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Viewing cable 06DAKAR2779, 2006-2007 GUINEA-BISSAU INCSR PART II:

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06DAKAR2779 2006-11-21 10:20 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Dakar
VZCZCXRO4932
RR RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHDK #2779/01 3251020
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 211020Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6903
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 DAKAR 002779 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL, AF/RSA, AF/W, EB/ESC/TFS AND INR/AA 
JUSTICE FOR AFMLS, OIA AND OPDAT 
TREASURY FOR FINCEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN KCRM KTFN PTER SNAR PU
SUBJECT: 2006-2007 GUINEA-BISSAU INCSR PART II: 
FINANCIAL CRIME AND MONEY LAUNDERING 
 
REF: STATE 157136 
 
OVERVIEW 
-------- 
1.  This cable is Part Two of the 2006-2007 National 
Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Financial 
Crimes and Money Laundering report for Guinea-Bissau. 
Included is a narrative overview (paras 2-12).  Para 
13 contains responses keyed to the numbered questions 
beginning with Reftel paragraph 17. 
 
2.  Despite increased drug trafficking and the specter 
of oil production, Guinea-Bissau?s instability and 
tiny economy make it an unlikely site for major money 
laundering, except as the placement point for proceeds 
from drug payoffs, theft of foreign aid and corrupt 
diversion of oil and other state resources, headed for 
investment abroad. 
 
3.  Guinea-Bissau has adopted the uniform AML law and 
hopes to have an operational FIU by the end of the 
year.  Real progress, however, will be hampered if not 
entirely stalled by lack of capacity, corruption, 
instability, and distrust, particularly of the 
judicial sector.  As one banker commented, Guinea- 
Bissau is small and the judiciary is indiscreet; 
accordingly only a blatant transaction would likely 
cause the bank to incur the risk of filing a STR. 
 
4.  Three banks operate in Guinea-Bissau.  Western 
Union and MoneyGram are associated with the banks. 
The Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO), based 
in Dakar, is the Central Bank for the countries in the 
West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU or 
UEMOA):  Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d?Ivoire, Guinea- 
 
SIPDIS 
Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo, all of which 
use the French-backed CFA franc currency, which is 
linked to the euro.  The Commission Bancaire, 
responsible for bank inspections, is based in Abidjan. 
 
5.  On November 2, 2004, Guinea-Bissau became the 
third WAEMU country to enact the WAEMU Uniform Law on 
Money Laundering (the Uniform Law).  The new 
legislation largely meets international standards with 
respect to money laundering; it does not comply with 
FATF recommendations concerning politically-exposed 
persons, and lacks certain compliance provisions for 
non-financial institutions.  The law does not deal 
with terrorist financing. 
 
6.  On May 29, 2006, the Minister of Finance 
promulgated a decree establishing an FIU, although the 
FIU is not yet operational.  As of the date of 
writing, members had been selected, but not yet 
appointed by the President.  The FIU is expected to be 
in place by the end of the year, headquartered in the 
old BCEAO building in Bissau. 
 
7.  Official statistics regarding the prosecution of 
financial crimes are unavailable.  There are no known 
prosecutions of money laundering. 
 
8.  The penal code of Guinea-Bissau criminalizes 
terrorist financing.  However, there are no reporting 
requirements or attendant regulations.  The BCEAO is 
working on a directive against Terrorist Financing. 
The directive is expected to be presented to the WAEMU 
Council of Ministers in December 2006.  If adopted, 
the member states would be directed to enact a law 
against terrorist financing, which most likely would 
be presented as a Uniform Law in the same manner as 
the AML law.  Because, like the AML law, it is a penal 
law, each national assembly must then enact the law. 
(NOTE:  Since the uniform AML law was adopted by WAEMU 
in 2002, four of the eight member countries have 
enacted it.  END NOTE.)  In addition, the FATF-style 
regional body for the 15-member Economic Community of 
Western African States (ECOWAS), African Anti-Money 
Laundering Inter-governmental Group (GIABA) has 
drafted a uniform law, which it hopes to have enacted 
in all of its member states, not just the WAEMU 
states.  GIABA will present is draft at a conference 
November 21-23 in Niamey. 
 
9.  The UN 1267 Sanctions Committee consolidated list 
is circulated both by the BCEAO to commercial 
 
DAKAR 00002779  002 OF 005 
 
 
financial institutions and the Ministry of Finance. 
To date, no assets relating to terrorist entities have 
been identified.  The WAEMU Council of Ministers 
issued a directive in September 2002 requiring banks 
to freeze assets of entities designated by the 
Sanctions Committee. 
 
10.  Multilateral ECOWAS treaties deal with 
extradition and legal assistance.  Other bilateral 
accords are not known.  Under the Uniform Law, once 
established, the FIU may share information freely with 
other FIUs in WAEMU. 
 
11.  Guinea-Bissau is a party to the 1988 UN Drug 
Convention, has signed but not ratified the UN 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and 
has not signed or ratified the UN Convention against 
Corruption.  The status of the 1999 UN International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism and the African Union Convention on 
Terrorism Finance is not known. 
 
12.  The Government of Guinea-Bissau should continue 
to work with its partners in WAEMU and ECOWAS to 
establish a comprehensive anti-money laundering and 
counter-terrorist financing regime.  Guinea-Bissau 
should fully install its FIU, and work to improve the 
training and capacity of its police and judiciary to 
combat financial crimes. 
 
RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC REFTEL QUESTIONS 
-------------------------------------- 
13.  The following responses are to specific Reftel 
paragraphs/questions: 
 
GENERAL QUESTIONS 
----------------- 
Question 17: Is the country (or territory or 
dependency) considered an important regional financial 
center (such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Panama, 
Switzerland, etc.)?  What is its significance in terms 
of money laundering? 
 
-- Guinea-Bissau is neither a regional financial 
center, nor is money laundering thought to be 
significant.  Bissau?s banking sector is governed by 
the BCEAO, which issues the euro-pegged CFA franc 
(CFAF).  Along with the BCEAO, the ?Commission 
bancaire? is a supranational supervisory entity, based 
in Abidjan, Cote d?Ivoire, created in April 1990 to 
control and oversee financial institution operations. 
There are three banks in Guinea-Bissau, two of which 
(Banco da Uniao and Banco Regionale de Solidariedade) 
have begun operations in the last year and have 
between 6,000 and 9,000 accounts each.  The third 
bank, Banco da Africa Ocidental (BAO), began operating 
in 1999 as an investment bank and entered the retail 
market after the failure of then-other bank in Bissau, 
the Banco Internacional da Guine-Bissau, in 2002.  As 
of 2004, the BAO had approximately 7,000 accounts. 
 
Question 18: To the extent it is known, is money 
laundering/terrorist financing primarily related to 
narcotics proceeds?  (If applicable, specify drug.) 
If not, what is the major source(s) of the proceeds? 
Also to the extent known, do the criminal proceeds 
laundered in the jurisdiction derive primarily from 
domestic or foreign criminal activity?  Are the money 
laundering proceeds controlled by local drug- 
trafficking organizations, organized crime, or 
terrorist groups? 
 
-- Guinea-Bissau is increasingly being used by drug 
traffickers transiting between Latin America and 
Europe.  There is no evidence that drug proceeds are 
laundered in Bissau, however, other than proceeds that 
are used to buy off local officials or procure local 
cooperation.  For example, two reputed-to-be 
Columbians were arrested in 2006 with over 600 kilos 
of cocaine.  The two were later released and 
disappeared.  It seems likely that drug proceeds were 
involved. 
 
Question 19: Is there a significant black market for 
smuggled goods in the country?  If so, do you believe 
it is significantly funded by narcotic proceeds or 
 
DAKAR 00002779  003 OF 005 
 
 
other illicit proceeds?  Does contraband smuggling 
generate funds that are laundered through the banking 
system? 
 
-- Arms smuggling is believed to be prevalent, and 
drug proceeds likely fund arms purchases. 
 
Question 20: Does money laundering/terrorist financing 
occur in the banking system, within an offshore 
financial center or free trade zone, or in the non- 
bank financial system (e.g., exchange houses) or via 
alternative remittance systems such as hawala, or all 
areas?  Is the country experiencing an increase in 
financial crimes, not limited to money laundering or 
terrorist financing, such as bank fraud and 
counterfeit currency?  Please explain. 
 
-- The banking sector demonstrated a relatively high 
awareness of money laundering risks and all banks 
reportedly had compliance programs in place.  However, 
banking officials believed Bissau to be vulnerable to 
laundering, particularly via over- and under-invoicing 
of imports.  Guinea-Bissau has no known free trade 
zones and is not linked to offshore centers.  Official 
statistics regarding prosecution of financial crimes 
are unavailable. 
 
Question 21: To the post?s knowledge, do the country?s 
financial institutions engage in currency transactions 
involving international narcotics trafficking proceeds 
that include significant amounts of United States 
currency or currency derived from illegal drug sales 
in the United States or that otherwise significantly 
affect the United States? 
 
-- Guinea-Bissau appears to be a transit point between 
Latin America and Europe and does not significantly 
affect the U.S.  Bissau?s financial institutions do 
not appear to have a significant role in laundering 
drug proceeds. 
 
OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS 
-------------------------- 
Questions 22 to 24: These questions are not 
applicable, and are not reproduced, as Bissau has no 
offshore banking or other institutions. 
 
FREE TRADE ZONES 
---------------- 
Question 25: Are there free trade zones operating in 
the jurisdiction?  If so, please give the number and 
briefly describe operations, capability and function. 
 
-- Bissau has no known free trade zones. 
 
Questions 26 and 27 pertain to free trade zones and 
are not reproduced. 
 
LAWS AND REGULATIONS TO PREVENT MONEY LAUNDERING 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Question 28: Is money laundering a criminal offense in 
this country? 
 
-- Yes, in 2004, Guinea-Bissau became the third WAEMU 
country to pass WAEMU harmonized legislation 
establishing a uniform law on money laundering. 
 
Question 28 (continued): Does the law apply only to 
drug-related money laundering?  Does the country list 
specific crimes or take an all serious crimes 
approach?  Note: In some jurisdictions, anti-money 
laundering laws cover ?all serious crimes? which are 
defined as crimes that carry a threshold minimum 
sentence in the jurisdiction?s penal code.  If the 
country lists specific crimes, what offenses are 
covered?  If there is a threshold minimum, what is 
that threshold? 
 
-- Under the new legislation, the source of the 
proceeds can be any crime. 
 
Question 29: Has the country enacted secrecy laws that 
prevent disclosure of client and ownership information 
by domestic and offshore financial services companies 
to bank supervisors and law enforcement authorities? 
 
 
DAKAR 00002779  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
-- The uniform law on money laundering enables banking 
information to be shared with law enforcement 
authorities.  The law states:  ?Notwithstanding all 
contrary legal provisions or rules, professional 
secrecy may not be invoked . . . to refuse providing 
information to the control authorities.? 
 
QUESTION 30: Do current laws provide for the 
establishment and funding of a financial intelligence 
unit (FIU)? 
 
-- The current law provides for the establishment, 
albeit not funding, of an FIU.  A directive 
establishing an FIU was signed in May 2006, but the 
FIU has not yet begun operations. 
 
FINANCIAL SECTOR 
---------------- 
Question 31: Who supervises and examines financial 
institutions for compliance with anti-money 
laundering/counter-terrorist financing laws and 
regulations? 
 
-- The Banking Commission has the responsibility to 
supervise financial institution compliance with 
AML/CTF laws and regulations.  The Commission 
reportedly has conducted some AML compliance 
examinations; however, due to the fact that half of 
the member states have not adopted the uniform law, 
its efforts have been limited. 
 
Question 32: Are banks and other financial 
institutions required to know, record, and report the 
identity of customers engaging in significant 
transactions, including the recording of large 
currency transaction at thresholds appropriate to the 
country?s economic situation?  What is the statutory 
threshold? 
 
-- National Assembly resolution number four in 2004 
deals with money laundering.  Article 26 stipulates 
that if a bank suspects money laundering it must 
obtain a declaration of all properties and assets from 
the suspect and notify the Attorney General who is 
then required to appoint a judge to investigate. 
 
Question 33: Are banks and other financial 
institutions required to maintain for an adequate time 
records necessary to reconstruct significant 
transactions through financial institutions in order 
to be able to respond quickly to information requests 
from appropriate government authorities in narcotics- 
related or other money laundering or terrorist finance 
cases?  For how long? 
 
-- The law requires financial institutions to preserve 
records for at least ten years. 
 
Question 34: Are the money laundering controls applied 
to non-banking financial institutions, such as 
exchange houses, stock brokerages, cash couriers, 
casinos, insurance companies, etc., and to 
intermediaries, such as lawyers, accountants, or 
brokers/dealers?  Who supervises such entities for 
compliance? 
 
-- The law applies to a host of sectors, including all 
of those listed above and others.  Some entities have 
government regulatory authorities; others (such as 
attorneys and accountants) have professional 
supervisory authorities, while others have no 
effective regulator. 
 
Question 35: Do financial institutions report 
suspicious transactions?  Is such reporting mandatory 
or voluntary?  Is reporting required for all 
suspicious transaction, or is there a threshold amount 
below which suspicious transaction reports are not 
required?  Are non-bank financial institutions 
required to report such transactions? 
 
-- The law requires financial institutions to report 
suspicious transactions to the FIU; there is no 
minimum threshold.  Non-bank financial institutions 
are also required to report.  As yet, however, there 
is no FIU. 
 
DAKAR 00002779  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
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