Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06BRASILIA2521, BRAZILIANS BEGIN TO SPEAK OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL "CRISIS"

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06BRASILIA2521.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BRASILIA2521 2006-11-30 16:46 2011-07-11 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO2904
PP RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #2521/01 3341646
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 301646Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7529
INFO RULSDMK/DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHDC
RHMFIUU/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEANHA/FAA NATIONAL HQS WASHINGTON DC
RUEWMFU/TSA HQ WASHINGTON DC
RUWDQAB/NTSB WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 3461
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 8756
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 5943
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 4440
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 5958
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 6614
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 5811
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 3274
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 4024
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3529
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 5023
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 2060
RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO 1194
RUCPDO/USDOC WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 002521 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
TSA FOR VICKI REEDER, SUSAN HASMAN 
 
SIPDIS 
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PASS TSA ATTACHE JOCHOA 
FAA FOR C. TERE FRANCESCHI 
CA FOR OVERSEAS CITIZENS SERVICES 
DOD FOR OSD 
NTSB FOR JOHN CLARK, BOB MACINTOSH 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAIR OTRA CASC ECON BR
SUBJECT:  BRAZILIANS BEGIN TO SPEAK OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL "CRISIS" 
 
REF: BRASILIA 2315 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Brazilian Air Traffic Controllers' continued "work 
to rule" operation, which reduces the number of aircraft each 
controller handles to the maximum allowed by International Civil 
Aviation Organization standards (14), has made flight delays routine 
in Brazil: on November 27, according to the press, almost a quarter 
of all flights nationwide were delayed by at least 30 minutes.  The 
situation was worse over recent holidays, when the great majority of 
flights faced delays.  The press also has reported the existence of 
radar blind spots and communication gaps in the area where Brazil's 
worst aviation disaster occurred: the September 29 mid-air collision 
between a U.S.-registered ExcelAire executive jet and a Gol Airlines 
Boeing 737 over Eastern Matto Grosso state.  The commander of the 
Brazilian Air Force, which is responsible for Air Traffic Control 
(ATC), and the Defense Minister were forced to acknowledge during a 
Congressional hearing that ATC errors may have been contributing 
factors in the September 29 tragedy.  In addition, the press has 
made sensational new revelations about four near-misses between 
aircraft in flight since May 2006, two of which occurred since 
September 29, which easily could have resulted in collisions and 
fatalities.  All this has created a palpable public sense that 
Brazil's air traffic control system is in "crisis."  Air Force 
General Paulo Roberto Vilarinho was relieved as Director of the 
Department of Airspace Control due to the ongoing problems.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
2. (U) Flight delays have become the rule in Brazil over the last 
two months as air traffic controllers have instituted a 
"work-to-rule" operation in the workplace, reducing the number of 
flights each controller handles.  The Brazilian press has started 
reporting on flight delays along with traffic congestion reports in 
the morning.  According to one source, a quarter of all flights in 
Brazil were delayed by at least 30 minutes on November 27.  The 
work-to-rule operation was instituted primarily in response to the 
September 29 mid-air collision and controllers' longstanding 
complaints that they were over-worked (reftel).  That tragedy, along 
with subsequent troubles, has resulted in at least one bureaucratic 
victim.  On November 26, GOB spokespersons confirmed that Air Force 
General Paulo Roberto Vilarinho, the head of Brazil's Air Traffic 
Control, has been reassigned from his post as Director of the 
Department of Airspace Control. 
 
Equipment Failures and Limitations 
---------------------------------- 
 
2. (U) Air traffic controllers have been voicing their complaints 
vociferously in the press, recently stating that equipment failures 
are quite normal. They have stated that all problems are reported to 
their commanders.  Reportedly, one of the controllers on duty on 
September 29 and who was tracking the ExcelAire Legacy's flight from 
Brasilia said that his computer screen was showing the jet's 
altitude to be at 36 thousand feet when it really was flying at 37 
thousand feet. The controller then passed the incorrect information 
to his replacement on the next shift. Both Brasilia and Sao Jose dos 
Campos air traffic controllers have rejected the possibility of 
human error. 
 
3. (U) Controllers unanimously pointed out that there are blind 
spots and communication failures in the area where the September 29 
accident occurred.  In this case, equipment for the Center for Air 
Defense and Airspace Control-1 (CINDACTA-1), which controls air 
traffic in Brazil's central-east region, where the crash occurred, 
 
BRASILIA 00002521  002 OF 003 
 
 
very often indicates incorrect aircraft positions, and communication 
gaps also are frequent.  In contrast, the Air Force commander and 
the National Agency of Civil Aviation, ANAC, denied any gaps in 
Brazilian radar systems. 
 
4. (U) The flight controllers reportedly said that they had problems 
communicating that same day with two other planes that were flying 
the same route as the Legacy jet, one from Spanish airline "Iberia" 
and the other from Brazilian airline, Tam.  However, after receiving 
a distress signal from the Legacy's transponder after the collision, 
an American airplane from Polar Air helped relay communications 
between air traffic control and the Legacy, directing it to its 
ultimately safe landing at Serra do Cachimbo Air Force Base. The 
Polar Air aircraft was also flying in the same region as the other 
flights, but at an altitude of 32 thousand feet. 
 
Four Previously Un-reported Near-Misses 
--------------------------------------- 
 
5. (U) 22 in-flight "incidents" in Brazilian airspace between from 
January to June 2006, (as compared to 80 such incidents for all of 
2005 and 82 for all of 2004).  Other accounts note that there have 
been four in-flight near misses between aircraft since May 2006. 
One occurred two weeks after the September 29 crash near Rio de 
Janeiro.  The press reported, based on interviews with air traffic 
controllers, that on October 15, Gol flight 1805 was approaching Tom 
Jobim International Airport in Rio at the same time that Tam's 
flight 3831 was taking off with a destination in the region of Sao 
Paulo.  The planes, flying in opposite directions, almost collided, 
passing within 60 meters' distance of each other.  (International 
regulations reportedly mandate that 300 meters be the minimum 
distance between planes.)  Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo are both 
within the CINDACTA-1 area of responsibility. 
 
6.  (U) On May 19, a Gol Boeing 737 received permission from the air 
traffic control at Curitiba airport to descend to a lower altitude. 
Unfortunately, a small plane was doing parachute exercises in the 
same place and the aircraft almost collided.  This was considered a 
high-risk event by Brazilian authorities.  Another episode related 
by the Brazilian magazine "Epoca," involved a Varig aircraft flying 
in the area of Manaus.  After the pilot completed a right turn, the 
Manaus air traffic control tower advised him to keep his flight 
level.  Seconds later, another plane's shadow crossed the Varig 
aircraft's windshield, startling everyone.  The other plane passed 
within 50 meters of the Varig flight, according to these accounts. 
 
INVESTMENT IN FLIGHT SECURITY AND EQUIPMENT 
------------------------------------------- 
 
7. (U) Lack of resources has been a contributing factor to the 
current crisis.  During the past four years, a period over which 
Brazilian air space saw a marked increase in flights, the Lula 
Administration reduced the budget for airspace management and air 
traffic security by 25%.  Between 2003 and 2005, the Brazilian 
government invested 460.9 million reais (approximately 223 million 
US dollars) annually in aviation.  This was a significant reduction 
from the 2000 to 2002 period, when the average amount spent on 
aviation each year was 612.5 million reais.  The non-governmental 
organization Contas Abertas ("Open Accounts") has also criticized 
the government for failing to invest the full amounts authorized for 
aviation in the budget.  The draft 2007 budget for aviation, which 
already had been sent to Congress before the present crisis started, 
calls for an eight percent reduction in resources allotted to the 
sector.  The passenger volume, however, has been growing between 15 
 
BRASILIA 00002521  003 OF 003 
 
 
and 20 percent per year over the last two years. 
 
8. (SBU) COMMENT: Despite several initiatives announced to address 
the crisis, including the emergency hiring of new air traffic 
controllers, the recalling of retired air traffic controllers to 
serve on an interim basis, and making air traffic control a civilian 
rather than military profession (once implemented, this would allow 
higher pay), this is a problem that will take a long time to 
resolve.  It would also appear that the Air Force will in time lose 
its control over the ATC system.  Meanwhile, passengers in Brazilian 
airports will need to exercise a great degree of patience and all 
travelers, including our USG colleagues, should be prepared for 
delays. 
 
SOBEL