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Viewing cable 07KABUL28, NEW AFGHAN NATIONAL COMMUNICATION COORDINATION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KABUL28 2007-01-04 10:16 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO8791
PP RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #0028/01 0041016
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 041016Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5180
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3501
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000028 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT, 
EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN 
OSD FOR KIMMITT 
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV AF PREL PTER MOPS
SUBJECT: NEW AFGHAN NATIONAL COMMUNICATION COORDINATION 
CENTER ESTABLISHED 
 
1. (U) SUMMARY:  With active encouragement and support from 
the international community (IC) and especially Embassy 
Kabul, the Government of Afghanistan established the National 
Communication Coordinating Center (known as the NCCC or NC3) 
in early December 2006.  Although the GOA is still 
identifying adequate personnel and operating resources to 
make the NC3 fully operational, a small team of international 
(primarily U.S.) advisors and Afghan support staff, working 
full-time since the Center,s approval by the Policy Action 
Group, has already begun to show the GOA how, through 
coordinated planning and consistent messages, to improve 
public perceptions of the country,s progress in general and 
the GOA's own performance in particular. END SUMMARY 
 
Need for Better Strategic Communications 
---------------------------------------- 
 
2. (U) The May 29, 2006 riots in Kabul and the growing 
insurgency in the South focused the international donor and 
military's attention on the Government of Afghanistan,s 
(GOA) inability to communicate effectively with its own 
citizens.  Publicity about reconstruction and development 
efforts was limited to announcements of awards of new money, 
with no follow-on stories about completion of projects or 
improvements in delivery of services.  On the security side, 
publicity focused on military actions and casualty counts. 
The GOA had no pro-active message on the reasons for 
permitting Coalition Forces to pursue terrorists on Afghan 
soil nor the purpose of inviting NATO/ISAF forces to assist 
in providing security. 
 
3. (U) This lack of GOA strategic communications was first 
taken up during the July 2006 creation of the Policy Action 
Group (PAG) which consists of three pillars )- security, 
intelligence, and reconstruction/development )- and a 
Strategic Communications Working Group (SCWG), led by the 
GOA,s Minister of Information (rather than by the 
President,s Office, as the IC had recommended) to coordinate 
public diplomacy activities in pursuit of the PAG,s 
objectives.  The SCWG meets weekly in response to a primary 
Presidential Directive to help reconnect the central 
government to the citizens in the South, primarily using 
traditional means of communications. 
 
4. (U) During the SCWG,s formative first three months, 
Embassy Kabul DCM represented the U.S. at its meetings.  A 
USAID contractor, whose services the Embassy provided to the 
SCWG full-time, also attended as did U.S. military PAOs from 
ISAF and CFC-A.  Embassy Kabul PAO, who chairs the 
Mission-wide Joint Public Affairs Coordinating Committee 
(JPACC), now serves as the Embassy's representative.  Three 
SCWG sub-groups )- security, traditional communications, and 
reconstruction and development )- meet weekly to develop and 
recommend appropriate public diplomacy tools in these three 
areas. 
 
5. (U) To guarantee the implementation of SCWG 
recommendations, the U.S. proposed in September 2006 the 
establishment of a SCWG media war room, using existing GOA 
resources and USAID contractor support.  SCWG became 
convinced of the utility of a Secretariat that could address 
the public affairs issues relating to the situation in the 
South.  By late November, in close collaboration with two 
U.S. Army Public Affairs and Operations Specialists from 
CFC-A, and with the active support and encouragement of the 
Embassy, a senior staff member of the GOA,s National 
Security Council had developed, and the PAG had approved, a 
plan very similar to that originally proposed by the U.S. 
The NCCC was thus established. 
 
Role of NCCC and Staffing Plans 
------------------------------- 
 
6. (U) The NCCC takes direction and gets approval for its 
 
KABUL 00000028  002 OF 003 
 
 
proposals at the weekly meetings of the SCWG, but it operates 
under the day-to-day leadership of a senior member of the 
GOA,s National Security Council.  The NCCC is designed to 
provide Afghan citizens information about reform and 
reconstruction efforts.  Its other main function is to 
coordinate the communications efforts of ministries and 
provincial governors in order to create a frequent and steady 
flow of information on improvements in security, development 
and governance. 
 
7. (U) USAID quickly provided a funding mechanism to hire six 
Afghan professionals to form a Secretariat for the NCCC and 
SCWG.  These positions are expected to be filled in 
mid-January. The British Embassy will provide an operating 
budget for the Kabul-based Center.  NATO/ISAF, CFC-A and the 
US Embassy have all seconded full-time international 
communications advisors to the NCCC.  The U.S. advisor, 
funded by USAID, brings a staff of four Afghan professionals, 
with four more positions pending, one each for the four 
Southern provinces.  The NCCC team works from a large former 
private residence, provided by the GOA,s NSC, at which all 
SCWG meetings are now held.  If all goes according to plan, 
the Center will ultimately include press conference 
facilities as well as a center from which journalists 
covering events can file reports.  Meanwhile, the GOA has 
also provided its own funding for programmatic use pending 
the receipt of appropriate proposals. 
 
NCCC Products: Off To A Good Start 
---------------------------------- 
 
8. (U) In its first month of operation, even without a full 
staff, the NCCC has begun producing useful communications 
products, including pocket-sized thematic message cards which 
are delivered weekly to all Ministers, Ambassadors, generals 
and other principals.  An opportunity was also seized to use 
Hajjis returning to Kandahar to deliver positive messages to 
friends and relatives who would be welcoming them home after 
their 40 day pilgrimage.  This simple brochure, which 
features photos of President Karzai,s inspiring visit to 
Kandahar province in December, delivers the message that the 
Government of Afghanistan helps all Afghans fulfill their 
obligations to get an education and go on the Hajj.  It tells 
Hajjis they have a responsibility to help communities protect 
their schools and teachers, which have become prime targets 
for insurgents.  The brochure, which has been distributed at 
mosques in the south and is being given to all Hajjis 
boarding flights to Kandahar, represents a significant step 
in the NCCC,s efforts to move the GOA away from blaming 
outsiders for problems in security and development in favor 
of delivering Calls to Action for citizens to participate in 
security and development efforts. 
 
9. (U) At this point, pending the selection of a full-time 
Afghan professional staff (which the U.S. and other IC 
advisors will continue to mentor), the NCCC has not yet 
opened to Afghan journalists.  It is hoped that a formal 
opening can be held in February or March with the 
introduction of full-time professional assistance to GOA 
officials and journalists alike.  Although USAID and other 
international players can provide resources to improve the 
flow of information through the mass media, the NCCC also 
needs technical assistance in using the traditional channels 
of communications in the conservative South.  In the 
meantime, while the GOA continues to look for additional 
programmatic and other resources for the NCCC, donor 
organizations and coalition forces are helping the GOA 
Ministries to identify weekly examples of concrete 
improvements in security and development. 
 
10. (U) While there is still much to be done, the NCCC,s 
progress in the first month of its existence suggests that, 
with adequate support, it can make a significant difference 
in helping the GOA learn to better communicate with its 
 
KABUL 00000028  003 OF 003 
 
 
citizens and, in so doing, inspire greater faith in their 
government as well as in their own abilities to positively 
effect their country,s future.  Post will provide updates. 
NEWELL