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Viewing cable 07LONDON374, UK PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE HEARS POSITIVE VIEWS ON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07LONDON374 2007-01-29 17:17 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy London
VZCZCXRO1566
RR RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHLO #0374/01 0291717
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 291717Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1566
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 000374 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MNUC PARM MOPS UK
SUBJECT: UK PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE HEARS POSITIVE VIEWS ON 
RENEWAL OF UK STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENT 
 
 
 1. (SBU) Summary: The Defense Select Committee of the UK 
House of Commons met with five experts in nuclear arms and 
defense policy on January 23 to hear views on HMG's recent 
white paper endorsing a renewal of the UK's existing 
submarine-based nuclear deterrent.  Although the MPs heard 
some voices in opposition to the timing of the government's 
plans to upgrade its existing nuclear submarine force, the 
general consensus of the experts was that UK national 
security requirements, even in a post-Cold War world, require 
a nuclear deterrent.  End Summary. 
 
Views of UK and U.S. Experts 
 
2. (U) The Defense Committee asked a group of US and UK think 
tank-based experts to testify on the Blair Government's 
recent publication, "The Future of the UK's Strategic Nuclear 
Deterrent:  The White Paper," which spelled out the UK 
Government's decision to retain and upgrade Britain's 
submarine-based nuclear deterrent capability.  The experts 
appearing before the committee: 
 
-Prof. Richard L. Garwin of the U.S. National Academy of 
Sciences 
-Mr. Paul Ingram of the British American Security Information 
Council (BASIC) 
-Dr. Stephen Pullinger of the International Security 
Information Service (ISIS) Europe 
-Dr. Jeremy Stocker of the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (IISS) 
-Dr. Lee Willett of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) 
 
3.  (U) The focus of the hearing, led by the Committee's 
chairman James Arbuthnot, a Conservative Party MP, was to 
review the arguments put forward by the Blair Government for 
retention and renewal of the UK's current deterrent 
capability.  Key points made at the hearing are summarized 
below. 
 
Deterrent Still Needed, But When to Build? 
 
4.  (SBU) The MPs heard a general consensus from the experts 
-- with the exception of Ingram (BASIC) -- that the Blair 
Government's decision to replace the existing Trident system 
was the right one, despite some drawbacks.  Asked for an 
overall assessment, Stocker of the IISS said that although 
there were gaps, the White Paper "got everything right."  Dr. 
Pullinger (ISIS) endorsed retaining a nuclear deterrent, but 
told MPs that the White Paper underestimated the threat to UK 
national security of WMD proliferation to non-state actors 
and did not prioritize it highly enough in laying out the 
case for a nuclear deterrent.  RUSI's Willett endorsed the 
decision to retain and upgrade the existing system, as well 
as praised the Government's "comprehensive" policy paper, 
though he acknowledged the paper lacked details on deterrence 
policy and counter-proliferation because these issues are 
difficult to discuss in a public document. 
 
5.  (U) Ingram, the most critical of the witnesses about the 
Government's plans, said the White Paper demonstrated 
overcautiousness and "institutional momentum" in refusing to 
consider dramatic new policies, such as disarmament.  Ingram 
argued that non-nuclear states would consider London's 
decision to renew its nuclear capability "provocative" and a 
breech of its NPT commitments to eliminate nuclear weapons. 
 
6.  (SBU) Professor Garwin of the U.S. National Academy of 
Science argued that the White Paper's recommendation to begin 
construction of additional submarines was premature.  He 
noted that in 1998 the U.S. extended the service life of its 
Vanguard-class subs from 30 to 40-45 years.  Considering the 
U.S. subs spend two-thirds of their lives at sea, whereas the 
British Vanguards spend only one-quarter of their time at 
sea, Garwin questioned the White Paper's assertion that the 
UK's subs would have to be retired in 2023-2029 and argued 
that they could be extended at least an additional 15 years 
like their U.S. counterparts.  Garwin's argument was 
rebutted, however, by RUSI's Willett who noted that the UK's 
Vanguard submarines were a less expensive model than the U.S. 
sub force (Embassy Comment: A point confirmed to us by the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.  End comment) so the 
lifespan of the UK submarine force and the impact of its 
shorter operational deployment schedule could not be 
extrapolated from a strict comparison to the U.S. force. 
 
Procurement Capabilities 
------------------------ 
7.  (U) Much of the Committee's interest focused on the 
experts' views of the optimal time frame required for 
developing a successor submarine-based nuclear force. 
Professor Garwin explained that costs often rise during 
 
LONDON 00000374  002 OF 002 
 
 
production, therefore it was speculative for the White Paper 
to argue that it is more cost effective to replace rather 
than refurbish the existing force.  He argued that a 
refurbishment to extend the current force by 10 years would 
allow HMG to invest in a smaller, more advanced submarine and 
missile system later on.  (Comment: Garwin also argued in his 
written submission, but not in person, that the UK's security 
is more imperiled than supported than supported by the 
existence of nuclear weapons.  End Comment.)  Asked if the 
White Paper's warnings were exaggerated about valuable 
submarine-building skills within the UK work force being lost 
if new submarines were not ordered now, Ingram replied these 
skills are transferable and could be brought back to the UK 
when needed, so it would be advantageous to delay the 
decision on a new replacement to allow Parliament and the 
British people to reach a full consensus on a deterrent. 
Willett of RUSI disagreed, saying further delay would cost 
more because a three-year refurbishment would be so costly 
and only extend the UK submarines lifespan by 10 years. 
 
Comment 
------- 
8.  (SBU) The expert witnesses by and large did not question 
the Blair Government's recommendation to continue as a 
nuclear weapon state, mirroring the apparent consensus on 
this decision within Parliament and much of the British 
media.  The exception were Ingram and Garwin, who argued that 
doing so would harm the UK's counter-proliferation goals. 
The most heated discussion arose when Professor Garwin, the 
American expert, advocated delaying the decision to build a 
new sub force because a delay would not threaten the British 
sub building skill base, a claim made in HMG's White Paper. 
 
9. (U) For copies of the written testimonies by the experts, 
please e-mail Terrence M. Dillon at DillonTM@state.gov 
 
Visit London's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/london/index. cfm 
Tuttle