Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06KINSHASA1839, Humanitarian Situation in Sake, North Kivu Province

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06KINSHASA1839.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KINSHASA1839 2006-12-08 11:23 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Kinshasa
VZCZCXRO0097
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #1839/01 3421123
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 081123Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5282
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001839 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
 
AID/W FOR DCHA/OFDA- AFERRARI, ACONVERY, CGOTTSCHALK, MSHIRLEY 
AID/W FOR DCHA/FFP- TANDERSON, NCOX, TMCRAE 
AID/W FOR DCHA/OTI- RJENKINS, KHUBER 
AID/W FOR AFR- KO'DONNELL, JBORNS 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/OFDA/ARO- JMYER, ADWYER 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/FFP- DSUTHER, ADEPREZ 
ROME FOR USUN FODAG- RNEWBERG 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PHUM PREF KPKO CG
SUBJECT:  Humanitarian Situation in Sake, North Kivu Province 
 
 
KINSHASA 00001839  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. Summary.  Fighting between dissident FARDC troops and FARDC 
integrated brigades in the Sake area of North Kivu, 27 kilometers 
east of Goma, forced an estimated 30,000-40,000 residents of that 
town and neighboring villages to flee towards Goma and Minova 
beginning Friday, November 24. Five days later, sufficient security 
had been restored to permit humanitarian actors to assess needs in 
locations to which IDPs had fled and to visit Sake itself. 
USAID/OFDA Emergency Disaster Response Coordinator Jay Nash visited 
North Kivu between November 29 and December 5 to assess the 
situation. On November 30, distributions of blankets and food to 
identified IDP groups from Sake in Mugunga and Minova began, though 
the great majority of IDPs appeared to have fled all the way to Goma 
and blended in with the Goma population, staying with host families. 
An estimated two-thirds of the Sake population has now returned, but 
humanitarian actors are wary of providing assistance in an 
environment where the population could still be considered to be at 
high risk of more conflict, and where there are large numbers of 
potentially predatory. Distributions in two towns west of Rutshuru, 
north of Goma, begun in response to displacements for related 
disturbances in the Tongo area, have been temporarily suspended 
because of a new outbreak of fighting in the region east of Rutshuru 
near the Ugandan border. UN security has told all UN personnel to 
wait until further notice before traveling in the area. End 
Summary. 
 
Background 
 
2. (U) On Friday, November 24, a Tutsi businessman allegedly 
suspected of ferrying supplies to members of General Laurent 
Nkunda's dissident non-integrated, largely Rwandaphone 83rd brigade 
of the FARDC in the Kichanga area north of Sake was shot and killed 
by Congolese police in Sake town, reportedly after having violently 
resisted arrest. A few thousand inhabitants of Sake decided to leave 
town the same day, fearing the incident would trigger vengeance from 
Nkunda's troops, though the town was, in principle, protected by the 
government-loyal 11th integrated brigade. 
 
3. (U) On Saturday, November 25, at 4:45 a.m., forces loyal to 
Nkunda's in the 83rd brigade attacked positions of the 11th brigade 
in the hills surrounding Sake.  The remainder of the Sake 
population, estimated at between 30,000 and 40,000, began to flee 
either eastward toward Goma or southward toward Minova (along Lake 
Kivu).  On Sunday morning, November 26, fighting intensified and at 
10:30 a.m. the 11th brigade fled toward Goma, leaving Sake, now 
empty of civilians, guarded only by MONUC forces, who were, at that 
time, maintaining a neutral position.  Outskirts of the town was 
soon entered by elements of the attacking 83rd brigade. 
 
4. (U) On Monday, MONUC retook the area by repelling the dissidents 
with force, and the 14th integrated brigade of government-loyal 
FARDC troops was sent to Sake to replace the 11th brigade.  By 
evening, the surrounding hills were also under control of 14th 
brigade.  On Tuesday, November 28, however, there was a new 
offensive by members of the renegade 83rd brigade on the hills 
around Sake, but they were again pushed back. 
 
5. (U) By Wednesday, November 29th, IDPs who had fled Sake and were 
now taking shelter in the villages of Mugunga and Minova began 
sending envoys back to collect belongings and supplies.  By 
Thursday, November 30, about 5% of the population, mostly men, 
appeared to have started spending the night in Sake.  They told OFDA 
Rep that many of their houses have been looted, in some areas by the 
occupying 83rd and in other areas by the 14th, who took up residence 
in people's houses when they arrived.  On the road to Minova, OFDA 
Rep saws many families carrying belongings headed back to Sake as a 
modest return had clearly started.  Returns continued over the 
weekend and by Monday, December 4, an estimated 60% of the 
population had already come back. 
 
Humanitarian response 
 
6. (U) For the first days of the crises, the humanitarian community 
judged the situation to be too insecure to permit them to travel 
very far from Goma westward toward Sake.  By Tuesday, November 28, 
however, an initial 800 IDP families had been identified in Mugunga, 
at roughly the half-way point between Goma and Sake, and 
representatives of UNOCHA and UNICEF reached Sake itself, finding it 
completely empty of civilians.  Given the relatively small numbers 
in Mugunga, it was concluded that the majority of the population 
must have fled from Sake in the other direction toward Minova, south 
 
KINSHASA 00001839  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
of Sake on Lake Kivu. 
 
7. (U) Representatives of UNOCHA and UNICEF traveled with a MONUC 
escort to Minova on Wednesday, but were surprised to find only a few 
hundred IDP families at that location as well.  Although there were 
some IDPs in all villages between Sake and Minova, most were clearly 
staying with host families.  During a more extensive visit to Minova 
on Thursday, November 30, OFDA Rep saw relatively few IDPs in towns 
along the road or in Minova itself.  No village gave the impression 
of being completely inundated by IDPs, and IDPs had not camped out 
in public buildings, such as schools and churches.  As a result of 
the Minova information, the humanitarians soon concluded that most 
of the Sake population must have fled to Goma itself and stayed with 
host families there, though they were not much in evidence. 
 
8. (U) On November 30, a distribution of UNICEF-provided blankets 
and 15-day World Food Program food rations began in Mugunga, where 
the number of registered IDP families had climbed to 1000.  At a 
meeting of key humanitarian actors the same night, it was decided 
also to register and arrange similar distributions for the 300-500 
IDP families that had been identified in Minova.  Plans were also 
made to assist a reported 2000 IDP families that had fled other 
activity by the 83rd brigade in the Tongo area, northwest of Goma, 
and had subsequently arrived in the towns of Kalengera, Rubare and 
Rutshuru. 
 
9. (U) Distributions to the Rubare, Kalengera and Rutshuru IDPs had 
begun on Tuesday, December 5, when additional IDPs, fleeing a 
takeover of the towns of Runyoni and Chengero (east of Rutshuru) by 
other armed elements also believed to be of the Nkunda faction, 
began arriving.  Distributions in the area were discontinued on 
December 6 when UN security officials banned UN staff travel in the 
entire Rutshuru region until further notice. 
 
The Sake distribution dilemma 
 
10. (U) Since the early days of the Sake crisis, the position of the 
humanitarian community has been to refrain from distributing any 
assistance to returning IDPs in Sake. The reason is that by 
providing assistance in Sake, they would be encouraging IDPs to 
return to a situation where security is not assured. Nkunda's troops 
are no more than 10 kilometers from Sake, and in Sake itself, 
returnees must deal with the presence of large numbers of FARDC 
troops, many of whom have taken shelter in the IDPs houses and 
helped themselves to many of the IDPs belongings.  An additional 
concern is that if assistance is indeed provided in Sake, the many 
FARDC troops present might well force the population to turn much of 
it over to them as soon as the humanitarians return to Goma. 
 
11. (U) UNOCHA has requested of FARDC military leadership that 
soldiers be deployed outside the city, rather than in it, so as to 
limit negative civilian-military interaction.  Though military 
authorities have agreed in principle, and though some troops have 
indeed been moved to the periphery of Sake and the neighboring 
hills, the town unfortunately still remains heavily militarized. 
The humanitarian community is now of mixed views as to whether 
distributions should now be initiated for returnees. The matter will 
continue to be debated in coming days as they continue to closely 
monitor the situation. 
MEECE.