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Viewing cable 06COLOMBO1819, GOVERNMENT BLAMES LTTE FOR JAFFNA HUMANITARIAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06COLOMBO1819 2006-11-02 11:05 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Colombo
VZCZCXRO7323
PP RUEHBI
DE RUEHLM #1819/01 3061105
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 021105Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4603
INFO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 6452
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 4506
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3283
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0130
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 3372
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0944
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 0280
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2453
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 7006
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 4838
RUEHON/AMCONSUL TORONTO 0075
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1460
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0476
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001819 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/INS, USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV CE
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT BLAMES LTTE FOR JAFFNA HUMANITARIAN 
CRISIS; ANNOUNCES PLAN FOR PRIVATE SECTOR TO HELP 
 
REF: COLOMBO 1812 
 
 1.  (SBU) Minister of Healthcare and Nutrition and lead 
peace negotiator DeSilva briefed the Sri Lankan Diplomatic 
Corps on November 2 on the outcome of the peace talks and 
government plans to mobilize the private sector to help meet 
humanitarian needs in Jaffna.  DeSilva disagreed with press 
characterizations that the talks had been a failure noting 
that it would be unrealistic to expect quick solutions to a 
problem that had lasted more than 30 years.  He said the 
talks in Geneva had been cordial, which augured well for 
future talks, and had focused on a political settlement and 
humanitarian issues. 
 
2.  (SBU) With respect to a political settlement DeSilva 
expressed satisfaction with the interaction that had taken 
place.  He said the LTTE had welcomed the southern consensus 
produced by the SLFP-UNP agreement.  He also said talks 
marked the first serious discussion between the two sides on 
a political settlement.  He provided no further details on 
the content of the political settlement discussions. 
(Ambassador will attend a briefing for Co-Chair Ambassadors 
by Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar on Friday November 3 where 
we expect to get more details.) 
 
3.  (SBU) DeSilva blamed the LTTE for humanitarian 
difficulties in Jaffna.  He disputed LTTE claims that the A-9 
road to Jaffna was closed.  He said the road was not closed; 
only the northern Omantai checkpoint is closed.  He pointed 
out that if the government truly intended to starve the LTTE 
it would have closed the road at a checkpoint further south. 
DeSilva further contended that the only reason for the 
closure of the Omantai checkpoint was that the LTTE had begun 
mortar shelling of the area on August 11.  Before then, the 
checkpoint had been open.  DeSilva also echoed long-standing 
GSL complaints that every truck proceeding through LTTE 
territory had to pay a 500,000 rp. (USD 5,000) tax.  DeSilva 
told the gathering that the GSL wants to ship food to Jaffna, 
but requires security guarantees.  He pointed out that UN 
Under Secretary General Egeland likewise had stated the UN's 
readiness to provide relief by sea, but also needs LTTE 
security assurances before doing so.  DeSilva concluded that 
these points demonstrate that the LTTE is intentionally 
preventing food from reaching Jaffna to try to score points 
against the government.  He nonetheless stated that the 
government is determined to deliver food and other supplies 
to Jaffna as soon as modalities can be worked out. 
 
4.  (U) DeSilva concluded by stating the GSL's readiness to 
return to negotiations even if there is not a full cease fire 
in place.  He complained that the LTTE had already broken the 
cease fire and reiterated that the GSL has no plans to 
initiate offensive actions, but will continue to defend 
itself if fired on. 
 
5.  (SBU) Minister of Enterprise Development and Investment 
Promotion Bogollagama then announced plans by the government 
to mobilize the Sri Lankan private sector to help relieve 
humanitarian conditions in Jaffna.  He said the government 
had asked the private sector to provide ships that can carry 
humanitarian cargoes from the ports of Colombo and 
Trincomalee to three ports in northern Sri Lanka.  He said 
the government aims to send 20,000 metric tons of food per 
month to Jaffna starting in November.  He noted 
parenthetically that the government also was planning to 
bring 3,000 metric tons from Chennai.  Ambassador Blake asked 
Bogolllagama why the government thought the private sector 
would be willing to ship supplies to the north when the ICRC 
and UN refused to do so in the absence of security guarantees 
from the LTTE.  Bogollagama responded that the Navy would 
provide security and that insurance arrangements would also 
need to be worked out. 
 
COLOMBO 00001819  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
6.  (SBU)  Comment:  While the government clearly is looking 
for ways to help relieve the situation in Jaffna, it does not 
appear that they have fully thought through how such a 
private sector mechanism could work in practice.  If ships 
flagged by the ICRC and the UN are reluctant to brave the 
passage to Jaffna, it is unlikely that private ships will do 
so even with the protection of the Navy.  Ambassador will 
host a co-chair meeting on November 7 to prepare for the 
November 20th co-chairs meeting in Washington.  We will use 
that occasion to seek co-chair Ambassador consensus on a way 
forward to resolve the Jaffna humanitarian impasse. 
BLAKE