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Viewing cable 06DAKAR3016, CASAMANCE: ESCALATION IN REBEL ATTACKS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06DAKAR3016 2006-12-27 10:51 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Dakar
VZCZCXRO4453
PP RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHDK #3016 3611051
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 271051Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7164
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0797
UNCLAS DAKAR 003016 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, PM/WRA, DRL/AE AND INR/AA 
AID/W FOR AFR/WA 
PARIS FOR POL - D'ELIA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PINS ASEC CASC KHDP PHUM SG MO
SUBJECT: CASAMANCE: ESCALATION IN REBEL ATTACKS 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
1.  (SBU) On December 20, Movement of Democratic Forces of the 
Casamance (MFDC) combatants ambushed a Senegalese army vehicle near 
the village of Kagnaru, north of Bignona.  Two soldiers died, and 14 
suffered injuries.  One day before, a Senegalese army vehicle struck 
a fresh landmine in the outskirts of Sindian, an area reoccupied by 
military forces in mid-August to combat radical MFDC elements led by 
Movement for the Liberation of the People of the Casamance (MLPC) 
leader Salif Sadio.  These recent attacks vary from the more typical 
acts of banditry that generally involve vehicle hijackings and 
robbing occupants' possessions.  The recent hostile attacks appear 
to be deliberate moves to preempt the GOS's decision to remove 
landmines from the Casamance with Moroccan assistance.  Landmines 
are the MFDC's weapon of choice, and rebels seem intent on violently 
resisting any effort to remove them prior to a negotiated peace 
agreement.  END SUMMARY. 
 
PEACE PROCESS STALLED 
--------------------- 
2.  (SBU) In late November, President Abdoulaye Wade received a 
group of traditional leaders from the Diouloulou area who offered to 
mediate the conflict.  On December 17, the Senegalese Army Corps of 
Engineers started demining in the area of Sindian.  In both 
initiatives, the GOS acted unilaterally, having failed to consult 
MFDC leaders. 
 
3.  (SBU) The demining operation is led by Moroccan forces, 
following President Wade's call for help from the international 
community, and a subsequent agreement signed during Moroccan King 
Mohamed VI's November visit to Senegal.  The GOS optimistically 
announced that the removal of landmines would take two months. 
However, Handicap International, a demining NGO active locally, says 
the timeframe is not realistic given the extent of the problem and 
the limited resources of the Senegalese army.  A senior MFDC member 
told EmbOff that he believes the GOS is using demining as an excuse 
to secure Moroccan help in capturing MFDC Atika faction/MPLC leader 
Sadio. 
 
SADIO IS MORE DANGEROUS NOW 
--------------------------- 
4.  (SBU) Recent violent attacks against the Senegalese army signal 
a major change in the MFDC/MLPC's strategy of the last six years, 
which was characterized by a lack of direct confrontation between 
GOS and MFDC forces.  Recent attacks have targeted troops involved 
in demining operations.  The nature of the December 20 attack, which 
took place in open areas near villages, shows that Sadio's men are 
willing to take major risks.  Likely feeling pressure from the GOS, 
Sadio has become radicalized and is expanding the fight to 
previously peaceful areas, which had been attack free for several 
years. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
5.  (SBU) The lack of GOS effort to promote the Casamance peace 
process, coupled with the suspension of government subsidies to the 
MFDC and the illness of MFDC founder Father Diamacoune Senghor, who 
is currently undergoing medical treatment in France, has left more 
room for radical civilian and MFDC leaders to operate.  Sadio and 
other radicals may launch more violent attacks against the army. 
Under pressure from the Senegalese army and unable to operate in 
Guinea-Bissau, Sadio may scatter his combatants and their 
sympathizers and launch a new campaign of small attacks with the 
potential to create more suffering in the region.  Sadio's staying 
power could also attract combatants from other factions who still 
believe in independence to rally behind him.  END COMMENT. 
 
6.  (U) For additional background on the Casamance conflict, visit 
Embassy Dakar's classified website at 
http://www.state.sgov/gov/p/af/dakar/. 
 
JACKSON