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Viewing cable 06ANKARA6585, TURKEY: EXPANDING OPPOSITION HORIZONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ANKARA6585 2006-12-05 13:51 2011-04-20 21:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara
null
Dianne Wampler  12/06/2006 10:48:48 AM  From  DB/Inbox:  Dianne Wampler

Cable 
Text:                                                                      
                                                                           
      
C O N F I D E N T I A L        ANKARA 06585

SIPDIS
CX:
    ACTION: POL
    INFO:   CONS TSR PMA DAO ECON DCM AMB RAO FCS PA MGT

DISSEMINATION: POL /1
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:RWILSON
DRAFTED: POL:JGWEINER
CLEARED: PA:DSREEBNY, DCM:NMCELDOWNEY

VZCZCAYI450
PP RUEHC RUEAIIA RHEHAAA
DE RUEHAK #6585 3391351
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051351Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0192
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 006585 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU US
SUBJECT: TURKEY: EXPANDING OPPOSITION HORIZONS 
PRE-ELECTION: GETTING THEM TO WASHINGTON 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson, reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
1. (SBU) Prior to Turkey's 2007 parliamentary elections, it 
is time to expand to Washington our outreach to Turkish 
opposition leaders.  Two, three or perhaps more are likely to 
be in the next government and they need to start to 
understand the realities and challenges of the relationship 
first hand.  End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Peering around the corner at Turkey in 2007, 
parliamentary elections that must take place by November are 
likely to result in a coalition government.  The math is 
simple:  Only two parties overcame Turkey,s 10% threshold in 
2002, handing both the ruling Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) and the Republic People's Party (CHP) parliamentary 
seats disproportionate to their actual electoral strength. 
Two other parties -- the True Path Party (DYP) and the 
Nationalist Action Party (MHP) -- came very close but failed 
to make it over the 10% threshold.  The result has been over 
four years of one-party AKP government. 
 
3. (C) Chances are excellent that one, if not both, DYP and 
MHP will join AKP and CHP in parliament a year from now.  AKP 
and CHP remain likely to take the two largest chunks, making 
DYP and MHP the potential king-makers.  If AKP forms the next 
government, its most likely partner would be Mehmet Agar's 
DYP.  For the CHP to take power, it would logically turn to 
Devlet Bahceli's MHP, or even attempt a coalition of all AKP 
rivals. 
 
4. (C) CHP and MHP in particular often tout an anti-American 
(and even anti-EU) line that is gaining in strength as 
elections near.  It is opportunist politics.  Now is the time 
for us to (a) engage these parties more forcefully and (b) 
give them a sense of what it feels like to bear the 
responsibilities of dealing on the world stage. 
 
5. (SBU) We of course have frequent working level contacts in 
Ankara, Istanbul, Adana, as well as in the course of our 
travels around the country.  In the new year, we will be 
renewing and intensifying our outreach efforts here in 
Turkey.  We also intend to continue to include opposition 
party representatives when USG officials come to consult on 
regional issues such as Iran, Iraq or the Caucasus. 
 
6. (C) This is a crucial time for Turkey and this region. 
For opposition leaders, we propose leveraging greater 
exposure to the U.S. and U.S.-based NGOs and think tanks. 
Opposition figures from other major allies do this regularly. 
 One such possibility would be via Brookings, which we 
understand is planning to bring Turkish NGO and think tank 
reps to Washington.  This would have the dual advantage of 
exposing these leaders to the U.S. and different circles in 
Washington and vice versa.  The Washington Institute is 
another option, and we may be able to  involve groups such as 
the German Marshall Fund and American Turkish Council (ATC) 
to help as well.  ATC, for example, could at a minimum invite 
opposition party representatives, along with GOT officials, 
to its annual conference in late March.  Programs should 
ideally also include meetings on the Hill, as well as with 
State Department and other agency officials as available. 
This sort of exposure will prepare us mutually for the next 
iteration of democratically elected government in Ankara, 
just as it teaches them first-hand about our system and our 
priorities. 
 
7. (C) Parties here may not be universally receptive, at 
least initially.  Their bread and butter -- especially CHP 
and MHP -- has been bashing the U.S.  It is all too easy to 
complain, without providing an alternative vision, when a 
party is in opposition.  It is harder to do so once in power 
and dealing with regional realities.  The earlier Turkey's 
opposition leaders have a first-hand sense of how those 
realities play in Washington (and in Brussels and London, for 
example), the fewer the bumps in their initial foreign policy 
leadership roads.  If one goes and enjoys a good program, 
others may feel irresistable pressure to follow.  It is 
important that these programs be non-partisan and 
all-inclusive. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ 
 
WILSON