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Viewing cable 06TOKYO7134, ANITTERRORISM EXERCISE IN TOTTORI PREFECTURE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06TOKYO7134 2006-12-26 23:33 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO4125
RR RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #7134/01 3602333
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 262333Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 8823
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 1788
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 2744
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 0329
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUESDJ/FBIS OKINAWA JA
RUALSFJ/USFJ DIA REP YOKOTA AB JA
RUHBABA/CG III MEF CAMP COURTNEY JA
RHMFIUU/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RUALSFJ/USFJ SIMFAC YOKOTA AB JA
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9369
RUEHKO/USDAO TOKYO JA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 007134 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM ENERG JA PARM
SUBJECT: ANITTERRORISM EXERCISE IN TOTTORI PREFECTURE 
 
REF: TOKYO 06346 
 
1. SUMMARY: On November 26, 2006 in Tottori Prefecture, the 
central government conducted its fourth large-scale 
antiterrorism exercise in accordance with a Japanese law to 
protect citizens and assets in the event of a national 
emergency (reftel). Participating in the drill, were over 
1,500 officials from the Self-Defense Force (SDF), the local 
police, fire department, medical field, and other wide-area 
assistance groups. As the sophistication of the government's 
approach to these drills gradually improves, so does the 
effectiveness and realism of the scenarios. The scenario 
involved an attack on a community center by armed North 
Korean agents using sarin gas, which was a first for this 
type of exercise. While the overall training went smoothly 
with a few minor shortcomings, the public was not highly 
supportive of the exercise. Some residents continue to 
believe it is implausible that a terrorist attack could occur 
on Japanese soil. On December 21, 2006, Tottori Prefecture 
along with other relevant organizations held an action review 
meeting regarding the field exercise and the results will be 
issued in a report in February 2007.  END SUMMARY. 
 
About Tottori Prefecture 
------------------------ 
 
2. Tottori Prefecture is the least populous prefecture in 
Japan (2006 population, 603,994) mainly because it is an 
agricultural area with no major industry to sustain the 
economy. Tottori prefecture sits between Hyogo Prefecture and 
Shimane Prefecture on the Sea of Japan, with the closet 
nuclear power plant (NPP) in Shimane, which is approximately 
90 minutes away by train or 17km. For this reason, Tottori 
Prefecture is not within the emergency planning zone (EPZ) 
priority range for disaster prevention measures in the 
vicinity of nuclear installations. In the case of NPPs, the 
EPZ target range is approximately 8-10km. However, Tottori 
Prefecture participates in an annual nuclear emergency drill 
with Shimane's NPP. In conversations with Mr. Shinichi 
Mizunaka, Manager of the Tottori Prefecture Disaster 
Prevention Office, Tottori's disaster prevention planning 
office participates in command and communication training 
exercises with the NPP to maintain harmonious relationships 
and to practice issuing and receiving situational updates 
using various telecommunication systems (i.e., radio 
networks, etc.). 
 
3. Tottori Prefecture is the first prefectural government to 
draw up a civilian protection plan as stipulated by the 
central government. Some pundits point to the prefecture's 
close proximity to Korea, approximately 400km away, as to the 
motivation behind such immediate action. The 2001 North 
Korean ship that fired at a Japan Coast Guard vessel, 
injuring two officers, prompted Tottori Prefecture to begin 
developing a protection plan. By 2003, current Governor 
Yoshihiro Katayama (elected in 1999) took the lead in 
organizing a meeting with multiple agencies, such as 
prefectural emergency management offices, the SDF, the fire 
department, and police to explore the most effective 
emergency protective measures for its citizens. In an effort 
to broaden and strengthen the prefecture's protection plans, 
the Cabinet Secretariat requested Tottori to conduct a 
half-day map exercise in August 2006 based on an attack by 
unidentified armed agents spraying a chemical agent inside a 
crowded sports facility. The table-top exercise provided a 
forum to discuss appropriate response options before the 
practical field training was carried out in late November 
2006. 
 
Details of the Drill 
-------------------- 
 
4.  EST officer attended the November drill and noted that 
the overall planning and coordination of relief efforts went 
smoothly with the exception of minor behind-the-scenes 
hiccups. Comments below will highlight the overall scenario, 
including the major facilities used in the training, and the 
shortcomings identified. 
 
5. MAJOR EXERCISE SITES: In the ground exercise, major 
facilities included, Tottori Prefectural Western District 
Office and Yonago City Hall set-up as the task force 
 
TOKYO 00007134  002 OF 003 
 
 
headquarters, Tottori Prefectural Hall of Martial Arts used 
as the stage for the chemical attack by terrorists, and 
Yonago Municipal Health and Wealth Center established as a 
safe haven to provide food and medical care for slightly 
contaminated victims. In addition, NTT provided Disaster 
Messaging Service, which is available only at the time of a 
disaster. In response to the phone network congestion that 
followed the Great Hanshin Earthquake in 1995, NTT designed a 
unique emergency voice mail service for family and friends to 
verify the safety of their loved ones in stricken areas. The 
victim can record a message via, a public, mobile, or private 
phone up to 30 seconds in length by dialing 171   1 (if 
registered with NTT) or 2 (if not registered)   victim's home 
phone number. This voice mail is stored for up to 48 hours 
and offers a chance for family and friends living outside the 
affected area to make contact with those inside the disaster 
area through recorded messaging. For more information on this 
service, visit NTT West website: 
http://www.ntt-west.co.jp/info/saigai e/E81z171.html. 
 
 
6. OVERALL SCENARIO: The exercise began at 9:35am, 5 minutes 
after a supposed chemical attack by North Korean agents at 
Tottori Prefectural Hall for Martial Arts where residents 
gathered for an event. The first to arrive were several fire 
trucks and personnel, the local police and the SDF. Most 
emergency personnel arrived on the scene wearing chemical 
protective gear, similar to a hazmat suit. At 10:00am, the 
medical team arrived and the evacuation and rescue operations 
began. Based on the scenario, 10 people were killed, 15 
critically-wounded, 40 semi-severely wounded, and 153 
suffered minor injuries. As victims were rescued they 
received emergency triage and walked through decontamination 
tents, which were set-up outside the building by the SDF and 
other medical personnel. By 10:15am, victims were transported 
to appropriate medical facilities. For example, 
critically-wounded patients were transported by ambulance to 
temporary medical facilities established at nearby bases. 
Victims with minor injuries received care inside Yonago 
Municipal Health and Wealth Center. Around 11:00am a siren 
sounded around the martial arts facility, and over 100 
residents with assistance from local government officers were 
evacuated by bus and taken to the Kamo Elementary School. At 
11:15am, decontamination activities were carried out. By 
12:30pm, the actual field training concluded. However task 
force meetings continued until 4:00pm. 
 
7. PRESS CONFERENCE: At the press conference held after the 
exercise, officials from the Cabinet Secretariat's Office 
seemed pleased with the overall results of the training. 
Tottori Prefecture's governor emphasized the strengths of the 
drill stating that, "the capabilities of each organization 
were demonstrated and mutual cooperation among each 
participating agency was observed." 
 
8. A FEW FLAWS IDENTIFIED: According to Mr. Mizunaka, there 
was a network communication breakdown between the command 
post and the field personnel. In some instances, emergency 
respondents could not receive the command post's instructions 
or provide it with situational updates. This matter is being 
investigated by the action review committee. Secondly, 
although emergency personnel promptly arrived on the scene 
with proper gear and equipment, some of the decontamination 
tents took a noticeable amount of time to properly inflate. 
Lastly, some prefectural staff members admit that the warning 
siren was barely audible and those participating in the drill 
did not hear it. It appears that the local government made a 
decision to greatly reduce the volume of the siren in an 
effort not to disturb non-participating residents. 
 
Next Steps 
---------- 
 
9. The central government will continue to organize joint 
civil protection activities with local governments. The next 
map exercises will take place on February 2, 2007 in Saga 
Prefecture and February 7, 2007 in Ehime Prefecture.  Plans 
for practical training exercises will be announced at a later 
date. For more information on civil protection drills, visit 
Cabinet Secretariat Civil Protection Portal Site: 
http://www.kokuminhogo.go.jp/en/pc-index e.html. 
 
 
TOKYO 00007134  003 OF 003 
 
 
Comment 
------- 
10. This exercise marked a number of firsts. It was the first 
scenario that involved an attack from North Korea. The drill 
also marked the first time civilian causalities were included 
in a scenario, reflecting growing concerns over possible 
North Korean aggression. Furthermore, this was the first 
drill in which the government did not share the scenario with 
participants beforehand, perhaps because of top officials' 
criticism of past exercises. 
DONOVAN