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Viewing cable 06BUENOSAIRES2590, POST SUPPORTS DELAY OF HEZBOLLAH TRI-BORDER AREA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BUENOSAIRES2590 2006-11-20 17:41 2011-04-10 00:00 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Buenos Aires
Appears in these articles:
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1364384-el-temor-oculto-del-gobierno-a-nuevos-actos-terroristas
VZCZCXYZ0013
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBU #2590/01 3241741
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 201741Z NOV 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6527
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION IMMEDIATE 5743
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 5596
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO IMMEDIATE 5948
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T BUENOS AIRES 002590 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC -- ZARATE 
TREASURY FOR TFI -- HEFFERNAN 
DHS FOR ICE -- D.THOMPSON 
STATE FOR S/CT -- NOYES 
STATE FOR WHA -- MCCARTHY/CROFT 
STATE FOR EB/ESC -- DAS SIMONS AND JEAN CLARK 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2026 
TAGS: KFTFN EFIN PTER SNAR ETTC PREL AR
SUBJECT: POST SUPPORTS DELAY OF HEZBOLLAH TRI-BORDER AREA 
TERRORIST FINANCE DESIGNATIONS 
 
REF: A. BRASILIA 2420 
 
     B. 11/15 JEAN CLARK EMAIL 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR E.A. WAYNE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B AND D). 
 
Summary 
------- 
1. (S/NF) Post understands that Treasury proposes the 
designation under E.O. 13224, on November 21, of nine 
individuals and two organizations operating in the tri-border 
region.  Post does not object to the specific individuals and 
organizations that will be subject to the designation. 
However, Post believes that for operational and political 
reasons the decision and announcement should be postponed. 
Post believes the eventual designation of these targets would 
be more effective if approached on a case by case basis. 
Post fully supports AmEmbassy Brasilia arguments (Ref a), 
particularly with regards to taking into account local 
sensitivities, the need to coordinate with local and regional 
security and intelligence agencies, and the timing in 
relation to the early December 3 plus 1 meeting. 
Furthermore, we note that an announcement not coordinated 
with our regional partners could jeopardize ongoing DEA and 
SIMO operations targeting several of these individuals and 
organizations.  Finally, this is a particularly sensitive 
time in Argentina following the release of the AMIA 
investigative report/indictment.  Moving too rapidly and 
without coordinating the public designation of these 
individuals could be counterproductive and reverse the 
positive momentum building in recent weeks and months.  While 
fully supporting the designations, Post recommends Treasury 
postpone them until they can be integrated into and 
coordinated with ongoing operational timetables.  End Summary. 
 
InterAgency Agreement to Postpone Nov. 21 Designation 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
2. (S/NF) We understand from the State Department (Ref B) 
that Treasury is proposing to designate under E.O. 13224 on 
November 21, 2006, nine individuals and two organizations 
operating in the tri-border region in support of Hezbollah. 
While none of the individuals/organizations on the list is 
from Argentina, Post has significant equities at stake that 
could be jeopardized by an uncoordinated and precipitous 
announcement.  Member agencies of Post's Law Enforcement 
Committee, including Legatt, DEA, SIMO, DAO, Treasury OTA, 
ECON, and POL sections, have contributed and cleared on the 
following response.  We appreciate the opportunity to provide 
input into this process. 
 
Post's Concerns with Uncoordinated Designation 
--------------------------------------------- - 
3. (S/NF) The majority of these individuals and organizations 
are well known to agencies at Post.  We strongly support 
their eventual designation under E.O. 13224.  However, we 
have serious concerns regarding the timing of the proposed 
designations and the lack of advance warning to our GoA 
interlocutors. 
 
-- (S/NF) Ongoing enforcement operations are targeting most 
of the individuals and organizations listed, and publicly 
aligning them with terrorism and terrorist activities, 
without coordinating with the agencies undertaking the 
operations -- or collaborating with local and regional 
security and intelligence services -- would jeopardize the 
tremendous amount of operational equities in place. 
 
-- (S/NF) As AmEmbassy Brasilia notes (Ref A), the 
governments of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay deny that 
there is evidence of ""operational acts of terrorism"" in the 
tri-border area, and we publicly agreed with this statement 
in the 2005 3 plus 1 meeting communique.  We also committed 
to ""the prompt exchange of information in order to deter 
illegal acts.""  Therefore, public designation of individuals 
 
and organizations operating in this region, and without prior 
notification to and discussions with the other countries 
involved, would be seen as a repudiation of our previous 
public statement, and could disrupt the early December 3 plus 
1 discussions. 
 
GoA Reaction and Case for Delay 
------------------------------- 
4. (S/NF) There is a strong potential for political fallout 
locally from the sudden U.S. domestic designation of these 
individuals and entities.  Although we do not believe the GoA 
would object in principle to any of the targets proposed for 
domestic designation, we do expect that the GoA, and 
particularly Argentine security and intel agencies, would 
object strenuously to an uncoordinated announcement.  This 
would complicate and likely hinder future bilateral law 
enforcement cooperation.  We argue, therefore, that the case 
for postponing the designations is compelling: 
 
-- (S/NF) Delaying the designations would give Post agencies 
time to collaborate locally and integrate the coming 
designations into specific ongoing operations, and would 
further allow us to use the publicity to best effect.  Moving 
forward with the designations on the current timetable would, 
on the contrary, contribute to souring relations with local 
law enforcement contacts. 
 
-- (S/NF) In addition, there is relatively strong 
anti-American sentiment in Argentina, and the Kirchner 
administration's natural inclination is to reject U.S. 
pressure.  Therefore, a rushed and uncoordinated designation 
could contribute to alienating both bilateral and public 
support, just as the fallout from the AMIA investigative 
report and indictments is aligning Argentine and U.S. 
interests and driving a wedge between the public and 
Hezbollah supported groups and activities.  Not only might 
this play a role in undermining GoA support in the tri-border 
region, it could complicate our longer term effort to 
convince the GoA to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist group. 
 Already some press reports have accused the GoA of being a 
tool of the U.S. and Israel on the AMIA case.  These 
sentiments could easily find widespread echo if the U.S. acts 
unilaterally. 
 
Post Comment and Recommendation 
------------------------------- 
5. (S/NF) Post is extremely supportive of Treasury overall 
goals of designating terrorist organizations, facilitators, 
financiers, and inciters, and they are a crucial aspect of 
the overall effort to target and take down terrorist groups 
and individuals.  However, they will be more effective if we 
integrate them into an overall operational plan. 
Specifically, if Treasury's actions are organized to coincide 
with takedowns, arrests, and seizures by local authorities, 
the impact would be much greater and further reaching.  At a 
minimum, close consultation and coordination with local 
authorities will help assure much more productive results. 
Therefore, we invite Treasury officials to visit Argentina 
and the region, participate in meetings with local security 
and Intel forces, and discuss how to move forward with the 
designations -- case by case -- so that they serve as the 
culmination of successful, multilateral counter-terrorist 
operations.  End Comment. 
WAYNE