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Viewing cable 06ISTANBUL2100, ISTANBUL CONFERENCE SEES NEW U.S. POLICY TREND IN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ISTANBUL2100 2006-11-21 14:49 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Consulate Istanbul
VZCZCXRO5164
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHIT #2100/01 3251449
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 211449Z NOV 06
FM AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6371
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 002100 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: ISTANBUL CONFERENCE SEES NEW U.S. POLICY TREND IN 
THE MIDDLE EAST 
 
 
1.  Summary.  A largely academic audience responded 
positively to visiting scholar Dr. Ian Lesser of the Woodrow 
Wilson Center and former Foreign Minister Ilter Turkmen's 
discussion of the "Future of Turkish-American Relations." 
Lesser and Turkmen inaugurated Sabanci University's Istanbul 
Policy Center on November 17 addressing Turkish perceptions 
of the U.S. and anticipated changes in U.S. policy in Iraq. 
Lesser anticipated the Administration's policy in Iraq would 
shift to a "traditional, multilateral" approach, with U.S. 
troops redeploying to Northern Iraq, but no precipitate 
withdrawal.  Lesser and Turkeman agreed that Turkey and the 
U.S. would both oppose a new nuclear power (Iran) in the 
neighborhood.  Turkmen described the U.S.-Turkey relationship 
in largely favorable terms, but noted that public perception 
has a 'disturbingly' anti-U.S., anti-EU bent, fueled by 
nationalism as well as radical leftism and exacerbated by the 
summer 2006 Israeli military action in Lebanon. End summary. 
 
2.  Former Minister of Foreign Affairs (1980-83) and current 
Hurriyet columnist Ilter Turkmen and former S-S/P staffer 
(1994-95) and now public policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson 
Center Dr. Ian Lesser addressed the opening of Sabanci 
University's Istanbul Policy Center. Turkmen's perspective is 
informed by 40-plus years of public service; he noted the 
U.S.-Turkey relationship always has ups and downs but that 
the relationship is distinguished as Turkey's lengthiest 
(formal) bilateral relationship.  Current negative public 
perceptions of the U.S. are fed by radical leftists and 
nationalists, infused with a mixture of religious enthusiasm. 
 Current public perceptions about the U.S., he argued, were 
mostly wrong but aggravated by disproportionate Israeli use 
of force against Palestinians generally and the Lebanese this 
past summer more particularly.  Turks believe the U.S. 
colludes with Israel in these matters.  Ian Lesser took note 
of rising nationalism in Turkey from left and right.  Poll 
results count more today in terms of influencing government 
than they did in the Cold War period when there was a 
bilateral bargain for survival and after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, Lesser said that Turkey denied strategic use of 
Incirlik airbase, for instance.  In the long term, however, 
the key question was not a particular issue like EU accession 
but Turkey's convergence -- or not -- with Europe and the 
West, which Lesser said is not in doubt. 
 
3.  Turkmen reflected on the huge - and positive - cultural 
shift brought about among Turkey's military elite through 
NATO membership and friendship with American general 
officers.  He recounted his personal experience as a junior 
MFA officer assigned to Turkey's first NATO mission when the 
country had its first "annual review" in 1952.  When Turkey 
was told it should retire its only (WW I) era battleship, 
some Turkish officers shed tears.  The strong military 
relationship with the U.S. has forever marked the Turkish 
military culture and Turkey's general officers honor the 
vital contribution of the United States. 
 
4.  Turning to Iraq and the war on terror, Lesser said the 
U.S. administration departed from traditional regional 
approaches to problem-solving and instead focused on 
functional problems, with the U.S. asking friends and allies 
for specific favors, thus changing the "timbre" of 
relationships.  The biennial U.S. elections helped the 
administration in moving toward a new policy it was already 
seeking.  The Iraq effort had been a strategic U.S. error, 
according to Lesser, but not an existential one as it is for 
some of Iraq's neighbors, including Turkey.  The current 
policy was not sustainable but headed toward a "more 
traditional, multilateral" approach; there would be no 
precipitate withdrawal but most likely a redeployed residual 
American force in Northern Iraq.  Coordination and 
cooperation with Turkey would be an integral part of any such 
effort.  Taking exception to Richard Haas' article in the 
current issue of Foreign Affairs, Lesser thought chaos in 
Iraq and the region was not inevitable and that there were 
still options for unilateral U.S. involvement.  Ambassador 
Turkmen said the U.S. experience in Iraq should be sufficient 
to dissuade Turkey from sending its troops into Northern 
Iraq, with or without an increased presence of U.S. troops in 
that region.  On the PKK, Lesser counseled staying with the 
original intent of the Ralston mission to address Turkey's 
security concerns and avoid making it a trilateral exercise. 
Regionally, Lesser predicted the U.S. would back away from a 
policy of regime change with a much reduced interest in 
risk-taking.  The EU, he said, could and should be involved 
in continuing tranformational efforts in the region with 
regime change no longer on the table. 
 
5. Considering Iran's nuclear gambit, Turkmen said the 
atmosphere in Turkey was "disturbing" because of anti-U.S., 
anti-EU tendencies in Turkish public and foreign policy 
 
ISTANBUL 00002100  002 OF 002 
 
 
circles.  Were the AK Party not in control of the Prime 
Ministry, Turkmen said there would be Islamist radicals in 
the streets shouting, "Allahu akbar!" in support of Iran. 
Lesser did not anticipate a military option -- American or 
Israeli -- in dealing with the threat of a nuclear Iran and 
opined the region would have to deal with a nuclear or near 
nuclear Iran for some time.  On the other hand, the U.S. 
remains the dominant military power in the region and could 
take certain military actions successfully on its own, such 
as keeping open the Strait of Hormuz.  However, America's 
military power is not hegemonic and has lost a "soft power" 
buttress.  Nevertheless, he argued, on all absolute issues, 
U.S. and Turkish views are convergent, both are status quo 
actors and neither want a new nuclear power in the 
neighborhood. 
 
6.  Comment.  The audience was largely receptive and 
questions tended to mirror points in the presentations. 
Turkmen closed the session answering a question on the 
up-tick in Turkish nationalism.  In 40 years in the 
diplomatic corps, he had never heard a colleague mention the 
Treaty of Sevres, underlining a point that the current 
fixation in some quarters, including among professionals, is 
not a healthy variant in the Republic's history. 
JONES