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Viewing cable 07BRASILIA107, CHAMBER PRESIDENCY CONTEST REVEALS COALITION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07BRASILIA107 2007-01-19 17:29 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO3194
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0107/01 0191729
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 191729Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7900
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 5908
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 4543
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 6717
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 6049
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 6132
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 3729
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 9048
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000107 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2017 
TAGS: PGOV BR
SUBJECT: CHAMBER PRESIDENCY CONTEST REVEALS COALITION 
WEAKNESS AND RIFTS 
 
REF: A. 06 BRASILIA 2758 
     B. 06 BRASILIA 1960 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Dennis W. Hearne for reasons 1.4 b a 
nd d. 
 
1.  (SBU)  Summary.  The battle for the presidency of the 
Chamber of Deputies (equivalent to U.S. Speaker of the House) 
is revealing an inability by the presidential palace to 
enforce discipline within the governing coalition and may 
cause a rift with lasting damage.  The crisis is worsening 
and there is some chance that an opposition candidate could 
win the Chamber presidency and its far-reaching legislative 
authority.  Frontrunner Arlindo Chinaglia, Workers Party (PT) 
from Sao Paulo and government leader in the Chamber, has 
lined up support from several parties by implied promises of 
ministerial appointments and posts in the leadership 
directorate.  Chinaglia's base includes not only the PT and 
the largest party in the Chamber, the Brazilian Democratic 
Movement Party (PMDB), but also the mercenary 
"rent-a-parties" that were mainly responsible for the 
"mensalao" scandal that rocked the Lula government through 
2005 and led to the downfall of several ministers and 
congressmen.  Incumbent Chamber President Aldo Rebelo, 
Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB), from Sao Paulo, although 
considered to be President Lula's favorite, has seen his 
support ebb away before Chinaglia's charm offensive, which 
Rebelo says includes blatant offers of spoils.  As Chinaglia 
gained momentum, members from opposition and disaffected 
parties launched a "third way" candidate from the Brazilian 
Social Democracy Party (PSDB), introducing the near certainty 
of a second round of voting.  With a seriously fractured 
pro-government side, the surprise outcome could be a win for 
the opposition, and a realignment of political forces.  End 
summary. 
 
CONGRESSIONAL WARFARE 
--------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) The contest for the Presidency of the Chamber of 
Deputies, a position second in the line of presidential 
succession after the vice president, has become an 
increasingly complicated chess game in the past few weeks. 
In December the incumbent, Aldo Rebelo (PCdoB), looked set 
for easy reelection, with broad support among members, 
including many in the opposition.  He is President Lula's 
preferred choice, even though Rebelo's Communist Party is a 
tiny component in Lula's coalition in Congress.  Indeed, the 
Chamber presidency traditionally goes to the largest party, 
with other parties receiving less important posts in the 
directorate according to the proportionality rule.  In the 
next Congress, which opens February 1, this would give the 
PMDB the Chamber presidency, the PT the first vice presidency 
and so on.  The PMDB -- which is expected again to hold the 
Senate presidency -- opted not to put forth a candidate, so 
the PT did:  Arlindo Chinaglia, the government leader in the 
Chamber.  This set off a confrontation within Lula's 
coalition, pointing up the clear rifts. 
 
3.  (SBU) Chinaglia is an aggressive campaigner.  He has won 
pledges of support from the PMDB, the Brazilian Labor Party 
(PTB), the Progressive Party (PP), and other smaller parties. 
 The pledges are based on in-house straw polls.  (The Chamber 
vote is secret, defections are inevitable, and there can be 
surprises, as was seen in the December 6 election of Aroldo 
Cedraz to the Federal Accounting Court, per ref A.)   The 
PMDB pledged its support in exchange for Chinaglia's promise 
of PT backing for a PMDB candidate for the Chamber presidency 
in 2009.  The small, mercenary "rent-a-parties" such as the 
PTB, PP, and the new Party of the Republic (PR), were 
apparently lured into supporting Chinaglia with promises of 
spoils.  So far Chinaglia has lined up support from all the 
parties that were mainly responsible for the "mensalao" 
scandal that rocked the Lula government in 2005.  Press 
reports, possibly resulting from behind the scenes work by 
Rebelo, have said the federal government has released funds 
for pet projects dear to key figures that Chinaglia has been 
wooing.  When the PTB announced its support this week, media 
said Chingalia had promised the agriculture ministry to a PTB 
figure, who even dropped by the minister's office to inspect 
his future digs.  Media say that Lula scolded his top 
lieutenants with a tough reminder that ministerial decisions 
are his alone to make, and nothing will be announced until 
 
BRASILIA 00000107  002 OF 003 
 
 
after the Chamber and Senate select their leadership.  The 
presidential palace has consistently (but perhaps 
disingenuously) disavowed any promises made by Chinaglia. 
Tarso Genro, Minister for Institutional Affairs, reiterated 
the message on January 18.  It is widely believed that the 
loser of the Chamber contest (that is, either Rebelo or 
Chinaglia) will be appointed a Minister as a consolation 
prize.  Civil Household chief Dilma Rousseff even paid a call 
on Aldo Rebelo earlier this week to try to persuade him to 
drop out of the race, presumably offering him an attractive 
post, but he refused.  (Note: Rebelo's name is now surfacing 
in the press for Defense Minister, a post Rebelo has sought 
in the past.  End note.) 
 
4.  (SBU) Chinaglia's opponents are quoted as saying that 
they could not vote for Chinaglia because he will lead the 
offensive to win political amnesty for disgraced former Civil 
Household minister Jose Dirceu (PT-SP), who was forced to 
resign in the "mensalao" scandal.  Chinaglia denies the 
charge. 
 
PSDB -- PING-PONG OPPOSITION POSITION 
------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU)  Last week the PSDB leader in the Chamber, Jutahy 
Magalhaes Junior, of Bahia, took a straw poll by telephone 
and announced that the PSDB would also support Chinaglia. 
That provoked vociferous protests from former president 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Senate PSDB leader Arthur 
Virgilio, Rio Grande do Sul Governor Yeda Crusius and other 
leading PSDB figures.  Jutahy was forced to reconsider and a 
party meeting was announced to revisit the matter in Brasilia 
on January 23. 
 
6.  (SBU)  Dissatisfied with the "Aldo or Arlindo" choice, a 
number of deputies from the PSDB, the Socialist People's 
Party (PPS), the Green Party (PV), and the Socialism and 
Freedom Party (PSOL) formed the "Group of 30" to launch a 
"Third Way" candidate, with a platform exulting ethics in 
government.  The result was the candidacy of PSDB deputy 
Gustavo Fruet, of Parana state.  Although the PSDB had 
already decided to reconsider on January 23, when the third 
candidate turned out to be from the PSDB itself, leader 
Jutahy Junior had to acknowledge the "new fact" and announced 
he was withdrawing his party's support from Chinaglia.  The 
intra-party confusion in the PSDB caused doubts, at least 
temporarily, about the PSDB's position as lead opposition 
party. 
 
TOWARD A SECOND ROUND 
--------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU)  Aldo Rebelo's base of support at present consists 
of his own PCdoB, the PSB, the Liberal Front Party (PFL), and 
probably some members from small parties.  Undoubtedly, parts 
of the PMDB and PSDB will also vote for him.  It is also 
likely that some disaffected PT members will also vote for 
Rebelo, since Chinaglia is associated with the PT's insiders 
circle of Jose Dirceu, Jose Genoino, and others who froze out 
many party members in Lula's first term. 
 
8.  (SBU)  The Chinaglia candidacy has also alienated the 
PSB, a key part of the Lula coalition, and solidly behind 
Rebelo.  On January 17, Rebelo and PSB president Eduardo 
Campos, the newly elected governor of Pernambuco, announced 
the PCdoB and PSB were uniting their congressional 
delegations into a single bloc in order to win the fourth 
secretariat whether Rebelo wins or not.   This may give some 
 
SIPDIS 
satisfaction to Rebelo, since he was just stung by the 
betrayal of Inocencio Oliveira (PR, from Pernambuco). 
Oliveira had pledged to support Rebelo, but could not resist 
Chinaglia's siren song, jumped on the bandwagon, then bragged 
he would be the next fourth secretary.  Ironically, it was 
with the locally influential Oliveira that Campos formed an 
alliance last fall for help to win the state governorship 
(ref B.) 
 
9.  (SBU)  The PSB and PSDB are now poised to agree to 
support either Rebelo or Fruet against Chinaglia in the 
second round, which appears a certainty.  The numbers favor a 
Chinaglia-Rebelo match-up in the second round, but there are 
still many uncommitted and soft votes in the Chamber, and 
Chinaglia could face Fruet instead. The prospects of an 
 
BRASILIA 00000107  003 OF 003 
 
 
opposition presidency in the Chamber cannot be counted out. 
 
10.  (C) Comment: This episode, which is far from over, 
reveals the weakness of Lula's control over his coalition, 
and the strength of the spoils system in Brazilian politics. 
During much of the action, Lula was away: he took a ten day 
vacation shortly after his inauguration, then came back and 
on January 17 pronounced himself unable to intervene since 
Chinaglia and Rebelo are both "like his children." And the 
episode also points up that all the ingredients for future 
corruption scandals and congressional gridlock are present in 
Brazil's political scenario, as Lula's second term gets 
slowly underway. 
 
Sobel