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Viewing cable 07KUWAIT48, KUWAITIS SKEPTICAL ABOUT PRESIDENT'S NEW IRAQ

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KUWAIT48 2007-01-14 14:55 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kuwait
VZCZCXRO7831
PP RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHKU #0048/01 0141455
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 141455Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8049
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 000048 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/I AND NEA/ARP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KMDR IZ KU KUWAIT IRAQ RELATIONS
SUBJECT: KUWAITIS SKEPTICAL ABOUT PRESIDENT'S NEW IRAQ 
STRATEGY 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary: Although the Kuwaiti government welcomed 
the President's new Iraq strategy, the Kuwaiti public was 
more skeptical.  While praising the strategy's ultimate goal 
of stabilizing Iraq, Kuwaitis expressed doubt that a 
temporary increase in the number of troops would achieve this 
objective.  Some editorialists also took the opportunity to 
criticize the Administration for what they perceive as the 
failure of other U.S. policies in the region, most notably 
with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  End summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) Quoting an unnamed government source, Kuwait News 
Agency (KUNA) reported January 11 that Kuwait "followed with 
interest" the President's speech outlining his new strategy 
on Iraq.  "Kuwait hopes this plan will be a constructive step 
to tackle the deteriorating security situation, and 
contribute to achieving security and stability...within a 
free, secured and united Iraq," KUNA reported.  Khaled 
Al-Jarallah, the Undersecretary at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, told the Ambassador the GOK believed it was "a great 
plan" and hoped it would succeed. 
 
3.  (SBU) Among the Kuwaiti public, however, the President's 
new Iraq strategy was greeted with more skepticism.  While 
supporting the goal of stabilizing Iraq, Kuwaitis questioned 
whether the strategy would be more effective than previous 
approaches in achieving that objective.  Dr. Abdullah Sahar, 
a Shi'a political science professor at Kuwait University, 
told Poloff January 14 that he was pleased that the new 
strategy showed that the U.S. had learned the lesson that 
control of Baghdad was essential to controlling the rest of 
Iraq.  However, he urged U.S. to make decisions based on 
military, not political considerations.  Sahar argued that 
providing jobs and essential services to Iraqis was more 
important than cracking down on the militias and would 
ultimately lead to a political solution.  He also advised the 
U.S. to "keep your eye on the ball (i.e. Iraq)," rather than 
getting distracted by other regional problems.  In a separate 
January 14 conversation, former Shi'a Minister of Information 
Dr. Saad bin Teflah told Poloff he was not optimistic that 
the President's new strategy would succeed.  He argued that 
the U.S. must do two things to stabilize the situation in 
Iraq: first, listen to its "old friends" in the Arab world; 
and second, clearly elaborate its policy on Iran, which 
strongly affected regional perceptions of events in Iraq. 
 
4.  (SBU) Editorialists generally echoed these views. 
Liberal columnist Dr. Ayed Al-Manna wrote in Al-Watan (local 
Arabic daily) January 13, "The new strategy of (President 
Bush) may constitute a workable and basic blueprint to 
control the state of turmoil currently prevalent in Iraq, but 
this measure will not be better than the earlier plans since 
they have not been translated into deeds on the ground."  He 
went on to advise the U.S. to "start another war (against 
insurgents in Iraq) to provide security and stability for all 
Iraqis."  Liberal lawyer and columnist Mohammed Al-Saleh 
echoed this view, saying "I don't think this new 
strategy...will help solve the disputes and wars in the 
Middle East."  He argued that America's sophisticated 
weaponry was useless against suicide bombers and IEDs. 
Al-Saleh characterized the conflict in Iraq as a struggle 
between Iran, Syria, and the Iraqi Ba'ath Party on one hand 
and the U.S. and the Iraqi government on the other, and 
concluded by emphasizing that "containing tensions in the 
Middle East rests on containing their causes." 
 
5.  (SBU) Some were more critical and used the opportunity to 
criticize other U.S. policies in the region.  In a January 13 
editorial in Al-Qabas (local Arabic daily), former Shi'a 
Member of Parliament Dr. Abdul Mohsen Jamal accused President 
Bush of "turning a deaf ear" to the many voices calling for a 
different approach and only listening "to the Republican 
hawks who are known to sympathize with the Zionists."  Jamal, 
who is often critical of the U.S. and supportive of Iran in 
his writings, added that the President was only looking to 
blame the Iraqi government and regional states for U.S. 
failures in Iraq.  He concluded by advising the GCC 2 against 
supporting "a new war to be waged by the U.S. 
administration." 
 
6.  (SBU) Another pro-Iran, anti-American Shi'a columnist, 
Dr. Sami Khalifa claimed the United States' "failure to 
dominate (Iraq's) national resources" had caused the 
President to "lose his balance."  President Bush "is 
currently thinking of drowning the whole region in a state of 
sedition among various sects and doctrines," he claimed.  In 
a separate January 13 editorial, Salafi Islamist columnist 
Ahmed Al-Kaus took a slightly more neutral tone, but warned 
that the U.S. was seeking "to involve our countries once 
again in a losing war of which we will be the first victims." 
 
KUWAIT 00000048  002 OF 002 
 
 
 He identified the "hateful sectarianism against the Sunnis 
(in Iraq) at the hands of the death militias" as the primary 
problem facing that country. 
 
********************************************* * 
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s 
 
Visit Kuwait's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ 
********************************************* * 
LeBaron