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Viewing cable 06TOKYO6346, CIVIL PROTECTION DRILL IN IBARAKI PREFECTURE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06TOKYO6346 2006-11-02 02:13 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXYZ0012
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKO #6346/01 3060213
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 020213Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7994
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4756
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1326
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 5105
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0865
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0418
UNCLAS TOKYO 006346 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG JA PARM
SUBJECT: CIVIL PROTECTION DRILL IN IBARAKI PREFECTURE 
 
 
1. SUMMARY: On September 29, 2006, in an exercise simulating 
a large-scale terrorist attack, the Ibaraki Prefectural 
Government conducted training with the central government, 
the Self-Defense Force, police, firefighters, and other 
organizations to practice rescuing citizens under the Civil 
Protection Law. Participating in the drill were 2,100-2,400 
people from approximately 80-100 organizations across the 
nation. Some leading Japanese officials pointed out flaws in 
the drill, saying it was unrealistic because participants had 
advance copies of the scenario. According to Kayo Nozawa of 
the Cabinet Secretariat, Ibaraki Prefecture engaged an 
independent reviewer, Sogo Bosai Solution, to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the drill.  Findings will be issued in 
mid-December. END SUMMARY. 
 
Background 
---------- 
 
2. The Civil Protection Law, enacted in 2004, defines the 
responsibilities of central and local governments for 
responding to armed attacks, evacuating and rescuing 
residents, providing medical and food relief, guarding key 
facilities and other actions to protect citizens in an 
emergency. GOJ cosponsors training exercises with local 
governments to prepare actors in the event of an attack. The 
first drill, conducted in Fukui Prefecture in November 2005, 
simulated a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant that 
damaged the facility and caused a potential leak of 
radioactive material. The scenario of the second drill, held 
in Hokkaido Prefecture in August 2006, assumed a terrorist 
attack against a petrochemical complex. The third drill, held 
in Ibaraki Prefecture in September 2006, was similar to the 
one in Fukui, except real evacuation drills were carried out 
in Ibaraki. The fourth drill is scheduled in Tottori 
Prefecture on November 26, 2006.  It will involve a chemical 
attack against a large, crowded facility with civilians 
needing to be evacuated. The main purpose of these drills is 
to examine the effectiveness of each prefecture's plan to 
protect its citizens during a crisis. 
 
GOJ also plans to conduct map exercises in eight prefectures 
(Saitama, Tokyo, Fukui, Osaka, Tottori, Ehime, Fukuoka, and 
Saga) on various scenarios including a bombing at a terminal 
station and intrusion by gunmen of unknown nationality. 
Participating prefectures in the map drills will practice 
procedures to analyze the situation in the field and maintain 
contact with government entities and other relevant 
institutions. 
 
Details of the Drill 
-------------------- 
 
3. Embassy Science officer attended the September drill. 
Everything went according to plan. The chain of events 
surprised very few people. For example, a player representing 
one of the prefectural task force teams was reading the 
scenario guide during the drill. 
 
A. MAJOR EXERCISE SITES: The three main facilities included: 
1) an emergency headquarters set up at the Ibaraki 
Prefectural Office: 2) a Nuclear Off-Site Center where the 
prefectural task force teams assembled; and 3) an evacuation 
center or safe haven located inside a multipurpose gymnasium, 
where radiological screening, first aid, and food was 
provided. Video conferencing (VTC) at each site provided 
information exchange and situational updates. 
 
B. EVACUEES: Approximately 700 residents from Tokaimura and 
nearby areas participated in the evacuation drill. Social 
workers and firefighters helped those unable to evacuate 
independently, including the elderly and school-aged 
children. According to a site official, local residents were 
informed of the time to vacate their homes or schools and the 
amount of time necessary to reach the rescue center.  To 
facilitate the evacuation, a one-way restriction was imposed 
on some streets in advance. The evacuees entered the 
evacuation center quietly without any sense of urgency. 
 
C. OVERALL SCENARIO: At 7:00AM, unidentified terrorists 
attacked the Second Tokai Nuclear Power Plant (Shirakata, 
Tokaimura) of the Japan Atomic Power Company.  The 
high-voltage cable was destroyed and the reactor 
automatically shut down. The Power Company alerted the 
appropriate crisis management officials and the GOJ 
established an emergency headquarters, an off-site center, 
and a safe haven. At 8:10AM, the GOJ gave warning to the 
residents, issued evacuation instructions to the local 
governments, and assigned special tasks to other relevant 
organizations as outlined in the Basic Policy Guidelines for 
emergencies. At 10:15AM, at the off-site center, the Ibaraki 
Prefectural Task Force Teams held its second meeting and the 
Joint Response Council began drafting regional evacuation 
plans.  At 10:40AM, the GOJ issued additional evacuation 
instructions. The GOJ conducted a VTC with the off-site 
center. Following the VTC, a third task force team meeting 
was held. By 12:00PM, the evacuation was completed and all 
the terrorists were captured. At 12:10PM, release of 
radioactivity began. The GOJ responded by conducting aerial 
and maritime monitoring of radioactivity. At the safe haven, 
a disaster guidance seminar for residents was convened and 
radiological screenings were administered. At 12:20PM, the 
Ibaraki Prefectural Task Force and the Joint Response Council 
held a fourth meeting. By 13:10PM, the Japan Power Company 
reported that the radioactivity release had ceased. At 
13:20PM, the Ibaraki Prefectural Task Force and the Joint 
Response Council held a final meeting. 
 
The drill was followed by a 2:00PM press conference. Cabinet 
Secretariat Councillor Genzo Inoue said that the scenario 
 
SIPDIS 
should not have been issued in advance. Governor Masaru 
Hashimoto concurred with Inoue, but also pointed out the 
value of having citizens practice their roles and 
responsibilities in such training exercises. Since the 
disastrous nuclear accident in 1999, Ibaraki has held regular 
nuclear disaster drills. However, a drill based on a 
terrorist attack was a first time occurrence and mystified 
some. Tokaimura Head Tatsuya Murakami commented that, in his 
view, the release of radioactive materials is a more 
realistic threat to local residents than terrorism. 
Therefore, he wondered which scenario should have been given 
higher priority. 
SCHIEFFER