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Viewing cable 07HANOI161, HANOI RATCHETS UP PRESSURE ON PRESS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07HANOI161 2007-01-26 09:44 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Hanoi
VZCZCXRO9304
RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHHI #0161/01 0260944
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 260944Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4403
INFO RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH 2440
RUEHZS/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 000161 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM KCOR VM KPAO
SUBJECT: HANOI RATCHETS UP PRESSURE ON PRESS 
 
Ref: A) HANOI 2996; B) HANOI 2705; C) HANOI 2412; D) HANOI 771 
 
HANOI 00000161  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) Politburo member Truong Tan Sang recently called on the 
Communist Party of Vietnam to strengthen "management of the press" 
by amending legal documents on press activities and improving media 
workers' "political stances, skills and ethics."  Sang's speech 
followed several high-profile GVN measures aimed at disciplining the 
press.  Between a general public that is increasingly interested in 
and concerned about corruption, and a local press that is under 
pressure to care about its readership and the bottom line, GVN and 
Party leaders have a tough row to hoe: allow the press to play a 
role in taking on corruption, but only in a way that does not 
threaten Party supremacy and government stability.  End Summary. 
 
Drawing a Line in the Sand 
-------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) On January 9, Politburo member Truong Tan Sang gave a 
speech calling on the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) to strengthen 
"management of the press" by amending legal documents on press 
activities and improving media workers' "political stances, skills 
and ethics."  Sang gave the speech at the conclusion of a two-day 
CPV conference on "press management" in Quang Ninh Province.  After 
detailing the positive role the media has played in Vietnam's 
socioeconomic development, Sang said that the Party "must enhance 
its leadership role" in appointing and recruiting media workers. 
 
3. (SBU) The Party Central Committee's Commission for Ideology and 
Culture, the Ministry of Culture and Information (MOCI) and the 
Vietnam Journalists' Association also presented reports at the 
conference on the media situation in Vietnam.  These reports listed 
some media outlets' "weaknesses," which included showing signs of 
"power abuse" and publishing "negative phenomena" without "following 
exemplary models."  These presentations also called for more 
training for media workers. 
 
Cracking Down for "Disobeying Government Orders" 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
4. (SBU) Sang's speech follows recent GVN measures to reassert 
control over the media.  For example, in November 2006, Prime 
Minister Nguyen Tan Dzung ordered tighter GVN control over the media 
and pledged not to privatize the press (Ref A).  Also in late 2006, 
MOCI slapped a one-month ban on two small publications -- one under 
the administration of the Supreme People's Court and the other under 
the supervision of the Vietnam Union of Friendship Associations -- 
for "violating articles in the Press Law and disobeying government 
orders" (Ref B).  Both publications ran a series of articles 
highlighting misprints and other problems with the State Bank of 
Vietnam's new plastic bank notes, which replaced Vietnam's paper 
notes.  For example, stories alleged that the State Bank Governor's 
son had profited from the printing contract.  MOCI also fined eight 
other newspapers for publishing articles that had "false 
information" on the introduction of new bank notes. 
 
5. (SBU) Similarly, in late 2006 another popular publication, The 
World ("The Gioi"), got in trouble for publishing readers' letters 
that criticized GVN leaders for their failings on corruption.  The 
GVN banned The World from publishing more letters because they were 
"out of line with the objectives of the publication." 
 
Press Increasingly Interested in the Bottom Line 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
6. (SBU) Senior Colonel Tran Nhung, a leading journalist at the 
Veterans Affairs Journal, told us that Sang's speech reflected Party 
concern that media outlets have not been "sufficiently enthusiastic" 
about running stories that reflect or support GVN policy.  For 
example, GVN officials were "annoyed" that only a few newspapers 
were interested in reporting GVN criticism of Vietnam-related human 
rights legislation in the U.S. Congress.  Ironically, the reason for 
this diminished enthusiasm is that the local press and media are 
increasingly under pressure from their State, Party or Government 
parent organizations to become financially independent and 
commercially profitable.  They will naturally seek to print what 
their readers want, and these days, articles on corruption and 
related matters are popular subjects, Nhung explained. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
7. (SBU) Sang's speech appears to be part of a larger Party and GVN 
campaign to ensure that the press does not stray beyond established 
redlines.  However, between a general public that is increasingly 
interested in and concerned about corruption, and a local press that 
is under pressure to care about its readership and the bottom line, 
 
HANOI 00000161  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
GVN and Party leaders have a tough row to hoe: allow the press to 
play a role in taking on corruption, but only in a way that does not 
threaten Party supremacy and government stability.  End Comment. 
 
MARINE