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Viewing cable 07DILI11, NEW ELECTORAL LAWS GO INTO EFFECT, BUT MANY ISSUES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07DILI11 2007-01-15 09:48 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Dili
VZCZCXRO8018
PP RUEHPB
DE RUEHDT #0011/01 0150948
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 150948Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3202
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0779
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHXX/GENEVA IO MISSIONS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0844
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0746
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0572
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0606
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0684
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0463
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 2542
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000011 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS 
PACOM FOR POLAD AND JOC 
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM UN TT
SUBJECT: NEW ELECTORAL LAWS GO INTO EFFECT, BUT MANY ISSUES 
OUTSTANDING 
 
 
DILI 00000011  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1. Summary: The three main laws that will govern East Timor's 
presidential and parliamentary elections this year were finally 
promulgated last month.  While the final versions do contain a 
few compromises of note, the overall process resulted in laws 
that fall significantly short of reflecting a national political 
consensus.  Rather, the ruling Fretilin party used its 
overwhelming numbers in Parliament to push through its drafts of 
the laws, while the opposition despite having produced its own 
alternate versions did not ultimately rise to the challenge of 
serious debate.  The laws leave basic electoral structure used 
in the 2005 local elections in place, with the body 
administering the elections reporting to a Government ministry 
and a separate independent, somewhat strengthened supervisory 
commission, but important weaknesses remain. According to 
electoral experts, the laws contain a number of technical flaws 
or omissions that could have serious consequences if not 
addressed.  The independent UN Electoral Certification Team has 
likewise identified a number of problems with the laws that must 
be addressed to assure certification, but so far there is no 
sign that steps are being taken to address these issues.  End 
summary. 
 
2. The main laws which are to govern East Timor's upcoming 
presidential and parliamentary elections were passed in 
Parliament late last month and the President signed them into 
effect shortly thereafter.  They include the law governing the 
electoral administration and supervisory bodies (the Technical 
Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE) and the National 
 
SIPDIS 
Electoral Commission (CNE)), the parliamentary election law, and 
the presidential election law.  All three laws were based on the 
Government's drafts, which in effect were the ruling Fretilin 
party's versions.  (Note: the Government originally submitted 
only two draft laws, but the third law on the CNE was formed 
from articles originally contained in the Government's 
parliamentary election law draft.) Several opposition parties 
had submitted an alternate draft of the parliamentary election 
law as well as a separate law on the electoral bodies that would 
have had the STAE to no longer reporting to the Ministry for 
State Administration, but to CNE instead.  The laws ultimately 
passed did reflect some compromise with opposition positions, 
for example reducing the threshold for representation in 
parliament from five to three percent.  Overall, however, the 
laws as promulgated remain essentially the same as those 
proposed by the Government. 
 
Consultation process fell short 
------------------------------- 
3. Although numerous national and international NGOs were 
involved in organizing consultation on the laws, in the end 
these consultations had very little influence on the final shape 
of the laws.  The original drafting of the Government versions 
that ultimately passed was conducted with virtually no 
consultation.  The bilateral (Portuguese) and UN-supported legal 
drafting advisors consulted only with Government officials 
before drafting the laws.  The parliamentary committee 
responsible for reviewing the law and making recommendations to 
the plenary (Committee A: **)  did a cursory job at best of 
incorporating the consultation results and analyzing the drafts 
themselves.  This can in large part be explained by lack of 
necessary expertise on the committee, but committee members 
appear to have made little effort to draw on the expert 
resources available to them. Ultimately they addressed none of 
the more complicated aspects of the laws, such as the electoral 
formula, focusing only on a few issues. 
 
4. The plenary discussions also left much to be desired.  The 
most influential opposition parties opted out of plenary debate 
early in the process, boycotting all discussion and voting. 
They did this reportedly in response to Fretilin reneging on a 
gentlemen's agreement by which aspects of the opposition draft 
laws, especially the opposition proposals regarding the National 
Election Commission (CNE), were to be incorporated.  However, 
many observers saw this as politically immature and ultimately 
an abdication of their responsibilities in the debate.  In the 
end, Fretilin used its overwhelming numbers in Parliament to 
 
DILI 00000011  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
simply push through its own laws with no effort to bridge 
differences with the opposition or to develop consensus.  As a 
result, a number of opposition parties continue to publicly 
disavow the laws as passed.  While this is unlikely to have 
immediate implications, they will be able to point to this after 
the elections if they choose to question their legitimacy. 
 
Some compromises, but many flaws remain 
--------------------------------------- 
5. Despite the above noted process, there were a few notable 
compromises that are incorporated into the final laws.  These 
include: 
-- The electoral threshold for representation in Parliament was 
reduced from the five percent originally proposed by Fretilin to 
three percent.  (Opposition proposal: no threshold.) 
-- The quota for women on party lists was increased from one in 
the initial five to one in every group of four. (Opposition 
proposal: one in every group of five.) 
-- The CNE was given a five / six year** mandate, allowing it to 
remain in place through the next national elections, replacing 
the Fretilin proposal of  establishing a new, temporary CNE for 
each election.  (Opposition proposal: establishment of a 
permanent CNE.) 
-- Ballot counting can take place initially at the polling 
stations rather than being moved to district counting stations 
first.  However, the time limits placed on this are problematic. 
(Opposition proposal: complete counting at polling stations and 
recounting at district polling stations.) 
 
6.  According to IFES, the narrow consultation that informed the 
drafting of the laws left numerous problems and omissions in 
place that may have been addressed had the process allowed for 
wider scrutiny and feedback.  Examples in the parliamentary 
election law include: 
-- The provisions governing political propaganda define it only 
as text-based.  No voice transmissions, such as broadcast media, 
are mentioned. This is of particular concern in the Timorese 
context where low literacy means that the vast majority will 
receive their election information orally. 
-- Party candidate lists are required to include a minimum of 70 
names, arguably burdensome and unnecessary for smaller parties 
with a realistic expectation of only a handful of seats. 
-- The law refers to the Political Party law for provisions 
governing party and coalition registration.  However the 
Political Party law is particularly ambiguous on coalitions. 
Given the possibility that opposition parties will form a 
coalition, this is an important issue to flesh out in detail. 
-- While the electoral threshold was reduced, it is defined as a 
proportion of the total number of votes, not the total number of 
valid votes, causing the real threshold to be de facto higher 
than specified. 
-- Electoral violations are defined as pertaining to STAE 
personnel only, not all public servants who may carry out 
electoral functions. 
-- Some technical arrangements are specified in too much detail, 
and may have been better left to electoral bodies to determine 
taking local circumstances and other variables into account. 
For example, the law specifies poll station opening and closing 
times, ballot paper color, and the number and type of polling 
staff. 
-- Candidate lists can be submitted as soon as the election 
dates are declared.  This essentially links the date 
announcement to the preparation necessary to receive candidate 
lists.  If the dates are announced before the electoral bodies 
are logistically prepared to receive the lists, this will 
violate the law as written. 
 
Certification Team: laws fall short of benchmarks 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
7. In its second report, which incorporated a review of the 
STAE/CNE law and the parliamentary election law, the independent 
UN Electoral Certification Team identified a number of ways in 
which the laws as currently written fail to meet its benchmarks 
for certification.  In particular it notes that the law does not 
explicitly give CNE sufficient power to access "the original of 
 
DILI 00000011  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
any document held by STAE, or by any other governmental body 
(other than a Court) which has functions to perform in 
connection with the management of the elections".  Some 
additional concerns highlighted in the report are that the law 
permits voting at any polling station without provisions to 
prevent multiple voting; the requirement that counting at the 
polling stations be closed and transferred to district counting 
centers if not completed within an hour, which fails to meet the 
Team's transparency benchmarks; and ambiguity regarding 
identification needed to prove eligibility to vote. 
Interestingly, the Team's report was conveyed to the President 
before either the STAE/CNE or the parliamentary election laws 
were presented to him for promulgation, but he signed them 
quickly with apparently no reference to the concerns therein. 
It remains unclear at present what legal remedies are required 
to meet the certification benchmarks.  Subsidiary regulations 
may be able to address at least some of the concerns, but there 
is likely also a need for the laws themselves to be amended. 
To date there has been no indication that efforts are underway 
by Parliament or the Government to address the Team's concerns. 
 
8. The complete Electoral Certification Team reports are 
available at www.unmit.org.  The official English translations 
of the laws will also be posted at this site in the near future. 
GRAY