Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06KINSHASA1740, VIOLENCE QUELLED, BUT KINSHASA TENSELY AWAITING

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06KINSHASA1740.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KINSHASA1740 2006-11-14 09:15 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kinshasa
VZCZCXRO8017
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #1740/01 3180915
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 140915Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5148
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001740 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV ASEC CG KPKO CASC ELECTIONS
SUBJECT: VIOLENCE QUELLED, BUT KINSHASA TENSELY AWAITING 
ELECTION RESULT ANNOUNCEMENT 
 
 
1.  (U) Summary:  Three hours of violence erupted in the 
Gombe district of central Kinshasa late in the morning on 
Saturday, November 11.  Most of the fighting occurred near 
the official residence of Vice President Bemba on Gombe's 
main thoroughfare, and near Bemba's private riverside 
residence.  Though there are several versions of what sparked 
the violence, what is clear is that both the Bemba and Kabila 
camps worked together quickly to diffuse a potentially 
explosive situation.  The Presidential Guard did not deploy, 
and police and military forces appear to have reacted with 
restraint.  Fighting ended by early afternoon, and 
representatives of the two candidates met with each other and 
with MONUC.  No new incidents have occurred, though Kinshasa 
remains on edge in anticipation of the announcement of 
provincial results of the presidential election.  End summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) Fighting broke out in the Gombe quarter of central 
Kinshasa late in the morning of Saturday, November 11. 
Dozens of street gang members (locally known as "shegues") 
and armed men in civilian clothes burned tires and blocked 
traffic in at least three locations, while others threw rocks 
at passing motorists on Gombe's 30 June Boulevard.  (Note: 
Rocks broke the rear windows of a vehicle being driven by one 
mission employee, as reported separately via DS channel.  The 
employee was not injured and immediately drove from the 
scene.  End note.)  In an attempt to disperse these 
demonstrators in front of Bemba's official residence on 30 
June Boulevard at around 1100, police fired shots in the air. 
 Interior Minister Kalume reported later that police had also 
used tear gas.  Armed men in civilian attire then fired at 
police, setting off sporadic exchanges of gunfire that lasted 
for almost three hours.  Shooting, punctuated by several 
booms from RPGs, occurred near Bemba's official residence, 
near his riverside private residence, and near the residence 
of Air Force Chief of Staff John Numbi (who apparently was 
not at home).  Per the Interior Minister, the fighting 
resulted in the deaths of three civilians and one security 
officer. 
 
3.  (SBU) Bemba was in a meeting with the Belgian Ambassador 
at Bemba's private residence when the shooting broke out. 
Shortly thereafter, Bemba met with SRSG Swing and MONUC Force 
Commander Babacar Gaye.  President Kabila was in telephone 
contact with Bemba soon after the fighting began, as was 
Interior Minister Kalume.  Bemba made numerous calls to 
commanders of his militia in order to put a stop to the 
shooting.  Except for several scattered and smaller incidents 
later in the afternoon, fighting ended around 1245 and Swing 
and Gaye left Bemba's residence shortly thereafter.  An 
emergency meeting of the Working Group, which included 
representatives of both camps and Congolese security forces, 
took place at 1430.  Bemba claimed at the time and 
subsequently that the fighting was not initiated by his MLC, 
but rather by extreme elements not under his control. 
 
4.  (SBU) All fighting ended in Gombe by mid-afternoon and no 
new incidents have occurred since.  Importantly, there were 
no demonstrations nor any acts of violence in any other area 
of Kinshasa, where business continued as usual.  Even in 
Gombe, where many businesses closed and where there was 
little traffic over the weekend, activity quickly resumed.  A 
large National Day reception at the Angolan Ambassador's 
residence in Gombe took place as planned in the early evening 
of November 11 without incident.  (Note: On November 13, 
Kinshasa Governor Badonin Liwanga issued a statement that 
police had detained 337 "shegues" after the violence.  Most 
are being sent to rural training centers outside of Kinshasa. 
 End note.) 
 
5.  (SBU) AmCits were advised through the warden system to 
remain indoors during and after the fighting.  With the 
exception of the Mission employee whose vehicle was stoned 
(para 2), we are not aware of any AmCits who were directly 
caught up in any of the violence. 
 
6.  (SBU) The International Committee to Accompany the 
Transition (CIAT) convened the afternoon of Sunday, November 
12.  MONUC forces are now permanently positioned at Bemba's 
official residence on 30 June Boulevard, and Bemba has 
indicated he will withdraw most of his militia from the 
vicinity.  Bemba also agreed to participate in "joint" 
military patrols in a traditional hotspot area around 30 June 
Boulevard with General Numbi's guards and with FARDC's 7th 
Integrated Brigade forces.  During a November 13 meeting with 
the Ambassador and Political Counselor (septel), Bemba 
 
KINSHASA 00001740  002 OF 002 
 
 
reiterated his determination to avoid any further violence in 
Kinshasa. 
 
7.  (SBU) Comment:  The critical (and fortunate) difference 
between this flare-up and the violence of August 20-22 is 
that the two principals moved relatively quickly to contain 
the situation rather than to escalate it.  In August, both 
sides used their military forces to attack the other.  This 
time, the Presidential Guard was not deployed, and police and 
military forces did not overreact.  That said, there are 
clearly potential troublemakers within the broad coalition 
that Bemba assembled in the second round.  These elements may 
have been behind, or at least fanning the flames of, the 
problems on Saturday.  In an already tense environment, and 
with election results expected to be announced soon, the 
recent violence is a stark reminder that even a small spark 
has the potential to ignite trouble. 
MEECE