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Viewing cable 06RANGOON1776, BURMA AI UPDATE - DECEMBER 5

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06RANGOON1776 2006-12-07 02:10 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Rangoon
VZCZCXRO8507
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHGO #1776/01 3410210
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 070210Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY RANGOON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5491
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1261
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0061
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 4407
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 3651
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 7159
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4748
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 0053
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA 0987
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 0991
RUDKIA/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 0755
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHDC
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHPH/CDC ATLANTA GA
RUEHRC/USDA FAS WASHDC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001776 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA; USDA FOR FAS/PECAD, 
FAS/CNMP, FAS/AAD, APHIS; BANGKOK FOR USAID:JMACARTHUR, 
APHIS:NCARDENAS, REO:JWALLER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAGR EAID AMED PGOV PREL CASC TBIO KFLU BM
SUBJECT: BURMA AI UPDATE - DECEMBER 5 
 
REF: RANGOON 1679 
 
RANGOON 00001776  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: Burma has not reported any new cases of AI 
since it contained the March - April 2006 poultry outbreak 
through extensive culling.  The GOB continues to work with 
donors to improve its surveillance, reporting, and response 
capabilities.  David Castellan, a short-term advisor to FAO 
Rangoon, praised the GOB's progress in developing a 
vaccination strategy and improving its response plan.  He 
identified political barriers, centralized command and 
control, and lack of interagency coordination as the primary 
remaining obstacles to effective action.  FAO plans to 
increase its staff to better handle AI issues in Burma.  End 
summary. 
 
2. (SBU) David Castellan, a short-term Rangoon FAO 
consultant, briefed econoff on developments in the GOB's 
ability to identify and respond to another avian influenza 
outbreak.  He discussed the GOB's vaccination strategy, the 
costs of the GOB's response to the March-April 2006 AI 
outbreak, World Bank funding, problems of centralized 
control, political barriers, poultry sector restructuring, 
and increases in FAO staffing. 
 
3. (SBU) Vaccination Strategy: The GOB has decided that it 
will use vaccination to respond to AI only after all other 
methods, including moving, culling, or disposing of sick 
birds fail to work, and only if the outbreak moves out of 
control.  At that point, officials would use ring vaccination 
for all poultry around an affected area.  The Livestock 
Breeding and Veterinary Department (LBVD) will stockpile two 
million vaccines.  A short-term consultant will evaluate the 
existing regulatory structure and advise on changes necessary 
to address any legal constraints on the proposed strategy. 
Castellan said he believed the GOB made the right choice not 
to vaccinate before an emergency, but noted that the ring 
vaccination strategy requires extremely tight surveillance. 
 
4. (SBU) Culling Overkill:  While the GOB was successful in 
quickly halting the March-April 2006 AI outbreak through 
extensive culling, Castellan said the toll in lost revenue 
was high, especially for mid-size farmers.  GOB officials 
estimate that over 540 households were adversely affected by 
the culling.  Castellan said the "control area" of 10 
kilometers from the site of the outbreak was too large, and 
should be decreased to 2 kms.  This would reduce the farmers' 
financial losses and take into account the inability of 
breeders and butchers to cull so many birds in a safe and 
expeditious manner. 
 
5. (SBU) Coordination Problems and World Bank Funding: 
Castellan noted the need for better coordination between GOB 
human and animal health departments and the central 
government, and between central authorities and lower level 
state/division and district officials.  Although various 
meetings have been held, no true coordination or 
follow-through yet exists, he said.  Castellan noted that the 
World Bank would be more likely to release its projected $2 
million funding if government entities cooperate closely.  He 
confirmed that the World Bank's initial plan was to give $1 
million each to FAO and WHO to help develop infrastructure to 
handle the AI threat in Burma.  Projects would focus on 
capacity-building for human and animal health officials to 
develop in-country expertise, especially in epidemiology, lab 
diagnostics, surveillance, disease control, partnership, and 
leadership skills. The WB proposal will also include funding 
for more research on the AI vaccination, further analysis of 
the structure of Burma's poultry industry, and the creation 
 
RANGOON 00001776  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
of baseline data on Burma's extensive quail industry, about 
which little is now known.  The GOB culled almost as many 
quail (317,000) as chickens (327,000) in the March and April 
outbreak. 
 
6. (SBU) Surveillance, Labs and Political Barriers: According 
to Castellan, the top priorities in Burma are better 
surveillance and lab capabilities.  Castellan noted that 
strict surveillance is required for the GOB's ring 
vaccination strategy to work, and that regional commanders 
must ensure human and animal health officials in their 
regions work together.  He said that the quality of efforts 
around the country varies according to the quality of the 
regional commander, and the process of shifting 
responsibility from the national level to the state/division 
level had not really started.  He said that Burma can 
eventually have effective surveillance teams at the district 
level, but the political process to push responsibility down 
must come from the top, through states and divisions, before 
reaching the districts.  Faced with limited resources, 
Castellan said, Burma must choose the most efficient 
surveillance method.  He recommended that the government 
focus on training poultry marketers, veterinarians, and 
large-scale producers to create a strong biosecurity system 
and early warning mechanisms.  On lab capabilities, Castellan 
agreed that the National Lab can now confirm AI diagnoses in 
animals, and expected new efforts to focus on improvements at 
regional labs to enable them to perform initial diagnosis as 
well.  He said the lab in Mandalay, Burma's second city, 
still lacks key basic infrastructure. 
 
7. (SBU) Poultry Sector Restructuring: Castellan said GOB 
animal health officials plan a pilot project to set aside 
land for poultry farms outside villages (reftel).  The 
project will begin with 98 acres in Sagaing and Mandalay 
Divisions, sites of the prior AI outbreak.  FAO will work 
with LBVD to develop a comprehensive strategy that looks at 
the functional components of the overall AI strategy, 
including ministry restructuring, rather than one that 
focuses on the efforts of individual donors or implementers. 
 
8. (SBU) FAO Staff Increases: FAO plans to hire a long-term 
technical advisor to supervise the efforts of its five new 
short-term researchers and six national consultants.  The 
national consultants will focus on emergency planning, 
implementation and management, labs, epidemiology; 
communications, and biosecurity.   The FAO staff plant to 
operate from the LBVD offices to facilitate coordination, 
Castellan said. 
 
9. (SBU) Comment: The government is willing to cooperate with 
international donors and accept foreign advice on handling 
AI, unlike its attitude toward most other offers of 
international humanitarian assistance, since the pandemic 
also threatens them and their control over Burma. 
Technicians and government officials welcome new input on AI, 
but they are powerless to compel regional military commanders 
to support surveillance teams, enforce biosafety, distribute 
information to the public, or report suspected outbreaks in a 
timely manner.  Effective AI monitoring will require 
significant attitude and policy changes.  Until regime 
leaders push their all-powerful regional commanders to make 
AI a priority and cooperate fully with animal and human 
health officials, the GOB's capacity to prevent another AI 
outbreak will remain erratic and unpredictable.  End comment. 
VILLAROSA