Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06DILI592, UPDATE ON POLICING AND SECURITY ISSUES

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06DILI592.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06DILI592 2006-12-08 03:31 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Dili
VZCZCXRO9747
PP RUEHPB
DE RUEHDT #0592/01 3420331
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 080331Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3157
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0752
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHXX/GENEVA IO MISSIONS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0820
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0722
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0549
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0582
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0660
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0445
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 2495
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000592 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS 
PACOM FOR POLAD AND JOC 
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KPKO ASEC MARR UN TT
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON POLICING AND SECURITY ISSUES 
 
 
DILI 00000592  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: UNMIT reports that the situation in and around 
Dili IDP camps, which previously have been the main flashpoints 
for violence, largely has returned to "normal," with only 
sporadic rock fights and disturbances.  However, they remain 
concerned that government plans to utilize PNTL and F-FDTL in 
IDP relocation operations could provoke new security issues. 
UNMIT reports that a much-delayed operation to move IDPs from 
the four most problematic camps should begin in the coming week 
and the possible onset of heavy rains adds to the urgency. 
Meanwhile, the past week has seen a significant upswing in 
violent clashes between martial arts groups in Dili and in some 
districts.  The reactivation of screened PNTL continues to 
proceed slowly due the high number of those rejected due to 
allegations of past misconduct.  There is evidence of increasing 
pressure from GOET and unscreened PNTL themselves for police to 
be reactivated outside the screening mechanism.  In this mix, 
the increasing visibility of armed F-FDTL soldiers in Dili 
presents a further element of risk.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) At recent briefings for local diplomats and 
international agencies, UNMIT and UNPOL officials reported a 
major reduction in incidents involving the IDP camps in Dili, 
and fewer crimes overall in most districts of Dili.  UNPOL noted 
its increased operational presence around the camps and at newly 
reopened police stations in the Dili suburbs. However, they 
warned that the IDP situation could become volatile at any time. 
 UNMIT reports that after a number of delays the GOET has agreed 
to an UNMIT operational plan to begin relocating residents of 
the four most problematic IDP camps in Dili (i.e., the hospital, 
port, Obrigado barracks, and airport camps).  As of December 7 
UNMIT was only awaiting the final GOET list of ten new sites to 
which IDPs unwilling or unable to move back to their homes will 
be relocated and UNMIT hopes that the process will begin in the 
coming week.  As an incentive for IDPs to relocate, the UN has 
announced that blanket foot distributions in Dili will cease and 
henceforth food will only be provided to vulnerable gourps.  The 
GOET has announced that no further assistance will be provided 
to any IDP camp residents who fail to register for relocation by 
December 15.   Heavy precipitation on December 7 underlined the 
threat of the coming rainy season, and there are fears that 
flooding of the camps could result in a humanitiarian crisis as 
well as a security concern if desperate IDPs were to attempt to 
occupy government facilities or local hotels. 
 
3. (SBU) GOET plans to utilize PNTL and F-FDTL in the relocation 
operation have raised additional concerns.   UNMIT has received 
assurances that no F-FDTL personnel mentioned in the UN 
Commission of Inquiry report will be involved but remains 
seriously concerned that some of the F-FDTL elements will be 
armed, despite assurances from the Prime Minister to the 
contrary.  F-FDTL standard operating procedures calls for armed 
escorts for any F-FDTL carrying out such operations.  The GOET 
plan calls for 150 F-FDTL and and a like number of PNTL to be 
involved in these operations, bu given the relatively small 
number of screened PNTL available this does not seem possible. 
 
4. (U) While IDP-centered incidents have abated, Dili has 
nonetheless seen a number of violent incidents in the pst week 
involving martial arts groups (MAGs) and similar 
organizations/gangs.  A series of clashes between PSHT and 7-7 
members have taken place over the last few days in the Taibesse, 
Kampung Baru and Bebonuk neighborhoods of Dili respectively. 
These have resulted in two deaths, one stabbing and one gunshot 
in Taibesse, and one stabbing death in Bebonuk, as well as a 
handful of gunshot and stabbing wounds.  Several house burnings 
have also occurred.  These MAG clashes represent a significant 
shift in conflict dynamics as the East v. West element that has 
characterized much of the violence of recent months seems to be 
entirely absent.  Interestingly, organizations working in IDP 
camps report that their employees are feeling safer to move 
freely around Dili as they currently do not expect to be singled 
out for being from one or the other part of the country, and 
instead assess that only members of the MAG groups and gangs 
with tell-tale tattoos, scars or markings are now vulnerable to 
 
DILI 00000592  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
targeting. 
 
5. (U) The current clashes in Dili follow a number of incidents 
in the districts in the last couple months, usually involving 
the Colimau 2000 group and PSHT.  These clashes likewise have 
resulted in some deaths and house burnings, including an 
incident last month in Ermera district in which a PSHT member 
and several members of his family were killed in a single 
attack.  Colimau 2000, 7-7 and a third group, Korka, reportedly 
have a loose alliance with a focus against PSHT.  However, it is 
unclear to what extent the recent district incidents are linked 
to current developments in Dili.  Humanitarian aid sources note 
that the delayed onset of the rainy season, and consequent food 
shortages in the districts are already an issue and are likely 
to worsen in the coming months.  Food security issues are 
expected to exacerbate community conflict in the districts. 
 
6. (SBU) Screening and reintegration of PNTL officers is 
proceeding at a slow pace, despite pressure from GOET leaders 
who are demanding that PNTL be more quickly put back on the 
street.  The main problem is that the screening process is 
turning up numerous complaints of misconduct and even criminal 
behavior among PNTL officers that must be investigated further. 
There are 600 PNTL previously working in Dili now in some stage 
of the screening process of over 1,000 registered who have 
registered.  The files of some 60 per cent of these have been 
set aside for further investigation.  Of a list of 150 PNTL 
submitted by the GOET for the IDP camp operations, only 36 
passed muster. 
 
7. (SBU) It should be noted that only those with absolutely no 
allegations are currently making it through the screening 
process.  According to members of the Australian UNPOL 
contingent, it is possible, in fact likely, that a large number 
who have not passed have allegations that can be quickly cleared 
up once attention is given to this process.  That said, there is 
also an expectation that there are plenty of cases where 
allegations are well founded.  So far UNPOL has not begun work 
on this front.  Leaving this more intensive stage of the vetting 
unaddressed poses some real risks given the number of suspended 
police officers involved.  Combined with the fact that their 
F-FDTL counterparts are essentially back to business as usual 
with no restrictions on their movement or activities, resentment 
at being indefinitely sidelined could fester. 
 
8. (SBU) Acting Police Commissioner Antero Lopes acknowledges 
that there are ongoing threats by some unscreened PNTL to 
reoccupy their offices.  There is also some agitation  among the 
unscreened personnel of the special units to whom the message 
has been conveyed that the current priority for PNTL is 
community policing not rapid reaction forces.  Lopes 
acknowledged that "a majority" of the PNTL who participated in 
the November 16 "Peace March" with FDTL were unscreened, 
supposedly non-active personnel.  He said a number of unscreened 
PNTL were going about in their uniforms but mostly in connection 
with ceremonial occasions.  The unscreened "non-active" 
leadership of PNTL is only supposed to participate in ceremonial 
events out of uniform, as non-active Commander Paulo Martins did 
on November 28.  The leadership did not appear at the December 1 
ceremony to inaugurate the UNPOL-PNTL headquarters and according 
to Martins, he was neither invited nor informed.  In contrast, 
F-FDTL commander, Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak was there in 
full uniform. 
 
9. (SBU) In this mix of changing and complicated security 
issues, a PNTL that appears likely to remain in institutional 
limbo for months to come, and impatience on the part of both 
police and GOET for national police to be back on the streets, 
the visible reemergence of the F-FDTL introduces a further 
element of risk.  So far, their appearances at various meetings 
and ceremonies, including the November 28 independence day and 
December 7 Invasion day celebrations, have gone off without 
incident, but the large number of armed F-FDTL involved in these 
events raised concerns. Armed F-FDTL members present in Dili and 
 
DILI 00000592  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
in official ceremonies was the pre-crisis norm and there is 
currently no available evidence indicating clear intent on the 
part of F-FDTL to intentionally destabilize the current status 
quo. However, there are worries of potential intent to expand 
the role of the F-FDTL beyond its pre-crisis norm. 
 
10. (SBU) Comment: As has been repeatedly in evidence in recent 
months, there is a continual gravitational pull away from 
legitimate state institutions and processes toward the more 
informal networks, especially among the security forces.  The UN 
has conveyed a strong message to GOET that any involvement in 
policing operations by unscreened PNTL is unacceptable and that 
any F-FDTL members involved in community or IDP outreach or 
operations should under no circumstances be armed.  We should 
encourage the UN to be firm on these issues and provide 
diplomatic support vis-`-vis the GOET.  Likewise, we should 
strongly encourage the UN to move ahead with the next stage of 
PNTL screening to ensure that police with false or insufficient 
allegations of misconduct can return to duty while those with 
serious violations are appropriately disciplined.  Extended 
delay of this process will serve no one and presents further 
risks.  End comment. 
GRAY