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Viewing cable 06TOKYO6358, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 11/02/06

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06TOKYO6358 2006-11-02 07:56 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO7145
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #6358/01 3060756
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 020756Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8011
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/COMPATWING ONE KAMI SEYA JA
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 1202
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 8684
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 2079
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 8343
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 9740
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4763
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0872
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2434
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 09 TOKYO 006358 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 11/02/06 
 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) More US fleet visits to Hokkaido: Donovan 
 
(2) Okinawa gubernatorial election: Both camps contradictory over 
Futenma base 
 
(3) 2006 Okinawa gubernatorial race: Anger and bewilderment (Part 
1): "V-shaped pair of runways a cheap trick" 
 
(4) Agreement to resume 6-party talks: Behind-the-scenes 
negotiations held for 13 days 
 
(5) Seiron (Opinion) column by Jun Sakurada: Follow-up on my last 
argument on flaws in Japan's nuclear-arms debate; How to secure the 
quality of Japan-US security arrangements? 
 
(6) Cabinet Office admits having asked participants to ask questions 
from position of supporting bill amending education law 
 
(7) Battle intensifying between ruling, opposition camps over bill 
amending Basic Education Law 
 
(8) Action program on preventing global warming worked out by Japan, 
US, Australia and other three APP members 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) More US fleet visits to Hokkaido: Donovan 
 
HOKKAIDO SHIMBUN (Page 3) (Full) 
November 2, 2006 
 
US Embassy Minister Donovan responded to the Hokkaido Shimbun's 
interview at the US Consulate General in Sapporo. In connection with 
the rising tension over the North Korean situation, Donovan 
clarified his outlook to the following effect: "US Navy ships 
capable of intercepting ballistic missiles will call more often at 
Muroran, Otaru, and other ports in Hokkaido." 
 
Referring to US fleet visits to Hokkaido, Donovan explained: "That 
is because of ballistic missile defense (MD). They function within 
the framework of security." The United States has so far recounted 
that the purpose of US naval vessels' port calls in Hokkaido is to 
promote friendship and receive supplies. However, Donovan, as a US 
government official, has clarified that their port calls in Hokkaido 
are part of the United States' military strategy toward North 
Korea. 
 
In addition, Donovan said the US Air Force would relocate its F-15 
fighter jets' training to the Air Self-Defense Force's Chitose base 
next year or afterward. He added, "We'd like to convey necessary 
information in a transparent way." With this, he indicated that the 
US government would endeavor to ease the anxieties of local 
residents. 
 
In the meantime, importers of farm products like Japan and exporters 
like the United States have been at odds in the Doha round of World 
Trade Organization (WTO) multilateral trade negotiations over the 
issue of lowering tariffs on farm products. On this issue, Donovan 
said there would be no growth for agriculture protected by high 
tariffs. "Hokkaido farmers should be competitive enough to survive 
the international market, and they can." With this, he underscored 
 
TOKYO 00006358  002 OF 009 
 
 
the US position. 
 
(2) Okinawa gubernatorial election: Both camps contradictory over 
Futenma base 
 
MAINICHI (Page 2) (Full) 
November 1, 2006 
 
Okinawa Prefecture will announce its gubernatorial election 
tomorrow. The election is expected to become a de facto one-on-on 
duel between Hirokazu Nakaima, 67, recommended by the ruling 
coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party and the New Komeito, and 
Keiko Itokazu, 59, recommended by the opposition camp. It can be 
positioned as Round 3 for the LDP led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe 
and the leading opposition Democratic Party of Japan (Minshuto) 
headed by Ichiro Ozawa, following the recent two by-elections for 
the House of Representatives and Fukushima Prefecture's 
gubernatorial election. Meanwhile, it is a battle between the 
government and Okinawa in connection with the issue of realigning 
the US military presence in Japan. 
 
On Oct. 29, an open debate was held in the city of Naha with the 
participation of those expected to run in the upcoming gubernatorial 
election. In the forum, the two prospective candidates, Nakaima and 
Itokazu, developed their respective opinions over the issue of 
relocating the US Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station as the biggest 
point of contention in their election campaigns. In May, Tokyo and 
Washington reached a final agreement on a plan to lay down a 
V-shaped pair of airstrips in a coastal area of Camp Schwab. 
 
Nakaima: "I can't accept the present V-shaped airstrips plan. I will 
participate in the consultative council, and I want to resolve the 
problem without delay." 
 
Itokazu: "I will attend the consultative council's meetings to 
convey Okinawa Prefecture's public opinion against Futenma 
relocation within Okinawa Prefecture." 
 
Nakaima and Itokazu stressed their respective stances toward the 
government's consultative body with Okinawa's prefectural and 
municipal governments over the relocation of Futenma airfield, and 
they got a big hand. 
 
Nakaima and Itokazu are both alike opposed to the idea of relocating 
Futenma airfield to Camp Schwab's coastal area. However, Itokazu is 
poised to carry through her claim for the airfield's overseas 
relocation. Meanwhile, Nakaima, in his Oct. 30 press remarks, 
touched for the first time on the airfield's relocation within the 
island prefecture, saying: "Its relocation somewhere outside this 
prefecture is the best possible option. However, it's also 
conceivable to accept its relocation elsewhere within this 
prefecture." 
 
Nakaima announced his candidacy on Sept. 5 and he did not clarify 
whether he would accept the Futenma relocation within Okinawa 
Prefecture. That is because of his position as a successor to 
Governor Keiichi Inamine, who has been insisting on relocating the 
airfield elsewhere outside Japan. In January this year, however, 
Nakaima criticized Inamine for his rejection of the coastal 
relocation plan, saying, "I wonder if it's appropriate to make 
trouble with the government." In his heart of hearts, Nakaima was in 
favor of relocating Futenma airfield within the island prefecture. 
In the open debate, Itokazu pointed to this fact. Nakaima rebutted, 
 
TOKYO 00006358  003 OF 009 
 
 
"I can't accept the relocation plan as is, and I'm protesting the 
government's decision in disregard of Okinawa." This was all he 
could say. 
 
Itokazu also has a weak point. In her Oct. 13 policy remarks, 
Itokazu said she would not accept the Japan-US security alliance. 
Five days after that, however, she about-faced to accept the 
bilateral security setup. It was out of consideration for the DPJ 
and a conservative political group named "Sozo" (or the "Political 
group of OKINAWA revolution" as its official English name), with 
which she is united against the LDP and the New Komeito. In the 
debate, Itokazu recounted: "I'm going to run in the election against 
Futenma relocation within Okinawa Prefecture. Security is not the 
point of contention." However, an embarrassed stir ran through the 
audience. 
 
LDP avoids going too far for fear of backlash, guarded against 
Nakaima 
 
"It's been a decade since the government decided to return Futenma 
airfield. He has to be realistic. That's good." With this, Defense 
Agency Director General Fumio Kyuma, meeting the press yesterday, 
welcomed Nakaima's remarks accepting Futenma airfield's relocation 
within Okinawa Prefecture. There was an optimistic view, saying: "If 
Nakaima becomes governor, the (Camp Schwab) coastal relocation 
plan-which is a categorical imperative-will make headway." 
 
However, the government and ruling coalition avoid going too far 
into the election battle, with LDP Secretary General Hidenao 
Nakagawa having proclaimed nonintervention in the race. That is 
because the LDP thinks that its coming out to back Nakaima in the 
race would bring about stronger backlashes from Okinawa's local 
communities and would result in encouraging Itokazu. 
 
The government plans to lay down a Futenma alternative in a coastal 
area of Camp Schwab, with its both ends stretching out into the sea. 
The government will therefore have to ask for the governor's 
approval under the Public Water Body Reclamation Law before starting 
construction work, and the governor will greatly affect the future 
course of the coastal relocation plan. Some in the government are 
insisting on creating a special measures law in order to transfer 
the governor's authority to the state if Itokazu wins the race. 
 
On the other hand, the government remains guarded against Nakaima. 
In particular, the Defense Agency is strongly distrustful of Okinawa 
since Governor Inamine has not shown any positive stance about 
Futenma relocation in spite of his conservative position. One senior 
official of the agency even says, "It would be better to see Itokazu 
win and establish a special measures law to forcibly push for the 
plan." 
 
The government will have to start construction work without delay 
after the gubernatorial election in order to relocate Futenma 
airfield by 2014 as agreed with the United States. The government is 
only growing impatient. 
 
(3) 2006 Okinawa gubernatorial race: Anger and bewilderment (Part 
1): "V-shaped pair of runways a cheap trick" 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 27) (Abridged slightly) 
November 2, 2006 
 
"Don't fly over our city! US helos out now!" This message can be 
 
TOKYO 00006358  004 OF 009 
 
 
found on the roof of the Ginowan City Office adjacent to Marine 
Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma in Okinawa Prefecture. The message 
has been there since December 2, 2005, the 10th anniversary of the 
SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa) final agreement. Under 
the agreement, the United States was supposed to return MCAS Futenma 
to Japan in five to seven years' time. 
 
In May this year, Tokyo and Washington produced a final US force 
realignment report indicating that the relocation site for MCAS 
Futenma would be shifted from waters off the Henoko district in Nago 
to the coastline of Camp Schwab. The report called for the 
construction of a V-shaped pair of runways at the new site. Then 
Defense Agency Director-General Fukushiro Nukaga explained to Nago 
Mayor Yoshikazu Shimabukuro: "Two runways will be built for takeoffs 
and landings so that US military aircraft will not fly over 
residential areas." Shimabukuro bought the explanation and endorsed 
the relocation plan. 
 
Shigeo Yamauchi, head of Ginowan's Military Base Liaison Section, 
said: "The explanation was not true. Touch-and-go flight training 
has been conducted constantly at MCAS Futenma. It's not possible to 
use separate runways for takeoffs and landings." 
 
US aircraft make 150 to 300 takeoffs and landings daily in training 
at the airfield. They include Futenma-based helicopters and KC130 
aerial refueling tanker aircraft and Kadena-based P3C patrol 
planes. 
 
The runways' two separate purposes are not specified in any 
documents. The force realignment final report simply stipulates the 
size of the runways. A chart illustrating a visual flight path of 
the runway facing the sea, possible prepared for landing and takeoff 
training, is affixed to the agreements that were exchanged between 
the Defense Agency and Nago City and Ginoza Village. The chart is 
devoid of any explanation. 
 
Nago assemblyman Zenko Nakamura noted, "Although I asked about 
landing and takeoff training in an assembly session, the answer was 
vague." Tomihiroshi Ashi, representative of a local anti-heliport 
group, took this view: "In order to accept the Futenma relocation 
plan, the Nago mayor pretended to be taken in by the government." 
 
Is it true that once the V-shaped pair of runways is constructed, US 
military aircraft will not fly over residential areas? From 
Ginowan's experience, Yamauchi is skeptical. 
 
In order to reduce noise from MCAS Futenma, the Japan-US Joint 
Committee decided in March 1996 to prohibit flights between 10:00 
p.m. and 6:00 a.m. But the US military did not follow the rule, and 
nearby residents kept complaining about noise. 
 
Also in 1996, the MCAS Futenma commander sought the city's approval 
of a plan to expand the flight path circling the east side of the 
runway. The city rejected the request, but the US military went 
ahead and implemented the plan, which is still in place today. 
 
"Base representatives always say, 'We cannot answer operational 
questions.' They don't abide by a formal pact, and we don't expect 
such people to keep a verbal promise," Yamauchi noted. 
 
Hirokazu Nakaima, 67, a former Chairman of the Okinawa Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, is planning to run in the upcoming Okinawa 
gubernatorial race on the ticket of the ruling bloc. He is 
 
TOKYO 00006358  005 OF 009 
 
 
supportive of a plan to relocate MCAS Futenma to a site within the 
prefecture, while opposing the V-shaped plan. The opposition camp is 
set to field Upper House lawmaker Keiko Itokazu, 59, who is eager to 
move the base out of the prefecture. 
 
In February this year, Ginowan released an MCAS Futenma 
redevelopment plan featuring efforts to nurture new industries and 
an environment-friendly community. There is no knowing when that 
will come true, however. 
 
(4) Agreement to resume 6-party talks: Behind-the-scenes 
negotiations held for 13 days 
 
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 8) (Full) 
November 2, 2006 
 
WASHINGTON-The United States, China, and North Korea engaged in a 
hard-played tug of war until Pyongyang finally agreed to rejoin the 
six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear issue. The situation 
underwent a sudden change on Oct. 19 when Chinese State Councilor 
Tang Jiaxuan visited North Korea and met with Kim Jong Il. The three 
countries went through diplomatic negotiations behind the scenes for 
13 days. 
 
"The visit of Mr. Tang to North Korea showed how seriously China was 
taking the problem. China's working on North Korea was extremely 
important." With this, US State Department Spokesman McCormack 
indicated that Tang's North Korea visit as a key person in charge of 
China's foreign policy became a watershed. Tang arrived in Pyongyang 
on Oct. 18 and met with Kim Jong Il after waiting 24 hours. Back in 
Beijing, Tang met with US Secretary of State Rice, who was on her 
way to the countries concerned. "My visit to North Korea was not in 
vain," Tang told Rice. 
 
North Korea's aim was consistent from beginning to end. Pyongyang 
wanted Washington to call off its financial sanctions imposed on 
North Korea. Pyongyang explored a direct dialogue with the United 
States. However, Washington would not change its principle, 
insisting on negotiating within the framework of the six-party 
talks. China, aware of the United States' intention, set out to work 
on North Korea, searching for common ground while implying pressure 
on North Korea. 
 
In the meantime, Assistant Secretary of State Hill, who represents 
the United States at the six-party talks, was accompanying Rice. On 
Oct. 21, however, Hill, apart from Rice, went to Hong Kong for a 
briefing from the US Consulate General in Hong Kong on financial 
sanctions imposed on the Banco Delta Asia, a Macau-based bank. His 
visit to Hong Kong was a message to North Korea in a way, meaning 
the United States will not call off the sanctions and signaling 
North Korea to return to the six-party talks if it wants to talk 
about finance. 
 
On Oct. 23, Hill left Hong Kong for Fiji to attend a forum of 
Pacific island nations. At that point of time, Pyongyang seemed to 
have deemed that there would be no chance to talk about the 
financial sanctions if it does not come back to the six-party 
talks. 
 
"We'd like to hold talks in Beijing. We want the United States to 
participate in our informal talks in Beijing." With this, North 
Korea asked China to host an informal meeting of the United States, 
China, and North Korea. In response, China sounded out the United 
 
TOKYO 00006358  006 OF 009 
 
 
States on whether the United States would join the trilateral talks 
in Beijing. Later on, CNBC, a US TV broadcaster, interviewed Rice. 
In the interview, she revealed the circumstances behind the scenes. 
 
The North Korean proposal, which China conveyed to the United 
States, had a time limit. China asked the United States to answer by 
Oct. 31. Rice informally told Japan and other countries concerned 
about North Korea's proposal to hold trilateral talks with the 
United States and China. Meanwhile, Hill stayed in the Pacific-Asia 
region and was on standby in Australia until Washington gave the 
go-ahead. 
 
On Oct. 27, Tang met with South Korean Foreign and Trade Minister 
Ban Ki Moon. "This is an important time, so we should be 
coolheaded," Tang told Ban. With this, China indirectly urged the 
United States to participate in the trilateral talks. 
 
"Let's do it that way." Rice gave this answer to China after talking 
with President Bush. Hill left Sydney for Beijing. On Oct. 31, Hill 
first met with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei in Beijing. 
Later on, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan joined 
Hill and Wu. The three held talks over lunch. In the end, they 
agreed to resume the six-party talks, with Hill and Kim getting in 
touch. Their Beijing talks lasted seven hours. As a result, the 
13-day diplomatic bargaining came to an end. 
 
(5) Seiron (Opinion) column by Jun Sakurada: Follow-up on my last 
argument on flaws in Japan's nuclear-arms debate; How to secure the 
quality of Japan-US security arrangements? 
 
SANKEI (Page 13) (Slightly abridged) 
October 30, 2006 
 
North Korea's recent nuclear test is reviving the debate in Japan on 
nuclear arms. The debate in itself, as Foreign Minister Taro Aso 
stated, should not be squelched. But the past nuclear arms debates 
in Japan have lacked a constructive nature, sandwiched between the 
sentiment of Japan being an only-victim nation of nuclear bombings 
and the desire to make Japan truly an independent state by means of 
nuclear arms as advocated mostly by conservative and rightist 
intellectuals. 
 
I think the path the French government followed under President 
Charles de Gaulle before that country went nuclear at the early 
1960s is a good reference for Japan in thinking about the meaning of 
nuclear arms. Opinions expressed by intellectuals who clustered 
around de Gaul as advisors implied the reasons why France needed to 
possess nuclear arms. First, Raymond Aron looked at nuclear 
possession in the context of international politics. Aron advocated 
that France's "nuclear arms" would not be replaced by those of the 
United States. Secondly, Pierre Gallois, from a military point of 
view, formulated a theory of nuclear strategy. He studied the 
reasons why France needed to become a nuclear power amid the 
standoff between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Thirdly, France 
unfolded a policy laced with the culture of France symbolized by 
Andre Malraux. 
 
These intellectuals at times were at odds with each other and 
sometimes compensated each other in debating a nuclear option and 
gave support to the de Gaulle administration until it acquired 
nuclear weapons. At the time of the Cuban crisis, which brought 
humankind to the brink of a nuclear war, de Gaulle, who by then had 
made France into a nuclear power, definitely supported the US. Under 
 
TOKYO 00006358  007 OF 009 
 
 
the de Gaulle government, an advantage of nuclear possession, as 
Aron indicated, is that it makes it possible for the country to keep 
a balance between psychological independence as sought by France, 
and realism necessary to secure harmony in the West at the time. 
 
I think unless advisors like Aron, Gallois, and Malraux, are 
available to Japan, nuclear possession is not a realistic option at 
all. I wonder how Japan will conform to the ongoing international 
efforts to realize nuclear nonproliferation if it becomes a nuclear 
power. I also wonder how Japan will handle its "nuclear weapons" 
once the Korean Peninsula is denuclearized? How will Japan's 
"nuclear weapons" be actually used under the Japan-US security 
arrangements? No doubt Japan's "nuclear weapons" would make other 
countries less sympathetic to it. Can Japan appropriately prepare a 
system to make up for that loss of sympathy? 
 
Japan needs to answer each of those questions with persuasion; 
otherwise Japan's "nuclear weapons" won't meet its national 
interests. 
 
I have consistently maintained to date that improving conventional 
weapons that are applicable in actual scenes and signing an accord 
on the criteria on their use would be far more useful than 
considering nuclear possession. When North Korea test-fired missiles 
in early July, an argument calling on Japan to have a capability to 
attack the command center of the enemy base came out. I wonder how 
far this argument has deepened so far. Boiling down discussion on 
that argument and coming up with a proper policy would be a 
substantial contribution to the security of Japan. 
 
What is more, if Japan continues to rely on America's nuclear 
umbrella while being a nuclear free country, it is inevitable that 
it will have to delete "not allowing nuclear weapons into Japan" 
from the three nonnuclear principles of not possessing, not 
producing and not allowing nuclear weapons into Japan. 
 
However, the current state of the three nonnuclear principles 
shackle America's nuclear umbrella, though Japan relies on it. This 
is illogical in terms of securing the effectiveness of the Japan-US 
security arrangements. Debate on a review of the three nonnuclear 
principles ought to be essentially conducted from this point of 
view. 
 
North Korea's "nuclear possession" is no longer an armchair threat 
but a real one. 
 
It is therefore necessary for us to debate pragmatically, away from 
sway of useless emotions or desires, how to respond to North Korea's 
nuclear weapons in order to achieve the goals of removing and easing 
the threat. 
 
Jun Sakurada: politician scientist and lecturer at Toyo Gakuen 
University. 
 
(6) Cabinet Office admits having asked participants to ask questions 
from position of supporting bill amending education law 
 
YOMIURI (Page 4) (Full) 
November 2, 2006 
 
The Cabinet Office asked participants prior to a town meeting on 
educational reform held by the government in Hachinohe City, Aomori 
Prefecture, on Sept. 2, to ask questions from the position of 
 
TOKYO 00006358  008 OF 009 
 
 
supporting the bill amending the Fundamental Law of Education. In a 
meeting of the House of Representatives' Special Committee on the 
Fundamental Law of Education, lawmaker Ikuko Ishii (Japanese 
Communist Party) revealed this information, citing documents 
produced by the Cabinet Office, the Education Bureau of Aomori 
Prefecture, and other organizations. The government acknowledged the 
fact. 
 
Ishii presented two documents that had been sent by fax to the 
principles of local junior high schools by an education office and 
the Education Bureau of Aomori Prefecture. One document, "Request 
about questions in the town meeting," suggests that participants ask 
one of the three listed questions. 
 
Another document notes, "There was the following advice by the 
Cabinet Office about statements: (1) Use your own words, given the 
nature of the meeting as much as possible (and avoid reading in a 
monotone); and (2) don't say that you are "asked" (and give an 
impression that you are expressing your own opinion). 
 
In a question session of the committee yesterday, Hiroshi Doihara, 
Deputy Vice Minister of the Cabinet Office explained: "There are 
cases in which we distribute background data, with the aim of 
animating discussion. The Cabinet Office produced such data, though 
not all." Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiozaki said that the office will 
investigate to check if there are similar cases and then "survey 
results will be reported." 
 
(7) Battle intensifying between ruling, opposition camps over bill 
amending Basic Education Law 
 
YOMIURI (Page 4) (Full) 
November 2, 2006 
 
Now that rescue measures have been worked out for high school 
students who will not earn sufficient credit units for graduation, 
the ruling parties are eager to accelerate deliberations on a bill 
amending the Fundamental Law of Education. Meanwhile, the opposition 
camp intends to zero in on the government while stressing the need 
to review the current educational administration system in order to 
bring about a fundamental solution to education problems. The battle 
is heating up between the ruling and opposition parties over whether 
the bill should be passed in the current Diet session. 
 
The Special Committee on the Fundamental Law of Education decided in 
its directors' meeting yesterday to hold on Nov. 8 local public 
hearings, a precondition for taking a vote. But the opposition camp 
has been calling for more local public hearings, as well as a 
central public hearing to be held. The ruling camp is willing to 
speed up deliberations on the bill, separating it from the scandal 
over schools not offering compulsory classes, deeming that the 
problem has already been settled with the government's rescue 
measures. 
 
In the House of Representatives, nearly 70 hours have already been 
spent for deliberations on the bill amending the education law in 
both the current and last ordinary sessions. Given this, one 
official said, "Contentious points over the bill have been fully 
discussed," and the ruling side aims to have the bill pass the Lower 
House around Nov. 10. A senior LDP member said: "To secure 
satisfactory time for deliberations in the House of Councillors, we 
will have to pass the bill in the Lower House around Nov. 15, one 
month before the adjournment of the current session, at the 
 
TOKYO 00006358  009 OF 009 
 
 
latest." 
 
In a meeting yesterday of the party's "next cabinet," Minshuto 
(Democratic Party of Japan) Secretary General Hatoyama revealed his 
intention to further pursue the government's responsibility, saying: 
"I wonder why this problem had been left covered up until now. There 
is the culture of secrecy, and the responsibility also rests with 
the Education, Science and Technology Ministry." 
 
On the amendment bill, Hatoyama stressed his determination to block 
the bill from passing in the current Diet session, saying: "The bill 
will not serve to deal with contemporary issues. Should the ruling 
parties try to push the bill through the Diet, we will have to 
doggedly hold out against it." 
 
Minshuto, the Japanese Communist Party, the Social Democratic Party, 
and the People's New Party decided in a meeting yesterday of their 
Diet Affairs Committee chairmen to call on the Lower House Education 
and Science Committee to hold intensive deliberations on problems 
related to bullying and failure in teaching compulsory subjects. 
Minshuto Diet Affairs Committee Chairman Yoshiaki Takagi argued: "We 
will not be able to properly deliberate on the amendment bill as 
long as such issues as bullying and compulsory subject issues remain 
unresolved." 
 
(8) Action program on preventing global warming worked out by Japan, 
US, Australia and other three APP members 
 
ASAHI (Page 4) (Full) 
November 2, 2006 
 
The government yesterday released an action program compiled by the 
Asia-Pacific Partnership (APP) on Clean Development and Climate 
launched by six countries, including Japan, the United States, and 
Australia. Under this program, the six countries will set up eight 
industry-specific working panels tasked with mapping out specific 
projects, under which experts will be sent to China and India, in 
which large volumes of carbon dioxide (CO2) have been emitted from 
the iron and steel industry. The dispatched experts will give 
guidance on improvement of energetic efficiency and research each 
nation's potential capability of reducing CO2 emissions from the 
cement industry. 
 
SCHIEFFER