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Viewing cable 06NDJAMENA1350, UN AND NGO COMMUNITY ON INTERNATIONAL FORCE FOR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06NDJAMENA1350 2006-11-22 16:43 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ndjamena
VZCZCXRO6883
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #1350/01 3261643
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 221643Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4594
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0869
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0126
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR PRIORITY 1226
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0355
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 0125
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0346
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 001350 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CD PGOV PREL SU UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: UN AND NGO COMMUNITY ON INTERNATIONAL FORCE FOR 
EASTERN CHAD: NO INTERNAL INTERFERENCE 
 
 
NDJAMENA 00001350  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
 1. (SBU) SUMMARY. In two separate meetings on November 21, 
the United Nations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
in Chad made clear that any eventual international force on 
the eastern border with Sudan should focus on protection of 
humanitarian corridors and not involve itself in Chadian 
internal political-military affairs.  The UN Technical 
Assessment Team (TAM), currently in the Central African 
Republic, will return to N'Djamena on November 27 when it 
will brief the diplomatic community before traveling to the 
east from November 28-30.  UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO) Assistant Secretary-General Hedi Annabi 
will meet up with the TAM in Chad on November 30 and will 
brief the Ambassador on the TAM's conclusions on December 2. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (SBU) On November 21, UN agencies in Chad hosted two 
separate meetings to brief the diplomatic and NGO communities 
about the impending visit of the Technical Assessment Mission 
(TAM) from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(DPKO).  The TAM arrived briefly in Chad November 21 before 
flying immediately to the Central African Republic to begin 
its work there.  The office of the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP), which is coordinating the TAM's visit, hosted 
a small meeting for the diplomatic community.  Later in the 
day, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) hosted a second meeting open to members of the NGO 
community with a view to finding a consolidated position to 
present to the TAM when it met with them on November 27. 
 
WHAT A FORCE WILL DO 
-------------------- 
3. (SBU) UNDP, OCHA and the NGO community were unambiguous 
that any eventual international presence in eastern Chad 
should be mandated to protect refugees and to the extent 
possible internally displaced persons (IDPs).  It should also 
be responsible for protecting humanitarian corridors to allow 
unobstructed access between the refugee camps, IDP zones and 
humanitarian bases of operation and to prevent further 
deterioration of the overall humanitarian situation. 
 
4. (SBU) UNDP Chief Kingsley Amaning was explicit that the 
force should serve as a clearly visible deterrent against 
humanitarian displacements and cross-borderQttacks, in 
particular the Janjaweed  He also said that the force should 
act as a barrier against rebel infiltration into the refugee 
camps.  Amaning also looked to the force to report on human 
rights violations occurring in eastern Chad as a means of 
highlighting for the international community the magnitude of 
the "atrocities." 
 
WHAT A FORCE WILL NOT DO 
------------------------ 
5. (SBU) At both meetings the UN and NGO communities made 
clear their belief that the eventual force should not get 
involved in Chadian political-military internal affairs. 
Specifically, UNDP warned against the force's being seen as 
supporting the Government of Chad's (GOC) political-military 
aspirations or as intervening against the powerful anti-Deby 
rebellion.  UNHCR later pointed out that avoiding such 
pitfalls would be easier in theory than in practice.  UNDP 
also cautioned against the force assuming entirely what 
should be the GOC's responsibility to protect the 
humanitarian community operating in the east.  The issue of 
whether the force would have the authority to chase 
perpetrators across the border was debated but not resolved. 
 
TO ARM OR NOT TO ARM 
-------------------- 
6. (SBU) No consensus could be reached among the UN and 
humanitarian representatives over whether an international 
presence in eastern Chad should be armed and as such be 
allowed to make armed interventions.  UNDP insists that 
President Deby's precondition for accepting such a force in 
Chad, which, in UNDP's view would be unarmed police forces, 
made the issue a moot point, but NGOs in particular 
questioned the efficacy of a unarmed team of monitors in the 
face of an armed, aggressive enemy. 
 
7. (SBU) The CARE Country Director argued that by way of 
precedent, the only factor that brought peace and ultimately 
established order in Sierra Leone was the arrival of armed 
British forces.  A UNHCR representative countered that the 
unarmed UN Protection Force in Bosnia was an example of a 
 
NDJAMENA 00001350  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
successful unarmed monitoring mission.  Representatives of 
the diplomatic community were equally skeptical of how a 
force that lacked the mandate to "shoot back" could be 
effective in eastern Chad. 
 
THE BIGGER THE FORCE, THE BETTER 
-------------------------------- 
8. (SBU) There was general agreement among the humanitarian 
and UN agencies that a force size of several hundred civilian 
forces would be insufficient to ensure security in eastern 
Chad, given the number of troops amassing on both sides of 
the border and given the deterioration of the situation as a 
result of inter-ethnic conflict, such as in Goz Beida.  UNDP 
argued that the bigger the force size, the stronger the 
message sent as a deterrent. 
 
9. (SBU) UNDP raised the point that force size may be 
determined by whether or not "hybrid" forces are ultimately 
deployed in Darfur.  If troop levels on that side of the 
border are sufficiently high to secure the situation, Amaning 
asserted that a similarly large presence might not be 
necessary in eastern Chad.  He also noted President Deby's 
concerns that a large UN force on the border might give 
Sudanese President Bashir a pretext to further destabilize 
Chad. 
 
THE SOONER, THE BETTER 
---------------------- 
10. (SBU) UNDP Chief told the diplomatic corps that he did 
not expect any force to arrive in Chad before the end of 
January 2007, something the NGO community grudgingly 
acknowledged, although they continued to hope to have the 
force installed as soon as possible.  UNDP pledged to raise 
issues of timing and force size with DPKO A/SYG Hedi Annabi 
when he met up with the TAM November 30.  Annabi is scheduled 
to de-brief the Ambassador on December 2 after his meeting 
with President Deby earlier in the day.  As a sidenote, UNDP 
Chief informed that French PM de Villepin would visit 
N'Djamena for four hours beginning at 0930 local time on 
November 30 as one leg of a trip that also includes 
Johannesburg and Brazzaville. 
WALL