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Viewing cable 07LONDON263, HMG REQUESTS POLONIUM TESTING FEEDBACK FROM CDC;

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07LONDON263 2007-01-23 13:15 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy London
VZCZCXRO5679
OO RUEHAG RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLZ RUEHROV
DE RUEHLO #0263/01 0231315
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 231315Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1420
RUEHPH/CDC ATLANTA GA IMMEDIATE
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 2129
RUEHBL/AMCONSUL BELFAST PRIORITY 0691
RUEHED/AMCONSUL EDINBURGH PRIORITY 0666
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 000263 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO CDC DR. CHARLES MILLER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL CASC PTER UK
SUBJECT: HMG REQUESTS POLONIUM TESTING FEEDBACK FROM CDC; 
CLAIMS POTENTIAL PRESS ISSUE 
 
REF: 06 LONDON 8249 
 
LONDON 00000263  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  (U) This is an action request.  Please see para 6. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY: The UK Health Protection Agency requests 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention provide 
laboratory test results on the U.S. residents potentially 
exposed to polonium in London.  The UK Health Protection 
Agency desire for the results of these tests is not only for 
their own analysis, but also to avoid a potential public 
relations problem if asked by the press if HMG has received 
any feedback on laboratory test results from the USG.  The 
FCO has also inquired about the test results.  END SUMMARY. 
 
3.  (SBU) BACKGROUND: Following the polonium-210 incident in 
December 2006, the UK Health Protection Agency (HPA) and FCO 
provided post with several lists containing the names of 
Amcits who were visiting the UK and may have been to areas 
that were affected by polonium-210 (reftel).  CA/OCS/ACS/EUR 
remains post's primary POC to pass information, specifically 
the names of Amcits from HMG who may have been in the 
affected polonium-210 areas.  Post understands that 
CA/OCS/ACS/EUR sent the Amcits names provided by HMG to the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).  Post 
further understands that the CDC has either contacted the 
Amcits directly or forwarded the names to the respective 
state health departments for contacting.  On January 5, 2007, 
HPA Director for Emergency Response, Dr. Nigel Lightfoot, 
emailed a letter to CDC Dr. Charles Miller 1) providing a 
summary of HPA efforts to date, 2) inviting CDC to visit for 
a further update on the HPA risk assessment and follow-up of 
individuals potentially exposed, and 3) requesting 
information of how many of the 140 U.S. residents potentially 
exposed had received follow-up examinations, how many had 
urine tests, and if the results could be shared with HMG. 
END BACKGROUND. 
 
4.  (SBU) On January 17, EST Counselor, ESTOff and MEDOff met 
with HPA Dr. Lightfoot and his staff to discuss lessons 
learned in response to the polonium incident (septel).  Dr. 
Lightfoot raised his January 5 request to CDC and explained 
that of the cases the UK is trying to follow-up with, 
one-third of the individuals reside in the U.S.  Dr. 
Lightfoot believes the CDC may find it difficult to respond 
to the request due to legal issues and/or logistical issues 
of trying to get information back from state health agencies. 
 Dr. Lightfoot claims this, however, raises a potential 
USG-HMG public relations problem as it is possible that at 
some point the press will start asking how many people were 
affected by the polonium-210 incident, what countries were 
they from, were these individuals contacted, and did the 
countries whose citizens were potentially affected provide 
laboratory test results back to HMG.  (COMMENT: The British 
press corps may spin this story in a way that portrays the 
USG not cooperating with HMG.  END COMMENT.)  ESTOff 
explained that due to the U.S. federal-state system, the CDC 
may be having difficulty receiving feedback from the state 
health departments.  Dr. Lightfoot stated that he foresees a 
potential problem in which HMG states that it provided names 
to the USG, but never received laboratory test results in 
return.  Dr. Lightfoot reiterated his offer for CDC, or other 
appropriate officials, to visit London as soon as possible to 
discuss this issue further and develop a joint USG-HMG 
position on what to say publicly regarding the potential for 
risk to individuals. 
 
5.  (SBU) On January 10, the FCO's Russia desk asked PolOff 
if the USG had any information on whether any of the Amcits 
that were identified by HMG as potentially being at risk had 
reported any medical issues after notification.  The FCO 
explained that if HMG brings any criminal charges against 
those responsible, the prosecutors will want to bring the 
most complete indictments possible, and therefore it would be 
useful to have any information on Amcits impacted by the 
incident.  The FCO indicated that this was not a formal 
request at this point, rather just an effort to determine if 
the USG was keeping any records on those notified, and if we 
knew if anyone was affected. 
 
6.  (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Post request Department encourage 
CDC to provide as much information as possible back to HMG. 
Additionally, Post requests the Department encourage CDC, or 
 
LONDON 00000263  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
other appropriate officials, to visit the UK as soon as 
possible, to meet with HPA officials and discuss a joint 
strategy on what to say publicly regarding the potential for 
risk to individuals.  Although a meeting in London would be 
best, another option might be to setup a conference call or 
video conference.  Post stands ready to assist as needed. 
END ACTION REQUEST. 
 
Visit London's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/london/index. cfm 
Johnson