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Viewing cable 07COLOMBO158, Respected NGO Analyst Tells Donor Ambassadors

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07COLOMBO158 2007-01-25 12:30 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Colombo
VZCZCXRO8044
PP RUEHBI
DE RUEHLM #0158/01 0251230
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 251230Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5249
INFO RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1213
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0155
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 9842
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 6784
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 4845
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3482
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0550
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 3574
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0972
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2651
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 7349
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 5083
RUEHON/AMCONSUL TORONTO 0097
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1751
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0519
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000158 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR SCA/INS 
USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958:  n/a 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PUM PTER EAID CE
SUBJECT:  Respected NGO Analyst Tells Donor Ambassadors 
to Expect Protracted Conflict in Sri Lanka 
 
 
1.(SBU) Summary:  In a hard-hitting presentation to 
donor ambassadors on January 25, as part of preparations 
for the January 29-30 Development Forum in Galle, the 
highly respected Executive Director of the Center for 
Policy Alternatives, Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, said the 
Government of Sri Lanka is more interested in 
consolidating a legislative majority than developing a 
credible devolution proposal.  Likewise the LTTE has 
been significantly weakened by recent fighting and has 
never in its history been willing to engage in peace 
talks from a weak position.  Saravanamuttu therefore 
expects a period of protracted conflict.  Saravanamuttu 
also warned that whatever devolution proposal emerges 
from the All Parties Process will be significantly 
weaker than the initial "majority report" of the experts 
panel.  He chided the donors for allowing the GSL to 
take us for a ride by promising peace and respect for 
human rights while actually pursuing a military strategy 
and a "creeping authoritarianism" that has worsened even 
since the announcement of the Commission of Inquiry on 
human rights.  End Summary. 
 
GSL Strategy: 
------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) Saravanamuttu began by noting that neither the 
GSL nor the LTTE has an interest in peace right now.  He 
said the GSL's objective is to consolidate its 
legislative majority and weaken the opposition UNP 
party.  Before entering into peace talks, its priority 
is to weaken the LTTE.  However, Saravanamuttu does not 
believe that the GSL attaches significant priority to 
developing a credible devolution proposal and predicted 
that whatever devolution proposal emerges from the All 
Parties Process will be significantly weaker than the 
initial "majority report" of the expert's panel.  He 
commented that the problem with the GSL's strategy to 
weaken the LTTE is that the LTTE has never once 
demonstrated any willingness to negotiate from a 
position of weakness over the last 25 years and is 
unlikely to do so now. 
 
LTTE's Strategy Has Failed Miserably 
------------------------------------ 
 
3.  (SBU) Saravanamuttu characterized the LTTE's 
strategy as having failed miserably.  It had failed to 
gain any significant benefits for the Tamil people from 
years of peace talks.  It had suffered significant 
losses on the battlefield in 2006 and its hope that the 
international community would react to deteriorating 
humanitarian conditions as a result of fighting by 
taking stronger action against the GSL had also failed. 
The cumulative effect of these failures was the gradual 
erosion of the LTTE's support in the Tamil community. 
Moreover, the LTTE losses in Vakarai and elsewhere in 
the east marked a significant blow to LTTE efforts to 
maintain the north and east as a putative Tamil 
homeland.  Militarily, Saravanamuttu believed the LTTE 
would find it difficult to launch any significant 
military counter-offensive in 2007 because of their 
weakened capabilities and declining capacity to recruit 
new cadres.  The likely alternative would therefore be 
for the LTTE to initiate more terrorist actions in the 
south including against economic targets, both to show 
it is still strong and to create an incentive for the 
GSL to return to talks. 
 
Bleak Outlook for 2007 
 
COLOMBO 00000158  002 OF 002 
 
 
---------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU) Saravanamuttu predicted that the outlook for 
at least the early part of 2007 is for protracted 
conflict.  The GSL has an advantage in the balance of 
forces.  It has also successfully weakened all of the 
media in 2006, but particularly the independent Tamil 
media.  As a result, few in the south are aware of the 
devastating humanitarian impact that the conflict had in 
2006, while most are aware of the military successes. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, public opinion polls show 
that a majority of the Sinhalese people believe a 
military solution is possible. 
 
5.  (SBU) Saravanamuttu also ticked off the following 
trends that he urged the donor community to be aware of 
and attempt to counteract. 
 
-- a "creeping authoritarianism" that has led to a 
growing consolidation of power in the hands of the 
President and his brothers; 
 
-- emergency regulations are being used to further 
curtail freedom of expression and other human rights; 
 
-- an attitude by the GSL of  "let?s see what we can get 
away with" with the international community:  in 
Saravanamuttu?s view, the GSL does not take seriously 
"critical statements and snubs" from the international 
community because the donors have not thus far been 
willing to take more punitive action.  Even if the 
western countries are willing to take such action, the 
GSL knows it has other options such as the Chinese, 
Pakistanis and Israelis who are willing to provide 
offensive military equipment with no conditions 
attached. 
 
-- Saravanamuttu concluded by urging the donors not to 
place too much faith in what the Commission of Inquiry 
on human rights could accomplish.  The Commission could 
only make recommendations that the GSL would be free to 
ignore.  Moreover, significant human rights abuses had 
occurred since the announcement of the Commission. 
 
6.  (SBU) Comment:  Saravanamuttu is one of the most 
respected analysts and thinkers in the Sri Lankan NGO 
community.  While we think the GSL will be more serious 
about pursuing a devolution and peace strategy than 
Saravanamuttu predicts, he may well be right.  His 
thinking also underlines the significant pressures that 
NGO leaders like him who speak relatively freely are 
under.