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Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM2866, SUDAN: 2006 Country Reports on Terrorism

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KHARTOUM2866 2006-12-18 14:52 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXYZ0014
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKH #2866/01 3521452
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 181452Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5586
INFO RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 002866 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR S/CT - R Shore and NCTC 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: ASEC EFIN KCRM KPAO PTER KHLS AEMR
SUBJECT:  SUDAN:  2006 Country Reports on Terrorism 
 
REF:  STATE 175925 
 
------------------ 
General Assessment 
------------------ 
 
1. (SBU) Sudan remains a cooperative partner in the Global War on 
Terror (GWOT).  The Sudanese government has been a strong ally in 
the war on terrorism, aggressively pursuing terrorist operations 
directly involving threats to U.S. interests and personnel in Sudan. 
 Sudanese officials have indicated that they view their continued 
cooperation with the USG as important and recognize the benefits of 
U.S. financial, training, and security assistance.  While the CT 
relationship is strong at the working level, at the political level 
a growing number of senior, hard-line Sudanese officials have begun 
expressing a sense of resentment and distrust over recent actions by 
the USG and questioning the benefits of their continued cooperation. 
 Their assessment reflects expectations that Sudan's cooperation on 
CT warrants its removal from the list of State Sponsors of 
Terrorism.  At this time, however, there is no indication that the 
Sudanese government will curtail its current level of CT cooperation 
despite bumps in the overall bilateral relationship.  The Sudanese 
government continues to allow USG officers unrestricted access 
throughout the country and the Sudanese continue to respond 
positively to USG requests. 
 
--------------------- 
Safe Haven Assessment 
--------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) In recent months, Usama Bin Laden and other senior al-Qaida 
leaders have called for the expansion of al-Qaida's presence in 
Sudan in response to possible deployment of United Nations 
peacekeepers in Darfur.  This has led to speculation that some 
individuals with varying degrees of association with al-Qaida have 
taken steps to establish an operational network in Darfur.  While 
elements of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), HAMAS, and the 
Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) remain in Sudan, there are no 
indications that al-Qaida affiliated extremists are active in 
Darfur, and local sources often use the term "terrorist" to refer to 
Janjaweed or local fighters, particularly Arabs.  Al-Qaida 
affiliated extremists, however, might be able to exploit the limited 
reach of Khartoum's security services, the vast size of the country, 
and the easy availability of black-market weapons in an attempt to 
expand their presence without Sudanese government knowledge. 
 
------------------------------ 
Terrorist Groups/Organizations 
------------------------------ 
 
3. (SBU) As noted above, the elements of a few terrorist groups 
remain in Sudan.  However, with the exception of HAMAS-which the 
Sudanese government considers to be freedom fighters rather than 
terrorists-the Sudanese government does not appear to openly support 
the presence of extremist elements in Sudan.  The Sudanese 
government has taken steps to limit the activities of these 
organizations.  As an example, Sudanese officials have welcomed 
HAMAS members as representatives of the Palestinian Authority (PA) 
but have limited their activities to fundraising.  The Sudanese 
government has also worked hard to disrupt foreign fighters from 
using Sudan as a logistics base and transit point for Jihadists 
going to Iraq.  However, significant gaps remain in the Sudanese 
government's knowledge of and ability to identify and capture these 
individuals.  There is some evidence to suggest that individuals who 
were active participants in the Iraqi insurgency have returned to 
Sudan and are in a position to use their expertise to conduct 
attacks within Sudan or to pass on their knowledge. 
 
4. (SBU) The LRA led by Joseph Kony, continues to be a major 
terrorist threat to Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC), and Southern Sudan.  Although the Government of Southern 
Sudan has worked to mediate peace between the LRA and neighboring 
countries and vowed to stamp out the LRA in Southern Sudan, little 
tangible progress is evident, and the LRA continues to commit 
atrocities against civilians in the south.  Negotiations between the 
LRA and the Ugandan People's Defense Forces (UPDF) continue, with 
occasional interruptions, in Juba under the mediation of the 
Government of Southern Sudan. 
 
------------------------------ 
Foreign Government Cooperation 
------------------------------ 
 
5. (SBU) In 2006, the Sudanese government has come under increasing 
fire from countries like Canada, human rights groups, and the 
lawyers of those detained extra-legally by the Sudanese government. 
The result has been an erosion of the ability and willingness of the 
security services to hold terrorist suspects until sufficient 
evidence against them can be obtained as the Sudanese government 
seeks to clean-up its human rights record.  While Sudanese officials 
regularly discuss counterterrorism issues with U.S. officials and 
senior Sudanese security officials have visited the U.S. for 
consultations, it remains to be seen how long the Sudanese 
government will continue to be an active partner in the GWOT given 
internal pressures and the deteriorating state of the bilateral 
relationship with the U.S. 
 
6. (SBU) Embassy Khartoum Point of Contact is Pol/Econ Counselor 
Eric P. Whitaker.  His e-mail address is whitakerep(at)state.gov and 
his telephone numbers are 249-183-774-700 (Embassy) and 
249-912159576 (cellular phone). 
 
HUME