Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06BERN2115, SWISS TO BAKER COMMISSION: USG SHOULD NO LONGER \

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06BERN2115.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BERN2115 2006-11-27 15:48 2011-03-14 06:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Bern
Appears in these articles:
http://www.letemps.ch/swiss_papers
VZCZCXRO9268
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHSW #2115/01 3311548
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 271548Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY BERN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3455
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
2006-11-27 15:48:00	06BERN2115	Embassy Bern	CONFIDENTIAL	06BERN2115	VZCZCXRO9268\
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK\
DE RUEHSW #2115/01 3311548\
ZNY CCCCC ZZH\
O 271548Z NOV 06\
FM AMEMBASSY BERN\
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3455\
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE	C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERN 002115 \
 \
SIPDIS \
 \
SIPDIS \
 \
SECSTATE FOR NEA/I, EUR, EUR/AGS \
 \
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2016 \
TAGS: PREL KNNP PTER ETTC IR IZ SZ
SUBJECT: SWISS TO BAKER COMMISSION: USG SHOULD NO LONGER \
"OUT-SOURCE" TO THE EU-3 OUR IRAN POLICY \
 \
Classified By: Ambassador Peter Coneway, Reasons 1.4 b/d \
 \
1.(C) Summary:  Swiss State Secretary Michael Ambuehl met \
with Baker Commission co-chairman James Baker on November 21 \
in Houston to share Swiss views on Iran.  In a briefing for \
Ambassador Coneway on November 27, Ambuehl reported that he \
told former-Secretary Baker that direct U.S.-Iranian talks \
would be necessary to achieve any progress on the Iranian \
nuclear question.  The USG, Ambuehl quipped, should no longer \
"out-source" foreign policy to the EU-3, but meet bilaterally \
with Iran, lay the framework for broad dialogue, and then \
bring in multilateral partners.  The Swiss are convinced Iran \
is determined to approach the threshold of nuclear-weapons \
status, but it may be possible to deter Iran from making the \
leap to becoming a full nuclear state.  As Swiss officials \
told NEA PDAS Jeffrey in Washington last week, there have \
been back-channel messages to the Swiss indicating that \
Tehran desires to restore relations with the international \
community.  Switzerland remains prepared to bring the two \
sides together at either the official, unofficial, or proxy \
level.  End summary. \
 \
2.(C) State Secretary Ambuehl flew from Switzerland to \
Houston on November 21 to meet with James Baker in advance of \
the upcoming release of the Baker Commission report.  Upon \
his return to Bern, Ambuehl invited Ambassador Coneway, DCM \
and Poloff for a briefing on his meeting.  DFA Iran expert \
and Deputy Director for Human Security & Peace Support, \
Guillaume Scheurer, who traveled to Houston and thereafter to \
Washington to brief NEA PDAS Jeffrey, joined the meeting, as \
did DFA Deputy Americas chief Urs Hammer.  (NB: DFA Deputy \
Disarmament head Jean-Daniel Praz and Swiss Embassy Political \
Counselor Ralf Hechner also accompanied Ambuehl to Houston). \
 \
3.(C) Ambuehl told the Ambassador that he had three \
objectives in meeting with Baker: First, to offer him the \
Swiss assessment of the situation in Iran; second, to convey \
Swiss ideas on how to restart talks on Iran's nuclear \
program, and; third, to offer Switzerland's good offices in \
potential talks.  Ambuehl described Baker as interested and \
in a listening-mode.  Baker, he said, peppered the Swiss \
delegation with questions, but gave little indication of his \
personal views on how to proceed, except to describe his \
mandate as first and foremost Iraq, then Iran. \
 \
---------------------- \
Gauging Iran's motives \
---------------------- \
 \
4.(C) Swiss officials are sure Iran seeks to reach the \
threshold of nuclear-weapons status, but are unsure how the \
Iranians define the threshold, or whether it might be short \
of actual possession of a device, Ambuehl said.  They are \
likewise convinced that Iran wants to negotiate and is ready \
to make concessions -- but only at the conclusion of \
negotiations, not as a pre-condition.  Finally, Iran desires \
access to Western technology, especially U.S. technology, \
rather than Russian technology, for its civil nuclear program. \
 \
5.(C) Asked to comment on Iran's machinations in Iraq, \
Ambuehl said it would be a mistake to believe Tehran is \
dissatisfied with the status quo.  While the Iranians fear a \
catastrophe in Iraq, they have no interest in helping the \
United States succeed.  The current state of Iraqi civil \
unrest appeals to Iran.  He surmised that Iran would prefer \
to sit down multilaterally on Iraq, rather than in bilateral \
discussions with the United States.  That said, Ambuehl \
interjected, Iran needs a settlement with the West for their \
own interests; they needs things that we can offer them: \
recognition by the United States, regional influence, \
recognition as a major power, and better relations with the \
international community.  "We have to buy them," Ambuehl \
asserted. \
 \
------------------------------- \
What the Swiss would have us do \
------------------------------- \
 \
6.(C) As to how the Swiss would proceed, were they in the \
position of the United States or EU-3, Ambuehl offered that a \
necessary first step would be direct U.S.-Iranian talks. \
These talks could be at any level the USG desired: secret, \
shuttle diplomacy, proxy -- whatever.  Ambuehl underscored \
his conviction that the United States should be in the \
drivers seat; the USG should no longer "out-source foreign \
policy" to the EU-3.  Direct talks, Ambuehl said, should \
start out broad and outline a framework for a dialogue, one \
that includes incentives for Iran, as well as step-by-step \
mechanisms for advancement and provisions for strict \
supervision.  Once the framework is set, the USG could \
 \
BERN 00002115  002 OF 002 \
 \
 \
multilateralize the talks to the level of the P5-plus-one. \
 \
7.(C) Ambuehl asserted that the USG should not demand \
suspension as a pre-condition to talks.  Granting that the \
Iranian leadership is untrustworthy, Ambuehl nonetheless \
insisted that one could not expect a card player to lay down \
his best card prior to the game.  Ambassador Coneway \
countered that suspension was not necessarily a permanent \
move and the Iranians needed to show good faith through \
suspension prior to negotiations.  Ambuehl conceded the \
point, but suggested that a certain amount of talking might \
be necessary to determine a negotiating partner's intentions. \
 \
------------------- \
Switzerland's role? \
------------------- \
 \
8.(C) Ambuehl reiterated Switzerland's readiness to play an \
intermediary role between the United States and Iran -- a \
message he conveyed to NEA PDAS James Jeffrey, and one which \
Swiss Ambassador to Tehran, Philippe Welti, planned to convey \
during biannual consultations in Washington next month. \
Switzerland, Ambuehl said, would host any type of meeting the \
USG requested -- official, unofficial, or proxy.  Whoever we \
proposed to represent the USG side, the Swiss would work to \
match with an equivalent delegation from the Iranian side. \
Ambuehl said that Ambassador Welti had recently been \
approached by the brother of former Iranian President \
Rafsanjani about opening unofficial channels to the USG.  It \
remained unclear whether Rafsanjani's approach was made in \
coordination with, or opposition to, Ayatollah al-Khamanei \
and President Ahmadinejad.  The Swiss Embassy in Tehran \
(which includes the U.S. Interest Section) was working to \
determine the answer to this question.  Ambuehl acknowledged \
that any credible Iranian representative would need a mandate \
from both Khamanei and Ahmadinejad. \
 \
9.(C) Ambassador Coneway thanked Ambuehl for the briefing and \
expressed hope that Switzerland's role would be one with \
which we and our EU partners could agree. \
 \
------- \
Comment \
------- \
 \
10.(C) Past Swiss offers to mediate with Iran have prompted \
unenthusiastic replies in both Washington and EU capitals. \
Clearly Ambuehl views the Baker Commission report as an \
avenue to promote his proposals once more.  Switzerland \
serves USG interests well as Protecting Power in Tehran. \
However, we defer to the Department on how useful the Swiss \
contribution could be in our broader policy with Iran. \
CONEWAY \