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Viewing cable 06KIRKUK174, KIRKUK RULING COALITION AGAINST BAKER-HAMILTON REPORT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KIRKUK174 2006-12-14 09:55 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY REO Kirkuk
VZCZCXRO4879
PP RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL
DE RUEHKUK #0174/01 3480955
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 140955Z DEC 06
FM REO KIRKUK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0788
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0750
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHKUK/REO KIRKUK 0816
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KIRKUK 000174 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/I - KHOURY-KINCANNON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS PINR IZ
SUBJECT: KIRKUK RULING COALITION AGAINST BAKER-HAMILTON REPORT 
 
KIRKUK 00000174  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Sensitive but unclassified; please handle accordingly. 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On October 10 key representatives of the 
ruling PUK/KDP-dominated local government demarched the REO, and 
on October 11 affiliated NGO's held a demonstration in front of 
our gate, about the Iraq Study Group (ISG) Report.  In the 
PUK/KDP's view, the ISG report was biased in favor of Baghdad. 
They strongly objected to any proposal to modify the 
constitution, and changes to Iraqi Constitution Article 140 on 
the final status of Kirkuk would cross a "red line."  Many of 
the representatives objected to characterization of Kirkuk as a 
"powder keg," and others expressed affront that "outsiders," 
whether Baghdad-by-fiat, the UN -- or especially Iraq's 
neighbors-- could hold sway in Kirkuk's final status 
determination.  Some also seized on the report's recommendation 
for dialog with Baathists, arguing that they represented few, if 
any, residents in Kirkuk while more broadly such a move could 
only reward terrorism and encourage militarization by other 
rejectionists.  The underlying motive for the multi-day push was 
to gauge any change in U.S. attitudes toward "Kurdistan."  REO 
Director affirmed that the ISG's recommendations would be taken 
into consideration but do not represent U.S. policy.  While the 
speakers included Arabs and Turcoman, principal political 
leaders of those groups in Kirkuk  (most of whom favor delay of 
Article 140 implementation in favor of a negotiated 
power-sharing arrangement) have not yet publicly commented on 
the ISG report.  It is likely that they were the intended 
audience for the noisy 300+ member PUK/KDP-sponsored 
demonstration in front of the REO condemning the ISG report. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
 
KIRKUK LOCAL GOVERNMENT DECAMPS TO THE REO~ 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
--------------------- 
 
2. (U) On October 10, REO-Kirkuk entertained an ad hoc meeting 
of the Kirkuk Provincial Council (PC), led by its Chairman, 
Rizgar Ali Hamajan, who was accompanied by two locally-based 
members of the national Article 140 Commission (which lays out 
the mechanism for resolving the status of Kirkuk) and almost 30 
PC members (all from the ruling PUK/KDP-dominated "Kirkuk 
Brotherhood List" -KBL).  Rizgar Ali stated his concerns about 
the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group (ISG) Report, keying on 
similar themes laid out by Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and 
Kurdistan Regional Government President Masoud Barzani who have 
dominated local media on the subject over the last few days. 
Token representatives of all KBL stripes -- an Arab, a Turcoman, 
a Christian and a woman - spoke during the REO meeting. 
 
3. (SBU) In the view of the PUK/KDP representatives, the ISG 
report was biased in favor of Baghdad and a centralized 
government over the regions and federalism.  Specifically, they 
insisted that natural resource policies (read "Kurdistan"-based 
oil reserves) were a partnership between the regions and the 
central government.   Rizgar Ali (and others) said they were 
insulted by terms like "time bomb" and "powder keg" to describe 
the situation in Kirkuk.  Kirkuk was a multi-ethnic city, and 
its problems were being addressed according to democratic means 
that were laid out and protected by a constitution that enjoyed 
national consensus.  What would be explosive would be if 
"someone" were to try to supplant the democratic process now in 
motion, they said.  A KDP representative went further in saying 
that now Kurds were America's best allies, if the U.S. tried to 
subvert Article 140, it risked becoming their "worst enemy." 
 
4. (SBU) Rizgar Ali and the other speakers were careful to 
stress the historically close ties between the local community 
and the U.S.  Most spoke at length about their own personal 
cooperation.  Rizgar Ali said he considered the REO and the PRT 
"part of his own family."  Speakers also agreed that the U.S. 
troop presence was part of the equation for success as well. 
For Rizgar Ali, that was why the ISG recommendations came as a 
shock.  Noting that none of the ISG team had visited the region, 
Rizgar Ali asked point-blank who provided Messrs.Baker and 
Hamilton the information by which they reached their 
conclusions.  Rizgar Ali insisted that he had never heard these 
views from the State Department.  Other speakers claimed that 
the constitution itself was the product of direct American 
involvement and coaching, so there was understandable confusion 
as to why the U.S. might now want to distance itself from some 
of its content. 
 
5. (SBU) All were vehement that Article 140 be implemented as 
written, without delay and without "outside interference."  A 
Turcoman representative speaking in Kurdish called Article 140 
"a local solution to a local issue."  Rizgar Ali warned that 
interference with Article 140 implementation would be crossing a 
"red line." Some also seized on the report's recommendation to 
 
KIRKUK 00000174  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
hold dialog with Baathists, arguing that Baathists represented 
few, if any, people in Kirkuk.  More broadly, they asserted, 
such a move could only reward terrorism and encourage 
militarization by other rejectionists.  Rizgar Ali said the PC 
would follow up with a written summary of their views. 
 
~FOLLOWED BY A PUBLIC DEMONSTRATION OUTSIDE THE GATES 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
------------------------------------- 
 
6. (U) On October 11, a clearly-scripted demonstration of about 
350 marchers made up of students and NGOs falling loosely under 
the KBL banner (comment: we understand that buses were paid for 
by the KDP) marched to the gates of the REO.  REO Director 
invited three representatives of the group (one from the PUK, 
KDP, and a Turcoman) into the compound.  Their views mirrored 
those expressed by the PC.  The group presented a letter 
outlining their concerns addressed to President Bush, the U.S. 
Congress and the ISG.  The gathering, while noisy, was 
well-behaved and followed closely the parameters worked out by 
local security, which cordoned off streets and followed the 
group at a discreet distance.  The local police commander 
escorted the demonstration leaders into the REO compound. 
 
COMMENT 
--------------- 
 
7. (SBU) This was only the second time Rizgar Ali ever came to 
the REO (the first was in March of this year following a fatal 
shooting incident involving REO contract security).  While 
individuals and small groups from the PC are regular guests 
here, the presence of the KBL's "A" list amounted to a de facto 
PC meeting.  Similarly, public demonstrations at the REO gates 
are uncommon.  The underlying motive for the multi-day push was 
to take measure of any changing attitudes of the U.S. toward 
"Kurdistan."  REO Director affirmed that the ISG's 
recommendations would be taken into consideration but do not 
represent U.S. policy.  That we received both a local government 
delegation and one from the demonstrators attests that we also 
listen to the views expressed locally.  For now, local media is 
carrying that message.   While some of the speakers included 
Arabs and Turcoman, principal political leaders of those groups 
here (most of whom favor delay of Article 140 implementation in 
favor of a negotiated power-sharing arrangement) have not yet 
publicly pronounced on the ISG report.  It is likely that they, 
not us, were the real audience for the noisy 300+ member 
PUK/KDP-sponsored demonstration in front of the REO condemning 
the ISG report. 
SCOTT