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Viewing cable 06MANAGUA2673, FSLN FACES DIFFICULTIES DELIVERING ON CAMPAIGN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MANAGUA2673 2006-12-11 22:56 2011-06-21 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Managua
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #2673/01 3452256
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 112256Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8415
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 002673 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR ENRG KDEM NU
SUBJECT: FSLN FACES DIFFICULTIES DELIVERING ON CAMPAIGN 
PROMISES 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 2652 AND PREVIOUS 
 
     B. MANAGUA 1787 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4 (b and d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) 
Foreign Affairs Secretary Samuel Santos recently admitted 
that the party is having difficulty reconciling its many 
campaign promises.  Santos specifically referred to the 
FSLN's desperate search for a solution to Nicaragua's ongoing 
energy crisis and the party's stated intention to replace 
only 200 top officials in the government, despite a clamor 
for positions from the rank and file.  Santos also commented 
on two key pieces of legislation, claiming that the reforms 
to the National Assembly's procedural regulations were 
altered for the better to require majority approval for 
secret votes and that the Assembly may only issue legal 
summons to private individuals regarding "matters of state." 
On the pending Freedom of Information Law, Santos reported 
that the FSLN fully supports the legislation and claimed the 
PLC is blocking implementation.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) DCM, polcouns, and poloff met with the FSLN's Foreign 
Affairs Secretary on December 7 to discuss pending 
legislation of concern and our upcoming briefing with the 
FSLN transition team on assistance activities.  Santos also 
mentioned the FSLN's concern with resolving the energy crisis 
(Ref B) and a lack of supporters (especially women) qualified 
for professional positions in the government.  Santos 
repeated that the FSLN will not support amnesty for convicted 
ex-President and PLC leader Arnoldo Aleman.  (Note: Poloff 
noted that Santos' appointment board contained the following 
entries: Ren Jing Yu (Chinese Embassy in Mexico); Paul Oquist 
(FSLN transition advisor); and Union Fenosa (electricity 
distributor).  End Note.) 
 
Energy Crisis a Central Concern for the FSLN 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
3. (C) Santos commented that alleviating the energy crisis 
and constant power outages is a top priority for the FSLN. 
Ortega is counting on Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez' 
promises to help Nicaragua with discounted fuel oil and 
generators to ease the problem, he explained.  According to 
Santos, the GON and National Assembly have behaved 
"shamefully" by turning the energy crisis into a political 
football instead of working to solve the problem.  He asked 
for any assistance the USG could provide to investigate 
solutions.  DCM mentioned a recent USAID-sponsored study on 
Nicaragua's energy crisis and offered to provide a copy of 
the report once it had been completed.  An enthusiastic 
Santos requested a copy as soon as possible. 
 
FSLN will not Fire the Civil/Foreign Service 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
4. (C) Santos stated that the FSLN will not engage in mass 
firings of the Nicaraguan civil and foreign service -- "We 
can not afford to," he commented.  He claimed that the FSLN 
plans to replace functionaries in only 200 key government 
positions.  The FSLN faces a shortage of qualified personnel, 
Santos admitted, and many Sandinista partisans are clamoring 
for government positions as a reward for helping the FSLN win 
the elections.  The party will probably not be able to 
fulfill its pledge of placing women in a large number of 
official positions as "many of the qualified women are in the 
National Assembly, and we won't pull them out," Santos 
remarked. 
 
Organic Law Reforms 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
5. (C) When DCM mentioned particularly objectionable aspects 
of a new law reforming National Assembly procedures ("Ley 
Organica" - see Ref A) -- such as a provision to allow secret 
votes and the Assembly's new power to issue legal summons to 
all citizens and residents -- Santos seemed surprised. 
(Comment: Santos' professed ignorance was incongruent as the 
"Ley Organica" had been front-page news for three days.  End 
Comment.)  He responded, however, that he understood that all 
of the Assembly's caucuses (including the ALN) had reached 
consensus on the reforms.  DCM commented that the public 
perception is that the current Assembly is handcuffing the 
next legislature.  Santos retorted that the U.S. system 
includes "contempt of Congress" regulations.  DCM explained 
that in our case the entire House or Senate must approve the 
resolution first, as opposed to merely the commission 
according to the Nicaraguan reforms. 
 
6. (C) Santos later called FSLN deputy and key Ley Organica 
negotiator Jose Figueroa for clarification.  Figueroa 
explained that the article on secret votes was modified to 
require a majority approval from the deputies, plus the 
consent of all caucus heads and the Assembly president (as 
opposed to a one-third vote of the deputies).  He also 
commented that the Assembly's powers to summon private 
individuals will only apply to "matters of state."  (Note: 
While the bill does specify "matters of state" when referring 
to the summoning of public officials (Article 51), it 
mentions only "themes of interest to the commission" when 
referring to private citizens of entities (Article 52).  End 
Note.) 
 
Status of Freedom of Information Law 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
7. (C) When DCM raised the status of the Freedom of 
Information Law, which has been languishing in the Assembly 
for months, Santos claimed the PLC is blocking implementation 
of the Law, which would significantly increase transparency 
in government operations.  He noted specifically that the PLC 
does not like an article of the Law that would require any 
project using government funds to be open to public scrutiny. 
 Regarding an aspect of the Law regulating the media, Santos 
explained that newspapers and other outlets that report on 
investigations in progress must also report if the subject is 
exonerated with the same level of prominence. 
 
FSLN will not Support Aleman Amnesty 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
8. (C) DCM and polcouns noted that several of the articles 
originally proposed in the Ley Organica seemed designed to 
facilitate amnesty for Arnoldo Aleman.  Santos repeated that 
Aleman is a convicted criminal, and the FSLN will not free 
him.  He noted that President Bolanos mentioned the same 
concern during a recent meeting.  "We would be burned," 
Santos said, and went on to comment that the issue of 
Aleman's amnesty is a Liberal family feud that the FSLN does 
not want to be involved in. 
 
9. (C) Santos added that the FSLN won the elections because 
of the Liberal division, and the party does not want to 
definitively resolve Aleman's status too soon because he is 
still "useful" to them.  DCM replied that the FSLN could help 
modernize Nicaragua's legal framework by definitively 
de-linking money laundering from narcotrafficking (an 
association often used by Aleman's defense team). 
 
Comment: An Impossible Situation for the FSLN 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
10. (C) The FSLN is already encountering difficulties after 
promising all things to all people in order to win the 
elections.  The party has worked hard to mollify investors 
and the business class by claiming that the new government 
will not oust the civil service wholesale, respect private 
property, uphold democratic practices, etc.  At the same 
time, the FSLN promised "zero unemployment," a resolution to 
the energy crisis, "economic justice," and more to their 
working class core supporters -- pledges that Santos admits 
the party will find challenging (or impossible) to reconcile. 
 FSLN support for secret votes and other objectionable 
elements in the Organic Law reforms already calls into 
question the party's true commitment to an open democracy, 
and Ortega's inauguration has yet to take place. 
TRIVELLI