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Viewing cable 06NDJAMENA1378, PRESIDENT DEBY ON INTERNATIONAL FORCE ON CHAD

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06NDJAMENA1378 2006-11-29 19:58 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ndjamena
VZCZCXRO1804
RR RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #1378/01 3331958
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 291958Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4627
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 0044
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 001378 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
LONDON AND PARIS OR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958 N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PREF CD SU
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT DEBY ON INTERNATIONAL FORCE ON CHAD 
BORDER 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 191795 
 
     B. NDJAMNA 1368 
     C. PARIS 7541 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary.  Meeting with the Ambassador, President 
Deby stressed that he was not against an international force 
in eastern Chad, but needed to know the composition, mandate 
and authority before taking a decision.  He reminded the 
Ambassador that Sudan would use any excuse to place a 
"pro-Arab" regime in N'djamena. The Government of Chad has 
proposed moving the Sudanese refugee camps further away from 
the border with Sudan in order to protect the refugees and to 
put an end to allegations that the camps were being used as 
bases by Sudanese rebels.  End summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) The Ambassador met with President Deby November 29 
for a forty-five minute discussion of security in Chad, 
including the situation of refugees in eastern Chad and 
Sudan's support for Chadian rebels.  The Ambassador had 
requested the meeting.  Foreign Minister Allam-mi, and three 
other presidential advisers were present. 
 
3.  (SBU)  Referring to the recent visit of Foreign Minister 
Allam-mi to Washington, the Ambassador expressed his hope 
that there would be other high-level exchanges.  President 
Deby responded that this was his hope as well, noting the 
importance of exchanging views given the current situation in 
Chad.  The Ambassador shared with President Deby sections of 
the Department's most recent press guidance (reftel A) which 
states that the United States supports the established 
government of Chad, led by President Deby, condemns the use 
of violence to achieve political goals, and urges all 
Chadians to engage in dialogue to address political 
grievance.  He then turned to border issues, and stressed 
that threats to Chadians, Sudanese refugees and humanitarian 
workers were of deep concern to the United States Government 
(USG).  The Ambassador continued that it was important to put 
in place an effective security force and requested the 
President's views on such a force in light of the recent 
declaration of a "state of war" with Sudan.  The Ambassador 
also queried the President as to whether it was possible to 
encourage a dialogue to resolve conflicts, including with the 
political opposition. 
 
THREAT FROM DARFUR 
------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU)  President Deby commented that these were all 
timely questions.  Concerning political dialogue, he noted 
that this issue had been discussed with Ambassador Yamamoto 
during his recent visits.  President Deby thanked the 
Ambassador "from the bottom of his heart" for the information 
contained in the press guidance and reminded him that Chad 
had - since 2004 -- been trying to call to the attention of 
the international community the threat that it faced from 
Sudan.  He noted that he had been the first African president 
to welcome a UN force in Darfur.  He had also early on asked 
that the Darfur dossier be moved from the African Union (AU) 
to the UN in view of the AU's failure to resolve the 
situation (despite the AU's unhappiness with his position.) 
Nonetheless, the Darfur crisis was still not resolved and 
Sudan refused to allow UN forces into Darfur. Given that 
Sudan had refused, UN forces could go through Chad and the 
Central African Republic (CAR), but would that not be an 
invitation to Sudan to seek "regime change" in Chad and CAR? 
And, President Deby continued, would this not give the upper 
hand to the "wahabists" who were the origins of the war in 
Afghanistan and currently spilling blood in Iraq?  Sudan, he 
claimed, sought to put in place a pro-Arab regime in Chad and 
then seek to resolve the Darfur crisis by force. 
 
SUDANESE AGGRESSION - NOT A CHADIAN REBELLION 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) President Deby continued that he had little 
patience for discussion of Chadian rebels.  During the April 
13 attacks the "chiefs" were Chadian, but the soldiers were 
Sudanese or from other countries.  How could one say that 
this was a Chadian rebellion, given the nationality of the 
soldiers, the origin of the weaponry and the uniforms? He was 
willing to speak with the "political class" -- if they were 
serious and had the best interests of the Chadian people at 
heart.  He had never refused dialogue with the political 
opposition, but would not dialogue with mercenaries that 
Sudan was placing in the east.  President Deby commented that 
Chad had experienced a similar situation in the eighties, 
when the international community failed to recognize that 
Chad was being occupied by Libya.  He himself had traveled