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Viewing cable 07KABUL99, IDPS, URBANIZATION AND THE CHANGING FACE OF AFGHAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KABUL99 2007-01-10 09:52 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO4161
OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHIK RUEHKUK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #0099/01 0100952
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 100952Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5368
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC 0276
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3508
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3397
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6667
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 2009
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000099 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS, SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR PRM/FO (DAS GREENE), PRM/ANE, SCA/FO, S/CRS, SCA/A, STATE 
PASS TO USAID FOR AID/SAA (KEYVANSHAD), 
REL NATO/AUST/NZ/ISAF 
 
E.O. 12958 N/A 
TAGS: PREF PREL PGOV AF
 
SUBJECT:  IDPS, URBANIZATION AND THE CHANGING FACE OF AFGHAN 
POVERTY 
 
1.  SUMMARY:  Ebbing and flowing tides of Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDPs) have been a constant feature of the Afghan landscape 
for, at least, the past thirty years.  Events in recent years seem 
only to mirror, in many ways,  similar displacements following the 
Soviet invasion, the civil strife under the mujaheddin in the 1990s 
and the Taliban's seizure of power.  These events drove over five 
million Afghans into exile and displaced millions more.  A 
fundamental difference this time, however, is that there are other 
forces at work. These forces, coupled with the continuing conflict 
in the south, southeast and east of the country, may be pushing 
Afghanistan to the brink of a chronic "displacement/urbanization" 
crisis, a crisis which will have important implications for the 
efforts of the Afghan Government and the U.S.-led international 
donor community to achieve political stability and economic 
development.  END SUMMARY 
- 
----------------------- 
SOURCES OF DISPLACEMENT 
----------------------- 
 
2.  Given Afghanistan's recent history, it is a tragic irony that 
the displacements generated by the effects of the on-going 
insurgency in the south are, in strictly numerical terms, dwarfed by 
other long-term factors.  The most recent UNHCR-supplied figures 
(October 2006) estimate that 20,000 families (approx. 134,000 
people) have been displaced by recent ISAF offensives aimed at 
uprooting Taliban from areas of the south and east.  Though tragic, 
these numbers pale by comparison to the number of people displaced 
by Afghanistan's on-going drought and by the number driven from 
their place of origin in search of livelihood as a result of the 
destruction visited upon Afghanistan's economy by thirty-plus years 
of warfare and instability. 
 
3.  Though exact numbers are hard to come by in a place such as 
Afghanistan, one has only to look at certain subjective indicators 
to realize the multidimensional nature of the crisis afflicting 
Afghanistan's population.  The first such indicator is the current 
state of Afghan agriculture and agricultural infrastructure. 
 
4.  Prior to 1979, 85% of Afghanistan's people made their living 
from agriculture.  The neglect and often-intentional destruction 
that thirty years of warfare have wrought upon Afghanistan's 
agricultural infrastructure will take generations to repair. 
Hundreds of miles of irrigation canals, built up over centuries, 
were intentionally destroyed or have fallen into disrepair and been 
left to fill with weeds and gravel.  The skills needed to maintain 
these underground systems have, in many cases, been lost.  The 
importance of these structures, a critical element in the sort of 
"dry land" agriculture traditionally practiced throughout 
Afghanistan, cannot be underestimated.  Once known as the 
"breadbasket of Afghanistan," the Shomali Plains, are now a 
semi-wasteland, scarred by years of war, landmines and drought. 
Throughout the country, thousands of hectares of orchards have been 
destroyed, used for firewood or allowed to go wild.  Rangelands that 
were once used to raise hundreds of thousands of goats, sheep and 
dairy and beef cattle have been seeded with landmines and allowed to 
go sere and useless. 
 
5.  Couple this destruction with the results of an on-going drought 
which, according to a recent UNDP estimate, has left 1.9 million 
people in 22 provinces facing chronic food and water insecurity.  As 
a result, agriculture, the traditional economic mainstay for the 
majority of Afghans, can no longer provide a viable source of 
livelihood for anything like the percentage of the population it 
once supported.  Afghanistan has become a country in which a large 
segment of the population now faces a decision; whether to stay in 
place and depend indefinitely upon assistance (especially food 
assistance) to support their family or to uproot their family, 
abandon their traditional lifestyle and seek their livelihood 
elsewhere.  The dramatic growth of Kabul stands as evidence of the 
choice being made. 
- 
 
KABUL 00000099  002 OF 003 
 
 
-------- 
THE CITY 
-------- 
 
6.  A century ago, Kabul was a city of, perhaps, 50,000 people.  As 
recently as 1990, after a decade of conflict had left the 
countryside ravaged, the city's population was approximately 
1,000,000.  The population dropped to well below a million during 
the Civil War in the mid 1990s when Kabul was on the front lines. 
Today, the population is fast approaching - if it hasn't already 
surpassed -- 4,000,000.  Some less formal estimates put the 
population at 4.5 million.  The city's population grew by an average 
of 15% per year between 1999 and 2002.  The return of 4.7 million 
refugees from Pakistan and Iran since 2002 has accelerated that rate 
significantly.  Afghanistan's annual population growth rate is 2.6%. 
 The rural growth rate, however, stands at only 2.3% while the urban 
growth rate is 4.7%.  These figures principally reflect the growth 
of Kabul, as Afghanistan's other urban centers (Kandahar, Herat, 
Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad and Kunduz) have seen some growth, but 
nothing of a similar magnitude. 
 
7.  A June 2006 World Bank report on urban poverty in Afghanistan 
estimated that 80% of Kabul's population (covering 70% of the city) 
is "informally" housed in unplanned neighborhoods which the 
municipal government does not recognize, often with no clear land 
title and little or no access to basic services and social 
infrastructure.  Most have no access to basic health care, to 
education or, even, to safe drinking water.  The same study notes 
that, in 2004, only 0.5% of Kabul's population was officially 
considered to be "homeless" (with 10,000 living in tents and another 
5,000 living in abandoned, destroyed government buildings).  This 
percentage of "homeless" has undoubtedly grown in the two 
interceding years, as in-migration has continued while housing and 
construction costs have soared.  The great majority of these urban 
poor relies upon informal employment which lacks protection and 
income security.  Most often this entails casual, hourly labor or 
self employment.  The two fastest growing sectors, construction and 
retail, rely heavily upon such labor. 
- 
----------------------- 
ONE PART OF THE PROBLEM 
----------------------- 
 
8.  Many efforts, such as USAID's, are underway to address various 
aspects of this dislocation.  USAID's Ag Program has made some 
inroads in addressing the damage done to Afghanistan's agricultural 
infrastructure.  Strides have been made in improving irrigation, 
rebuilding farm-to-market roads and repairing irrigation structures. 
 Six hundred and five kilometers of irrigation canals have been 
rehabilitated, and 22,000 Afghans are employed in cash-for-work 
projects.  Significant efforts have been undertaken to establish a 
micro-credit system for Afghan farmers and to rebuild the marketing 
infrastructure destroyed by thirty years of conflict.  USDA, working 
with USAID and the PRTs,  has focused upon watershed, dam and canal 
construction and repair, karez (cistern) replenishment and cleanout, 
and general irrigation projects.  These efforts also benefited 
thousands of rural residents.  These efforts are critical but their 
impact will not come soon enough to address the immediate needs of 
many of Afghanistan's rural poor.  As in most sectors, the sheer 
magnitude of the task dwarfs the resources available. 
- 
 
 
------------ 
ANOTHER PART 
------------ 
 
9.  There is also a cultural shift at work here.  This is 
particularly, but not exclusively, noticeable among refugee 
returnees, most of whom spent their exile in urban or semi-urban 
settings.  In January 2004, an "unexpectedly high" 42% of returnees 
reported that they intended to settle in urban areas upon their 
 
KABUL 00000099  003 OF 003 
 
 
return to Afghanistan.  Many (46% according to a recent UNHCR/ILO 
report) acquired new skills while in exile; all acquired new 
expectations.  The same January 2004 UNHCR report noted that, "Many 
refugees have got used to an urban life style, no matter how 
rudimentary, and [upon their return to Afghanistan] they are 
congregating, as would be expected, in urban areas.  [...]  Further, 
continuing conflict is also likely to spur some internal migration 
to Kabul and other towns. If the recent experience of Iran and 
Pakistan is any indicator, Afghanistan is facing a major urban 
expansion, fueled partly by the return of refugees." 
- 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
10.  While a significant majority of Afghans continue to reside in a 
rural setting, that percentage is steadily declining.  For a number 
of structural and sociological reasons - including the 
aforementioned destruction and changing cultural expectations - it 
is logical to assume this trend will continue well into the future. 
Rural poverty remains the central feature in the Afghan equation 
but, as a result of the dislocations noted above, urban poverty is 
becoming an increasingly important component.  Most poverty 
alleviation programs funded by international donors focus, 
disproportionately, upon restoring Afghanistan's agricultural 
sector.  Focusing assistance programs only upon rural poverty risks 
missing the dynamic part of the needs picture in Afghanistan.  As 
has happened in much of the developing world, the urbanization of 
poverty is fundamentally altering the picture in Afghanistan and 
reshaping the challenges ahead.