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Viewing cable 07BANGKOK499, RECENT THAI ECONOMIC POLICY - WHY?

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07BANGKOK499 2007-01-24 09:18 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Bangkok
VZCZCXRO6559
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHBK #0499/01 0240918
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 240918Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4325
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 3537
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 6581
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 8751
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY 2980
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 BANGKOK 000499 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS AND EB 
TREAURY FOR OASIA 
COMMERCE FOR EAP/MAC/OKSA 
PASS TO FEDERAL RESERVE SAN FRANCISCO FOR DAN FINEMAN 
PASS TO FEDERAL RESERVE NEW YORK FOR MATT HILDEBRANDT 
PASS TO USTR FOR WEISEL 
SINGAPORE FOR SUSAN BAKER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EFIN PREL PGOV TH
SUBJECT: RECENT THAI ECONOMIC POLICY - WHY? 
 
REF: A. BANGKOK 261 
 
     B. BANGKOK 152 
     C. 06 BANGKOK 7650 
     D. 06 BANGKOK 7504 
     E. 06 BANGKOK 7484 
     F. 06 BANGKOK 7435 
 
BANGKOK 00000499  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.  Investor confidence in Thailand has 
suffered a series of shocks over the past 40 days. The 
introduction of more stringent capital controls effectively 
limiting new investment, a series of bombs in Bangkok on New 
Year's Eve, and proposed amendments to the Foreign Business 
Act (FBA), all have combined to shake both foreign and 
domestic confidence in the economic management capability of 
the current government. This has been exacerbated by the 
regime's failure to consult with stakeholders, rapid 
policy-shifts and apparent lack of concern about the 
short-term impact of their decisions. Despite this, most 
economists continue to forecast Thailand's GDP for 2007 to 
come in at about the same rate of growth as was achieved in 
2006; 4-5 percent. Despite the benefits of a decline in oil 
prices and continued strength in Thailand's export markets, 
the perception that the current government is economically 
and politically inept will likley cause Thailand's economy to 
underperform, especially in comparison to its regional 
competitors. End Summary. 
 
2. (U) On January 17 the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of 
the Bank of Thailand (BoT) announced a 19 basis point 
reduction in the central bank's interest policy rate to 4.75 
percent (the 1-day repurchase agreement rate which replaced 
the previous policy benchmark based on the 14 day repo). The 
reason given by the MPC for their action was "Latest economic 
indicators point towards a slowdown in domestic demand. In 
particular, consumption and investment...showed a continued 
moderation. On the other hand inflationary pressures are 
expected to moderate..." 
 
3. (SBU) As we have reported (reftels), economists have been 
predicting for over a year that domestic demand and private 
investment would grow only modestly in 2006, and they were 
proven correct with these indicators growing at about 3 
percent and 2.9 percent respectively. The only driver to the 
economy was the export sector which grew about 16 percent in 
US$ terms. With the 14 percent appreciation in the baht last 
year, however, the effective contribution of exports to 
economic growth was much less but still was sufficient to 
achieve a 4.6 percent increase in GDP for the year. 
 
Confidence Lagging 
------------------------ 
 
4. (SBU) The reasons for the poor consumer and investor 
confidence in 2006 were a combination of the political 
turmoil in the run-up to the September coup, concerns about 
an economic slowdown in Thailand's major export markets, and 
the high price of oil in an economy that imports all its 
crude oil and is highly energy inefficient. The coup 
initially provided a lift to sentiment since it was seen as 
resolving the political unrest and providing a clear path to 
new elections along with a technocratic government that would 
formulate economic policy untainted by political and 
corruption-related factors. 
 
5. (SBU) In fact, the economic mood in Thailand is now quite 
negative. Offsetting the good news of the recent moderation 
of oil prices has been a series of policy decisions, along 
with the New Year's Eve bombings, that are widely seen to 
have been either badly managed, politically motivated, or 
both. The military-installed government is under growing 
criticism for not yet bringing any corruption charges against 
former PM Thaksin, for heavy-handed efforts to intimidate the 
media, and a general air of ineptitude. 
 
Capital Controls - Why so "Draconian"? 
---------------------------------------- 
 
 
BANGKOK 00000499  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
6. (SBU) There is little doubt that Thai exporters' margins 
were under severe pressure from the appreciating baht before 
new capital controls were implemented on December 19. Even 
those who supported the measures at the time now seem to be 
having second thoughts about the magnitude of the BoT 
response to the problem, terming the measures "draconian" and 
"using a sledge hammer to kill a fly". Financial market 
participants with whom we have spoken, including Stock 
Exchange of Thailand management, bemoan the "clear lack of 
understanding of how markets work" within the BoT and the 
failure to consult with market participants beforehand. An 
SET senior official told us "we are officials charged with 
running the stock market, yet they (BoT) never bothered to 
ask us what might happen when they put in their measures 
because they don't trust us. Actually, they don't trust 
markets." Similar criticisms were directed at Deputy PM (and 
former BoT Governor) Pridiyathorn. The CEO of a major stock 
broker said "what sort of policy do you expect from a 
regulator"? Pridiyathorn did not help his case when he 
announced that the market's steep decline in the wake of the 
capital controls announcement was "illogical." 
 
7. (SBU) Senior officials at the BoT continue to insist that 
they had no choice but to act as they did; arguing that they 
could not segregate capital flows and so had to apply the 
reserve requirement to all incoming capital (a policy quickly 
reversed for equities and that has been slowly and quietly 
liberalized on a continuing basis. Many believe that the 
controls will be mostly lifted within another month). Deputy 
Governor Atchana, when asked why the BoT did not try and use 
interest rate reductions as a first step to reduce baht 
appreciation replied that the Bank was concerned about the 
Ministry of Commerce lifting price controls on about 100 
controlled items and what such an action might do to 
inflation. She also argued that more severe action was needed 
to drive out the speculators considered to be the cause of 
the rapid baht appreciation and cutting rates "was just what 
the speculators want us to do. Why should we reward them." 
Several observers told us that Pridiyathorn's philosophy is 
that speculators only respond to "severe punishment" and that 
over time, markets always revert to their underlying value 
regardless of short-term shocks. 
 
8. (U) The SET was the worst performing stock market in Asia 
in 2006, down about 4.8 percent for the year. Even before the 
capital controls were put in place, the market still 
underperformed its regional competitors, up only 3.5 percent 
through the end of November on the back of foreign investors 
buying over net US$2 billion (Thais were net sellers 
throughout the year). Over the past month, the SET has 
declined 9 percent while Asia ex Japan has appreciated 3 
percent. In spite of recent polices, foreigners have sold 
only a net US$700 million of their Thai equity holdings. 
Reasons given for this are 1) long-term funds are content to 
maintain their exposure to Thailand to be in line with the 
MSCI global index benchmark, 2) with limited liquidity in the 
market, funds were concerned about moving the market further 
if they attempted to sell too quickly and 3),hedge funds have 
come back into the market over the past week expecting a 
bounce-back because the market is seen as being unusually 
cheap. As an indication of the lack of trading volume, 
year-to-date foreigners were net buyers of US$206.3 million 
in equities and contributed 42.1 percent of total market 
turnover. 
 
No Keeping the Baht Down 
-------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) Some local observers believe that the BoT analysis 
of the causes of the baht's appreciation was both overly 
simplistic in blaming the problem on "speculators" and not 
simplistic enough given the increasing current account 
surpluses in the last half of the year. Some note that, 
despite BoT rules requiring exporters to remit all their 
export earnings and convert them to baht within 14 days of 
payment, many kept US$ accounts overseas funded (contrary to 
BoT regulations requiring all export earnings to be remitted 
 
BANGKOK 00000499  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
and converted into baht within 14 days) by a portion of their 
earnings. With the accelerating decline of the dollar, there 
was a rush in the last quarter of 2006 for Thais to stem the 
depreciation of these holdings and convert to baht. Several 
bankers have told us that their exporter clients had an 
insatiable demand for baht every time the US$ had even a 
small rebound and that this accelerated the baht's rise. 
 
10. (SBU) Further exacerbating the baht's strength was the 
practice of some multinationals (especially Japanese) to 
undercapitalize their Thai operations and then fund them 
through intra-company loans. By doing so, the local operation 
would remit interest payments to the parent with only a 15 
percent withholding tax and no problems from the BoT for the 
remittance (as opposed to occasional problems receiving BoT 
approval for remitting surplus capital). This practice also 
reduces the Thai operation's profitability, and therefore the 
amount due the Thai taxman under the 30 percent corporate tax 
rate. Many of these companies also participated in the 
Japanese carry trade; borrowing at about 30 basis points in 
Japan to fund their Thai operation, plus some extra to invest 
in RTG short-term debt to earn 5 percent which would then be 
sent back to the parent as part of their debt repayment. This 
prompted the BoT to include intra-company loans under their 
new reserve regulations with the effect that now many local 
operations of multinationals must either prove to the BoT 
that the loans really are for operating purposes (a 
cumbersome process) or borrow from local banks at 
considerably higher interest rates. 
 
11. (SBU) In any case, the result has been the baht 
stabilizing at around 36/1USD but has caused the cost of 
capital to increase by about 30 basis points and liquidity on 
the capital markets to decrease. Bankers here tell us that a 
significant amount of baht trading now takes place in 
Singapore and that there is a wide spread (about 1 baht) 
between offshore and onshore baht/US$ exchange rates. Bank 
liquidity, while more than adequate for the larger banks, 
will be impinged by the application of International 
Accounting Standard 39 by the BoT. This rule requires Thai 
banks to set aside more collateral for non-performing loans, 
a rule that some of the less-well capitalized Thai banks will 
have to stretch to comply with. All this has acted as a 
further brake on Thai business' impetus to invest more in 
their operations. Exacerbating that reluctance has been the 
proposed amendments to the Foreign Business Act. 
 
Foreign Business Act - So Many Questions... 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
12. (SBU) As has been reported (reftels), there remains 
considerable uncertainty about the final form of the proposed 
FBA amendments and how they will be implemented. We have been 
told by several sources that the amendments as drafted by the 
Ministry of Commerce would have opened several service 
sectors to unlimited foreign ownership but that, after 
considerable cabinet debate, the amendments focused on 
extending the definition of an alien corporation to include 
as a measure voting rights (as well as share ownership) 
controlled by non-Thais, to increasing penalties for 
non-compliance, and to offer the possibility of receiving a 
license to continue operating and shareholder structures for 
some existing businesses that in future will not be 
permitted. 
 
13. (SBU) At a time when private investment is moribund and 
FDI is down by more than half from 2005, less than one month 
after investor sentiment was why wounded by the promulgation 
of the capital control regulations and only weeks after the 
New Year's Eve bombings, why would the RTG choose this time 
to propose new laws restricting new foreign investment and 
threatening some existing investors with the retroactive 
aspects of the proposed amendments? If we take at face value 
the RTG's claim that they are simply "closing loopholes to 
the existing law", the questions arise of why they 1) didn't 
first charge and try companies with violating the FBA under 
existing law and 2) why they didn't consult with the foreign 
 
BANGKOK 00000499  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
business community before making the changes? 
 
14. (SBU) It is privately acknowledged by the Deputy PM and 
widely understood in Thai society that the real reason for 
the amendments is that there is a political imperative to 
find the Shin Corp-Temasek transaction illegal. Despite the 
fact that former PM Thaksin has already received US$1.9 
billion for the shares he and his family sold in the 
transaction (now mostly residing in accounts at Siam 
Commercial Bank and Krung Thai Bank where they are closely 
monitored to ensure no funds are transferred abroad) and 
there are no Thai laws that make the seller of an asset 
responsible for ensuring the buyer complies with FBA 
regulations, the current government is anxious to show that 
this transaction was illegal in order to "prove" the corrupt 
nature of the former PM but are apparently unable to do so 
under the present FBA. However, if this is the only reason to 
amend the FBA, the government could have amended the National 
Telecommunications Act, the law which governs all aspects of 
that sector including limits on foreign equity participation, 
rather than the more general FBA. 
 
...And So Many Answers 
------------------------------ 
 
15. (SBU) The answer to this question as provided by DPM 
Pridyathorn was that, because the current FBA (and Telecom 
Act) lack an effective definition of the term "nominee", and 
it was through the use of nominees holding shares on behalf 
of Temasek that the Singapore company worked around the 49 
percent limit on foreign ownership of Thai telecom companies, 
it would be up to a court to provide a definition of the 
term. Rather than "the nightmare" of leaving such a 
definition to the court and then having it apply to all 
nominee structures in Thailand, Pridiyathorn argues that his 
government has taken the initiative to better define legal 
and illegal structures and to offer a way forward for most 
existing companies that might fall afoul of the amendments. 
He has said that by providing a better law, foreigners in the 
future will know what they can or can not do in Thailand and, 
as a result, Thailand will attract more FDI. Unfortunately, 
the fact that the term "nominee" remains undefined means 
there remains considerable scope for imaginative lawyers to 
find ways around the new restrictions. It also means that 
companies will not necessarily know if they are violating the 
new law or not. We believe that one reason "nominee" is left 
ill-defined is because many Thai companies and families get 
around non-FBA restrictions on ownership (especially laws 
limiting a person to 5 percent shareholding in a commercial 
bank or cross-holdings between banks and non-financial 
companies) through the use of nominees. 
 
16. (SBU) As is often the case in Thailand, there are various 
stories to explain that which is difficult to understand. We 
have been told, for instance, that a major Thai conglomerate 
with interests in telecom and retail has sought the FBA 
restrictions as a way to further their current market 
position and limit future competition. The quid pro quo will 
be that the group will help finance a marketing campaign for 
a positive vote on the referendum required for approval of 
the constitution currently being drafted. This is a response 
to the RTG concern that Thaksin will use his funds to finance 
a "no" vote campaign against the new constitution. 
 
17. (SBU) While there may be some truth to the story, we find 
it more likely that the recent moves of the interim 
government directed at foreign interests are primarily moves 
by the traditional Thai elite reasserting control over the 
Thai economy. Following the Asian financial crisis and 
Thaksin's policies that had the potential to significantly 
liberalize the services sector, these recent laws and 
regulations are a reaction to the perceived further potential 
loss of Thai-elite control over critical aspects of the Thai 
economy. It probably is a safe bet that the current 
government would never have negotiated the 1994 GATS 
agreement, with its phased liberalization of the retailing 
and telecoms sectors, and is looking for a way to duck its 
 
BANGKOK 00000499  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
GATS commitments or at least minimize their practical impact. 
 The moves are also part of the general roll-back of all 
things Thaksin-related. In the minds of the elite, these 
actions are not considered anti-foreign. They are considered 
as protection against the vagaries of foreign capital and the 
assurance that such critical sectors as telecom, banking and 
transport remain under Thai control and, therefore, are 
managed for the long-run good of Thailand (as opposed to the 
"short-term interests of foreigners who tend to focus on 
quarter-quarter financial results"). There may have been a 
desire to liberalize less critical sectors; architectural 
services, advertising or restaurants, for example. But the 
political capital needed to liberalize some and not other 
sectors would cost more than the government was willing to 
pay. 
 
What Next? 
-------------- 
 
18. (SBU) Most foreign businesses that are here will stay 
here despite the increased policy uncertainty. Many note that 
the BoT has already considerably softened its capital control 
rules and expect that there will simply be a new series of 
loopholes when the FBA is promulgated. New investment will 
also continue for sectors in which Thailand is most 
competitive, especially automotive and tourism. But in other 
sectors where Thailand is growing increasingly uncompetitive 
or if there is less reliance on existing investment, new 
investment is increasingly going to go elsewhere. An example 
of this thinking is a US technology company with factories in 
Thailand, Malaysia and Taiwan in addition to the US. A new 
plant was destined for Thailand but, following the coup and 
then the capital controls, the decision was made to put the 
investment into Malaysia. As the regional manager told us, 
"even though the capital controls and FBA won't affect us, 
why should we put additional money into Thailand when we 
can't see what the political system is going to be a year 
down the road and the current government seems uninterested 
in what the foreign community thinks." 
 
19. (SBU) Most economists here predict 4-5 percent GDP growth 
for 2007. When asked to explain how that can be when domestic 
consumption, private investment and exports are all forecast 
to grow at a lower rate than in 2006 when 4.6 percent growth 
was achieved, they point to anticipated increase in 
government spending. Given the fact that increased 
disbursements are unlikely until Q3 this year, the impact of 
government spending on GDP growth for the year as a whole 
will be marginal. The confidence in continued 4-5 percent 
economic growth is based on faith that this is the nation's 
"natural" rate of expansion. And no matter how poor 
government policy may be, as long as private companies have 
the financial flexibility to operate and the exchange rate 
remains competitive to that of Thailand's competitors, the 
country will grow at its "natural" rate, regardless of what 
most long-term foreign investors do.  We agree that the Thai 
economy has underlying strengths that probably will prevent 
2007 GDP growth from falling much below 3 percent.  If the 
stock market is a forecaster of future economic events, it is 
projecting a weak performance for Thailand this year. 
BOYCE