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Viewing cable 06CHIANGMAI211, UNDERCURRENTS, CONFIDENCE BOTH WEAK IN NORTH

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06CHIANGMAI211 2006-12-05 18:52 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Chiang Mai
VZCZCXRO6952
PP RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHCHI #0211/01 3391852
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 051852Z DEC 06
FM AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0345
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 0612
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY 0384
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 CHIANG MAI 000211 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV TH
SUBJECT: UNDERCURRENTS, CONFIDENCE BOTH WEAK IN NORTH 
 
REF: CHIANG MAI 169 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000211  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.   (SBU)  Summary.   The government's decision to retain 
martial law in most of northern Thailand Nov. 28 evoked little 
reaction here beyond concern from the Chiang Mai Chamber of 
Commerce for the province's image.  Political contacts see 
little reason to maintain restrictions, but were not surprised 
that the post-coup government suspects continued loyalty to 
former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in his home territory. 
Chiang Mai's previous governor, accused of "excessive loyalty to 
Thaksin," has been transferred to a less prestigious post. 
Most community radio stations are back on the air, but staying 
clear of political talk.   End summary 
 
2.  (SBU)  Confidence in the post-coup government is low, with 
many northerners noting the failure to fulfill the coup's stated 
objectives.   However several local officials described their 
work as easier since the coup, a welcome contrast to the amount 
of control exercised over their offices by MPs during Thaksin's 
time. 
 
3.  (SBU)  Contacts in Nan, Phrae, and Chiang Mai denied the 
oft-stated accusation of "political undercurrents" favoring 
Thaksin in the region, while readily accepting paranoia over his 
possible return.   Chiang Mai Provincial Administrative Officer 
(PAO) Thawatwong na Chiengmai confirmed but downplayed the 
occasional appearance of leaflets that accused the current 
government of planning to cancel various populist programs, such 
as the 30 baht health scheme, introduced by Thaksin.   An 
analyst from the National Intelligence Agency's (NIA) northern 
office agreed that these leaflets constitute the only tangible 
opposition to the coup.   He described martial law as more 
symbolic than operational, serving mainly as a warning against 
any possible counter-coup action. 
 
----Choosing constitution drafters---- 
 
4.   (SBU)   Locally elected PAOs such as Thawatwong were 
designated as one of the groups to help select 2,000 members for 
the National People's Assembly as a first step in drafting a new 
constitution.   Dr. Chanchai Silapaouychai, Provincial 
Administrative Officer in Phrae, described joining 76 other 
elected provincial heads in Bangkok to choose 36 colleagues for 
the assembly.   Noting that the group initially came up short, 
with only 32 instead of 36 nominees for the assembly, Dr. 
Chanchai suggested that the government's failure to fulfill the 
coup's objectives combined with expectations of a Thaksin 
comeback contributed to reluctance to participate.   Thawatwong, 
who attended the same gathering, offered a different 
explanation.  As an elected official, he noted that the rule 
barring the final group of 100 constitution drafters from 
running in elections for two years discouraged most politicians 
from participating.  He expressed doubt that Thaksin would 
return anytime soon, although he conceded that "Thaksin won't 
give up". 
 
----Out with the old ---- 
 
5.  (SBU)   The expected transfer of Chiang Mai's Governor, 
Suwat Tantipat, was announced Oct. 31 and effected 10 days 
later.  Most Chiang Mai contacts expressed sympathy for the man, 
whom they regarded as being punished for simply doing what was 
required of him as the senior government representative in 
Thaksin's home province.  In a convoluted effort to show respect 
without suggesting resistance to the new regime, the Chiang Mai 
business community arranged a hasty reception for the departing 
governor on Nov. 7.   Several hundred people attended, even 
though the invitations were faxed that afternoon. 
 
6.   (SBU)   In a surprising show of candor with the CG, a 
hold-over Chiang Mai Vice Governor praised several 
Thaksin-initiated programs, including the now-abolished CEO 
Governor budget.   Asked for examples of how the budget was used 
effectively in Chiang Mai, he cited the "clean and green" 
campaign that has placed flowers and decorative constructions on 
city streets and sidewalks - albeit  provoking objections from 
irritated pedestrians as well as those who view monumental pink 
plastic tulips as a waste of money.  Another fan of the CEO 
Governor budget claimed that the system was effective in 
increasing the flow of government assistance for flood-hit 
provinces in the past.  Without this budgetary authority and 
related MP involvement at the provincial level, bureaucratic 
procedures have slowed assistance to the impacted areas in the 
lower North, he noted.   Taking the other side of the argument, 
Dr. Chanchai decried the effects of the CEO budget scheme in 
Phrae, detailing projects dictated by MPs that included building 
a mango-drying plant in a non-mango-producing province and 
coercing farmers to grow jasmine rice in a sticky rice-growing 
area. 
 
----No politics please--- 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000211  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
7.   (SBU)  Most community radios that were closed following the 
coup resumed operations several weeks later after agreeing to 
conditions relayed by Third Army representatives (reftel).  Many 
adjusted their behavior as a condition of reopening; according 
to a local print journalist, community radio stations know that 
on-air political discussion is taboo. 
 
8.   (SBU)  Chiang Mai's only all-English station TITS (Tourist 
Information and Travel Services) 106.5 FM recently parted ways 
with its entire native English-speaking staff, leaving only Thai 
employees to broadcast a mix of pop music and community 
announcements.  Former DJs told ConOff that the owner encouraged 
them to leave in part due to concerns that English-language 
broadcasts were attracting the interest of military units.  The 
station's Thai owner informed foreign employees that military 
officials had visited the station several times since it 
returned to the air in October and that he was eager to 
discourage any further attention into the station's affairs. 
The station will now operate with a lower profile, employees 
said, balancing less frequent on-air English conversations with 
near-simultaneous Thai translations or Thai-only dialogue by 
Thailand-born DJs. 
 
9.  (SBU)   Comment:    Repeated remarks by Bangkok officials 
about political undercurrents in the north appear to be based 
more in the government's paranoia than in reality.   While a few 
journalists and academics grumble about constraints on political 
expression, some officials and others state the coup helped ease 
a difficult situation.  Most people are playing it safe for now, 
possibly waiting to see which way the wind blows. 
CAMP