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Viewing cable 06PORTAUPRINCE2187, JUDICIAL/POLICE BATTLE RAGES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06PORTAUPRINCE2187 2006-11-14 19:52 2011-06-29 14:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Port Au Prince
Appears in these articles:
www.haitiliberte.com
VZCZCXRO8714
PP RUEHQU
DE RUEHPU #2187/01 3181952
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 141952Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4585
INFO RUEHZH/HAITI COLLECTIVE
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 1281
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 1118
RUEHQU/AMCONSUL QUEBEC 0615
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1027
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 002187 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CAR 
S/CRS 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR 
INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA) 
WHA/EX PLEASE PASS USOAS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2016 
TAGS: PGOV KJUS KCRM SNAR PINR HA
SUBJECT: JUDICIAL/POLICE BATTLE RAGES 
 
REF: A. PAUP 1734 
 
     B. PAUP 1561 
 
PORT AU PR 00002187  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRS THOMAS C. TIGHE, REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D) 

1. (C) Summary.  Judge Napela Saintil on November 11 recused 
himself in the case against the Michael Lucius, the 
third-ranking member of the Haitian National Police (HNP) and 
director of its investigative unit (DCPJ).  Port-au-Prince 
prosecutor Claudy Gassant (ref B) on November 13 subsequently 
announced that he would pursue the case against Lucius 
(presumably naming another judge) and continue to refuse to 
process cases brought forward by the DCPJ.  Ref A details the 
origins of the dispute, which began in March when Lucius 
publicly accused Saintil of corruption after Saintil opened 
an investigation into Lucius' alleged ties to kidnappers. 
National Assembly President Joseph Lambert also attempted to 
intervene by forming a special committee and summoning the 
minister of justice, who refused to appear.  For now, HNP 
Director General Mario Andresol, having threatened to resign 
if Lucius were made to appear before Saintil, seems 
strengthened in his position at the head of the HNP. 
Saintil, whom many informed observers regard as corrupt, is 
further isolated and discredited.  Gassant's actions are the 
most noteworthy.  Brought in by Preval's team to reform 
judicial administration and attack judicial corruption, 
Gassant's refusal to assist in brokering a compromise and 
insistence that Lucius submit to the judicial process, have 
alienated his allies among the Preval team.  His latest move 
against Lucius in the wake of Saintil's recusal may endanger 
his own position in the government, in turn dealing a blow to 
judicial reform.  Whatever the outcome, this impasse is 
another example of President Preval's indecisive management 
of his government. End Summary. 
 
THE BLOW BY BLOW 
---------- 
 
2. (U) Judge Saintil announced to the press that he took his 
decision in order to end the bureaucratic stalemate resulting 
from his pursuit of Lucius.  In response to Lucius' ongoing 
refusal to appear before Saintil, Gassant in late October 
refused to investigate cases coming from Lucius' 
investigators.  Saintil stated that he had not recused 
himself under pressure, but indicated that the judiciary 
officials' failure to enforce the summons against Lucius had 
forced his hand.  After the intervening weekend, Gassant 
announced that he would continue to investigate Lucius, that 
he remained a "suspect," that cases originating from the DCPJ 
remained suspended, and that Lucius could not continue to 
"challenge the justice (system)." 
 
3. (U)  The Saintil-Gassant feud boiled over after Haiti's 
supreme court on October 21 rejected Lucius' appeal to his 
summons before Saintil (Lucius had appealed on narrow 
technical grounds, challenging the wording of the summons). 
Lucius' lawyers thereafter invoked article 19 of the Haitian 
constitution that stipulates that "high ranking officials" 
are not subject to arrest without the approval of the 
president, though the constitution does not make clear 
whether Lucius' position is subject to that provision. 
 
4. (C)  In the meantime, President Preval convened the 
minister of Justice, Gassant, Andresol, and presidential 
advisor Robert Manuel to attempt to resolve the dispute. 
Lucius indicated that he would answer the summons if the 
judiciary transferred the case to another judge.  However, 
Gassant, who is the official responsible for assigning cases 
to judges within Port-au-Prince, refused to effect a 
compromise and subsequently publicly declared that Lucius 
must cooperate with Saintil and submit to the judicial 
process.  Gassant's intransigence has reportedly infuriated 
Preval and divided his team, with opinion split among who was 
more to blame, Lucius, Saintil, or Gassant.  HNP DG Andresol 
reported to Emboffs that he had told President Preval that if 
Lucius were forced to submit to Saintil's summons, Andresol 
would resign. 
 
ENTER PARLIAMENT 
---------- 
 
5. (SBU) With President Preval failing to arrange a 
compromise, nor moving to support either Saintil or Lucius, 
National Assembly President Joseph Lambert moved to bring the 
issue before the senate during the last week of October. 
Lambert announced the formation of a special senate committee 
of inquiry to be headed by Senator Youri Lartortue.  Lambert 
and the committee requested that Minister of Justice Magloire 
appear before them, but Magloire ignored the request. 
Saintil on October 27 also officially communicated to Lambert 
that he would also refuse to appear before a committee headed 
by Youri Latortue.  Saintil wrote to Lambert that Latortue 
was his "arch enemy"  having refused to testify during the 
2000 Raboteau massacre trial, over which he presided. 
Saintil further accused a security agent of Latortue's, Leon 
Leblanc, of attempting to assassinate him in March, 2004. 
 
WINNERS AND LOSERS 
---------- 
 
5.    (C) COMMENT.  Saintil's recusal would have ended this 
impasse, but Gassant's insistence that Lucius answer the 
summons appears to have put him on a collision course with 
the rest of the GoH.  Our contacts judge that Gassant is 
motivated by a desire to uphold the letter of the law, but 
many also believe that he has crossed a line of arrogance and 
obstinacy that may result in his ouster and will certainly 
interfere with judicial reform.  Preval dislikes Lucius, 
based on Lucius' controversial tenure in the HNP (ref A), but 
Preval's refusal to move against him indicates that 
Andresol's backing of Lucius has been the decisive factor 
keeping him in place.  (Lucius did reportedly tell Andresol 
that he would accept a transfer to a less visible post within 
the HNP.)  At the root of all of the above machinations lie 
the institutional weakness of Haiti to resolve these kinds of 
disputes and Preval's own unwillingness to take decisive 
action.  The more powerful personalities will eventually 
prevail in this impasse, but Haiti's judiciary and police 
will be further weakened in the process. 
 
 
TIGHE