAGUA 0106 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4 (b and d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: Central American ambassadors in Nicaragua 
were startled by the populist rhetoric and procession of 
infamous guests surrounding the inauguration of President 
Daniel Ortega (reftel), but maintain a cautious optimism that 
regional and international agreements will constrain the 
Ortega administration's scope of action.  The ambassadors 
agreed on the need to publicize the benefits of CAFTA to 
regional economies and have been somewhat mollified by 
Ortega's promises to respect the rights of international 
investors and preserve relations with Taiwan.  They also 
believe that, as neighbors, their countries can engage the 
Nicaraguan government and help offset the negative influence 
of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez on Ortega.  Several 
commented on Ortega's margin of victory and "minority 
government," wondering how the Liberals will ultimately 
relate to themselves and the Sandinistas.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) Ambassador Trivelli hosted a group of Central American 
ambassadors for breakfast on January 17 to discuss the 
ramifications of Daniel Ortega's return to power on regional 
affairs.  The ambassadors were dismayed by Ortega's populist 
rhetoric during the inauguration, his accession to agreements 
with Venezuela, and proposals to alter laws governing the 
Government and Defense ministries without public 
consultation.  "He is behaving as though he has a clear 
mandate even though he only won with 38 percent of the vote," 
they commented.  The ambassadors were hopeful, however, that 
regional and international agreements such as CAFTA and the 
Central American Integration System (SICA) can constrain his 
actions.  They also agreed that Secretary Leavitt's health 
initiative, which was shared with most of them during 
bilateral meetings held on the margins of the inauguration, 
would be critical in helping Central America "catch up" with 
other countries in the region.  The following chiefs of 
mission attended the breakfast: 
 
- Costa Rica: Manuel Barrantes, Charge d'Affaires 
- El Salvador: Jose Roberto Francisco Imendia Maza, Ambassador 
- Honduras: Jorge Milla Reyes, Ambassador 
- Guatemala: Jorge R. Echeverria Roldan, Ambassador 
- Panama: Miguel Lecaro Barcenas, Ambassador 
 
3. (C) Several ambassadors made the point that "times have 
changed," so that the Sandinistas' behavior will not be as 
radical as in the 1980s.  "The Sandinistas are older now -- 
they have less hair and more children, grandchildren, and 
investments," commented Barrantes.  Milla wondered how long 
Ortega would be able to keep up his "double talk," and Lecaro 
responded, referring to Panamanian President Torrijos' 
relationship with Chavez, that one can be publicly polite and 
privately pragmatic (Torrijos realizes that Chavez is 
"unstable").  Echeverria mentioned that the other CentAm 
presidents can work through SICA to constrain Ortega, and 
that Guatemala can exercise a moderating influence as the 
country in charge of regional economic affairs. 
 
4. (C) The ambassadors are skeptical of Chavez' Bolivarian 
Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), especially as they have 
not seen any details of the agreement, and mentioned the need 
to publicize CAFTA and its success thus far as a 
counterbalance.  Ambassador Trivelli noted that CAFTA is an 
extensively negotiated treaty that underwent a thorough 
public vetting in each country.  Imendia mentioned that El 
Salvador has already enjoyed a significant GDP boost from 
CAFTA, and Milla encouraged the group to educate the Central 
American public regarding the benefits of CAFTA.  Imendia 
suggested that holding a regional conference on CAFTA would 
help promote the trade agreement.  The Ambassador, who 
remarked that President Saca had raised this idea during his 
meeting with Secretary Leavitt, suggested holding such a 
meeting in Managua to allow the Nicaraguan government to 
appreciate CAFTA's importance first-hand. 
 
5. (C) Some of the ambassadors commented on pre- and 
post-inauguration meetings with Ortega where the new 
President pledged not to disrupt the status quo in a number 
of areas.  Ortega assured El Salvadoran President Saca that 
El Salvadoran investors in Nicaragua would be respected. 
Honduran President Zelaya pointed out to Ortega that the 
Central American relationship with Taiwan has been of mutual 
benefit to the region and urged Ortega not to switch official 
recognition to the PRC.  (Note: Milla also remarked that 
Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian thanked Zelaya at Ortega's 
inauguration for his efforts.  End Note.) 
 
6. (C) Regarding Ortega's ability to enact wide-ranging 
reforms, several ambassadors noted that the Sandinistas are a 
minority in the National Assembly.  Milla wondered when and 
if the Liberals will finally put aside their differences and 
form a real opposition to the Sandinistas.  Ambassador 
Trivelli responded that the future of the Liberals is 
dependent on the Liberal Constitutional Party's (PLC) 
relationship with convicted party leader Arnoldo Aleman, who 
is essentially Ortega's hostage.  He commented on El 
Salvadoran ex-President Calderon Sol's pre-election efforts 
to separate Aleman from the PLC and suggested Calderon Sol's 
efforts might bear more fruit in the post-election 
environment.  (Note: On January 18, the Ambassador suggested 
to Spanish Ambassador Jaime de la Cadena that a return visit 
of Calderon to Managua to meet with Nicaraguan Liberal 
leaders, including National Assembly lawmakers representing 
the Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) and the Nicaraguan 
Liberal Alliance (ALN) might help to encourage them to mend 
their differences.  The Spaniard was receptive to the idea. 
End Note.) 
 
7. (C) Comment: Nicaragua's neighbors are understandably 
concerned if Nicaragua's domestic problems spill over the 
borders.  The Guatemalan ambassador noted that "when 
Nicaragua coughs, Guatemala develops a fever," while the 
Costa Rican warned that "if Nicaragua coughs, Costa Rica 
catches pneumonia."   We will continue to consult with the 
Central American ambassadors on the most effective ways to 
publicize CAFTA's successes and the use of regional 
mechanisms to counteract Chavez' influence in the region. 
The ambassadors agreed to continue to hold regular meetings 
to evaluate the actions of the Ortega administration. 
TRIVELLI