Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06LIMA4610, PERU: PRESIDENT GARCIA AT 100 PLUS DAYS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06LIMA4610.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06LIMA4610 2006-12-07 14:56 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Lima
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPE #4610/01 3411456
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 071456Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3251
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 1566
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 4158
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 7119
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 2700
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 9989
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ DEC QUITO 0874
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0988
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUMIAAA/CDR USCINCSO MIAMI FL
UNCLAS LIMA 004610 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PHUM PE
SUBJECT: PERU: PRESIDENT GARCIA AT 100 PLUS DAYS 
 
REF: A. LIMA 4451 
     B. LIMA 4519 
 
-------- 
Summary: 
-------- 
 
1.  (SBU) President Garcia's political skills have lent Peru 
a stability that the country has not enjoyed for several 
years.  While the APRA lost badly in the 11/19 regional 
elections, some argue that Garcia now can control a divided 
field of regional presidents and use the results to stave off 
patronage pressures from his own party.  Others maintain that 
Garcia will have to work with a mixed bag of regional 
presidents, many of them anti-free market radicals.  While 
Garcia's nods to populism have worried some observers and his 
government is not likely to pilot much-needed state reforms, 
he is enjoying a longer honeymoon than most observers 
expected.  End Summary. 
 
------------------ 
The Pros in Charge 
------------------ 
 
2.  (SBU) President Alan Garcia and his government have 
passed the first key mark of their administration, the 
country's November 19 regional and municipal elections. 
Although his APRA party fared poorly, Garcia's position 
remains strong.  For the moment, there is no organized 
opposition to the President.  Though they have slipped in 
recent weeks, his poll numbers remain in the high 50s (still 
higher than his support in the second round of the election), 
and his former rival, Ollanta Humala, has all but 
disappeared.  No solid anti-Garcia or anti-Government 
Congressional bloc has emerged in the Congress.  Instead, 
the ruling APRA party has led different coalitions on an 
issue-by-issue basis, which has helped the government manage 
the legislature.  All told, Peru under Garcia has enjoyed a 
stability and relative tranquility that it hadn't seen during 
years immediately prior. 
 
----------------------------- 
Regional Governments as Foil? 
----------------------------- 
 
3.  (U) APRA's heavy losses in the 11/19 regional and 
municipal elections -- the party went from controlling twelve 
Regional Presidencies down to only three -- create a new 
political panorama that presents both opportunities and 
challenges to the GOP (ref A).  While a manifest blow to the 
party's national standing, there may be a silver lining. 
Some have argued that APRA's loss is Garcia's gain, since the 
party must now depend more than ever on the President. 
Moreover, the drubbing APRA took may enable the President to 
stave off patronage pressures from party regulars.  Garcia 
can argue that handing out government positions to 
technically unqualified political supporters (as he did 
during his first term as president) would be political 
suicide in the face of a wary electorate. 
 
4.  (SBU) The President has already shown how he might use 
regional governments as foils.  In the context of the 
government's accelerated decentralization program (ref B), 
Garcia is seeking to shift both responsibility and 
(importantly) blame for problems and shortcomings away from 
the central government, and on to regional and municipal 
governments.  A recent high profile event on child 
malnutrition is illustrative.  In his public remarks, 
President Garcia laid the blame for inadequate nutritional 
programs squarely on regional governments, which he said had 
a narrow "bricklayer" mentality, i.e. a tendency to invest in 
(often poorly managed and slow starting) infrastructure 
projects rather than in helping the country's poorest and 
most needy.  Garcia commented acidly that if children in the 
regions could vote, regional governments would invest more to 
improve their diets. 
 
5.  (SBU) Some disagree with the wisdom of this approach. 
Former Interior Minister Fernando Rospigliosi told Polcouns 
on 11/30 that while Humala himself had disappeared, the 
sentiments that fueled his movement had not, and that many of 
the new regional presidents and local mayors shared Humala's 
radical values.  The central government's push for rapid 
decentralization, combined with inexperience and lack of 
capacity at the regional and municipal government levels, 
could generate and even exacerbate program failures. 
Rospigliosi suggested that blame for such difficulties would 
inevitably blow back on the GOP, aggravating social 
conflicts, particularly in high-conflict zones like Ayacucho 
and Puno, and strengthening popular pressures on the 
government. 
 
---------------- 
PTPA a Challenge 
---------------- 
 
6.  (SBU) Developments on the Peru Trade Promotion Agreement 
(PTPA) front have also generated mounting pressures.  The 
decision not to seek formal approval for the agreement during 
the U.S. congressional lame duck session has incited an early 
round of finger pointing in Peru.  Some observers have 
accused the government of failing to push the agreement with 
sufficient vigor in Washington, while some in the Garcia 
Government have responded by blaming the Toledo 
Administration for mishandling the initial strategy.  Garcia 
himself has generally remained positive about the 
legislation's prospects, and even enlisted former President 
Toledo to help, unthinkable several months ago.  As the GOP 
seeks to recalibrate its approach, many observers are 
convinced the rejection of the PTPA would be (and be seen as) 
a significant defeat for Garcia and a serious blow to the 
economic and strategic interests of Peru and the U.S. 
 
----------------------------- 
On a Populist Slope?  Not Yet 
----------------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU) Garcia's Achilles Heel could be his penchant for 
populism.  Where President Toledo was a poor politician but a 
good manager, Garcia's record suggests the exact opposite: 
that he is a master political tactician prone to strategic 
blunders and indifferent to everyday administration and 
management.  Critics have seized two recent issues to 
illustrate Garcia's alleged turn to populism.  The first was 
the GOP's decision to forgive the debts of 27,000 small 
borrowers from the government's Materials Bank (BANMAT).  The 
second was the proposal by an APRA representative in 
Congress' Labor Commission to include in the draft labor law 
a provision making it almost impossible to fire workers (ref 
C).  Following the public outcry, the government's response 
on both issues -- that small debtors would have to pay 50 
soles (USD 16) each for the amnesty and that the labor law 
provision would be modified to give employers more discretion 
in dismissing workers -- suggests that the populist path 
itself will entail serious political costs for the 
government. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Comment: Stability But No Great Reforms 
--------------------------------------- 
 
8.  (SBU) Many observers concede Garcia's gift for politics 
and the likelihood he will resist the kinds of populist 
impulses and pressures that led him, and Peru, down such a 
disastrous path in 1985-90.  Hope, mingled with the 
government's mostly positive signals up to this point, have 
kept the administration's honeymoon going for longer than 
most analysts would have expected.  At the same time, few are 
convinced the Garcia government has the political will or 
ability to embark on the kind of serious state reforms, 
including of the judiciary, that Peru requires to climb to 
the next level of political and economic development.  Such a 
project would have a high political cost, and would mean 
taking on established interests, some of them embedded in the 
state apparatus, the government and the APRA itself -- things 
Garcia has generally sought to avoid. 
POWERS