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Viewing cable 06NAIROBI5345, KENYA: 2006 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06NAIROBI5345 2006-12-22 10:05 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Nairobi
VZCZCXRO2350
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHNR #5345/01 3561005
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 221005Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6148
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 005345 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/CT - RHONDA SHORE, S/CT BRIAN PHIPPS 
 
E.O.12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ASEC EFIN KE
SUBJECT:  KENYA: 2006 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM 
 
REF: A) SECSTATE 177128 
      B) SECSTATE 175295 
 
1. (U) This is post's submission for the 2006 Country Report on 
Terrorism.  Begin text: 
 
2. (SBU) The government of Kenya continued to cooperate with the 
United States in identifying terrorist groups operating within 
Kenya. However, more work remains to be done in domestic areas such 
as law enforcement, enacting counterterrorism legislation, and 
prosecution of alleged terror suspects.  The Council of Islamic 
Courts, which has connections to terrorist organizations, rose to 
power in much of neighboring Somalia, a move that could lead to 
greater insecurity in northeastern Kenya, with its ethnic Somali 
population.  Many Kenyans and other observers blame the well-armed 
condition of robbers and carjackers on arms smuggling across the 
porous Kenya-Somalia border.  The ready availability of fraudulent 
relationship and identification documentation among Somalis raises 
terrorism vulnerabilities. 
 
3. (SBU) Kenya registered little progress toward the overall 
strengthening of its capabilities to combat terrorism, prosecute 
terror suspects, or respond to emergencies. The U.S.-supported Joint 
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), disbanded by the government of Kenya in 
2005, was not revived.  The Government of Kenya did not engage in a 
national discussion to sensitize the public to terrorism issues, nor 
did it finalize a national counterterrorism strategy. 
 
4. (SBU) Although Kenya still lacked counterterrorism legislation, 
the government made some legislative progress.  Kenya has previously 
drafted but has still not submitted to Parliament a counterterrorism 
finance bill that, along with other legislation, is needed to bring 
the country into compliance with relevant UN resolutions.  In April 
2003, Kenya published a draft "Suppression of Terrorism Bill," only 
to withdraw it after harsh criticism from human rights groups and 
Kenyan Muslim communities.  The Kenyan government wrote another 
draft of the bill in May, according to the UN Office on Drugs and 
Crime, but, like the year before, did not officially publish the 
document or submit it to Parliament.  In November, the government 
published the text of the Proceeds of Crime and Money Laundering 
Bill for public comment, but did not submit it to Parliament.  Until 
the bill is passed, Kenya has no way to effectively implement UN 
1267 Committee terrorist finance sanction designations.  The Central 
Bank of Kenya issued guidelines effective January 1, 2007 under 
Section 33K of the Central Bank of Kenya Act to strengthen controls 
over foreign exchange bureaus to regulate their use of third party 
checks and telegraphic transfers, transactions that may have 
previously been used for money laundering or terrorist finance. 
 
5. (SBU) There continued to be insufficient coordination among 
police, prosecutors, and other relevant government ministries that 
deal with terrorism issues.  The U.S. Embassy's Regional Security 
Officer, in conjunction with the State Department's Antiterrorism 
Assistance Program and the State Department-funded Department of 
Justice Resident Legal Advisor's Office, continued to focus on 
increasing the Kenyan Government's capacity to effectively 
investigate and prosecute terrorism through a wide variety of 
training programs and capacity-building and other assistance.  Other 
U.S. government agencies and departments offering extensive training 
and assistance in this regard include the Combined Joint Task 
Force-Horn of Africa, the Navy Seals, the Department of 
Transportation, the FBI, and the Departments of Homeland Security 
and Justice. 
 
6. (SBU) Although Kenyan officials are concerned about the 
possibility of terrorist threats from Somalia, it remains unclear 
just how far the government of Kenya, particularly the Ministry of 
Internal Security and the Kenyan version of the National Security 
Council, is willing to cooperate with the US when it comes to 
terrorism issues regarding Somalia.  In the run-up to presidential 
elections in 2007, passage of the controversial anti-terrorism bill 
is unlikely. 
 
7. (SBU) ATA-trained police investigators and counterterrorism 
prosecutors are credited with the re-arrest and successful 
prosecution of Kikambala bombing suspect Omar Said Omar after his 
acquittal on the main charge.  (Fifteen people were killed in the 
2002 bombing of the Paradise Hotel in Kikambala, Kenya.)  On April 
4, 2006, a Kenyan Magistrate Judge found terrorism suspect Omar Said 
Omar guilty of illegal possession of a firearm, ammunition, and 
explosives. He was sentenced to seven/eight years in prison. 
 
8. (SBU) While FAA and TSA training efforts in recent years improved 
aviation security, consistent enforcement of security procedures and 
planning remained a challenge, particularly at Wilson airport. 
Security has improved at Kenya's main air entry point, Jomo Kenyatta 
International Airport.   In November 2006, the Kenyan government 
effectively banned all flights to/from Somalia except for 
 
NAIROBI 00005345  002 OF 002 
 
 
humanitarian aid flights and flights to the Transitional Federal 
Government's center of Baidoa.  It is unclear how long the order 
will stand, especially in view of political pressure from growers of 
miraa, or qat, who have been deprived of their main market by the 
ban. 
 
RANNEBERGER