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Viewing cable 06ZAGREB1260, FAR RIGHT POSITIONS ITSELF FOR 2007 ELECTIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ZAGREB1260 2006-10-18 07:19 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Zagreb
VZCZCXRO2514
RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHVB #1260/01 2910719
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 180719Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6803
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 001260 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV HR POLITICAL PARTIES ELECTIONS
SUBJECT: FAR RIGHT POSITIONS ITSELF FOR 2007 ELECTIONS 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - Please handle accordingly 
 
1. (U) Summary and comment: The Croatian Party of Rights (HSP) has 
consolidated its status as a major right-wing political party and 
gained greater acceptability as a democratic political entity, 
although some statements made by its leaders occasionally echo its 
extreme nationalist past. Domestically, HSP's record in the past six 
months has been mixed.  In April, HSP performed poorly at partial 
early elections in three localities.  By late summer, however, a 
credible survey identified HSP as the third most popular party with 
10 percent of popular support.  The poll also found that HSP voters 
are the only ones who support a coalition with the ruling Croatian 
Democratic Union (HDZ).  This is good news for the HSP, but less so 
for the HDZ, which would likely need more than one partner to retain 
power after 2007 elections.  Internationally, the HSP continues its 
efforts to achieve full legitimacy, seeking especially U.S. 
acknowledgement of its transformation. To this end, HSP Party 
President Anto Djapic has repeatedly expressed a desire for closer 
ties with the U.S., even endorsing a widely unpopular Article 98 
agreement. 
 
2. (SBU) Although HDZ and HSP frequently share power at the local 
level, the international community's reservations about the HSP's 
nationalist roots make HDZ reluctant to embrace it as a main 
national partner until it gains wider international acceptance. 
Ironically, such recognition would likely boost HSP ratings at the 
expense of the HDZ, as both parties appeal to right-wingers.  This 
could be why the HDZ has yet to endorse HSP membership in the 
European People's Party (EPP).  The two parties need each other -- 
and probably other smaller parties -- if they want to rule the 
country after the 2007 parliamentary elections.  HSP's main 
usefulness to HDZ has been siphoning off the hard-right, allowing 
HDZ to move to the center.  This alliance has had the additional 
effect of moderating HSP's leadership, because further appeal to the 
hard-right will hurt HSP's chances of true power-sharing at the 
national level.  End Summary and comment. 
 
UP AND DOWN IN THE POLLS 
 
3. (U) A comprehensive survey commissioned by the International 
Republican Institute (IRI) found in early September that the 
Croatian Party of Rights (HSP) would win ten percent of the vote if 
parliamentary elections were held then.   This was a clear drop from 
the 11 percent high earlier in the year, however was still an 
increase from the eight percent low earlier in summer 2006.  Of the 
two counties and one major city where early elections were held in 
April 2006, the HSP only made the five-percent threshold in one. 
There are at least two reasons why HSP's standing was so weak during 
the past six months.  The by-elections in April were, for the most 
part, due to HSP councilors switching sides in local assemblies. 
This created the popular perception that HSP was simply pursuing its 
own interests rather than acting upon higher principles. 
 
4. (U) During the summer of 2006, the local media reported 
dissatisfaction among a group of more "urban" HSP-ers supporting MP 
Miroslav Rozic.  This situation climaxed in August when Rozic 
publicly criticized Djapic for surrounding himself with yes-men.  In 
the end, Rozic was disciplined, had to resign from a number of party 
posts, and was allowed to stay in the party presidency in exchange 
for retracting his criticism of Djapic. With idyll restored, the 
party could again turn to its overarching goal: getting ready to 
finally come to power after spending 16 years in opposition. 
 
5. (U) The same IRI poll also found that the HSP was the only 
political party whose voters wanted a coalition with the ruling HDZ. 
 The voters of all other parties - including those currently in the 
ruling coalition, such as the HSLS - prefer some of the opposition 
parties as their partners.  These findings place the HSP in the 
position of a solid political party that the HDZ simply cannot avoid 
or ignore as it prepares for the elections due in November 2007. 
Moreover, if the HSP does become number two in a future 
right-of-center coalition, it will seek to be more than just a 
"dcor": "We want to be policy makers in that government," Djapic 
told the Embassy earlier this year and that goal certainly has not 
changed. Djapic also explained at the time that Prime Minister and 
HDZ President Sanader had openly told him he didn't want the HSP to 
grow above ten percent, because that would bring his party enough 
seats in parliament to make them more than just a junior partner in 
a possible coalition with the HDZ. What strategy and agenda the HSP 
will choose for the election year, however, will be clearer after 
the party convention expected to take place in late November or 
early December. 
 
SLIPPING OFF SCRIPT: DJAPIC'S NATIONALIST RHETORIC 
 
6. (U) Djapic and HSP are likely to spice up their rhetoric - 
carefully - as elections approach.  For example, the Chief 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) recently challenged the Croatian Government's 
motion to be granted status as a "friend of the court" in war crimes 
cases against several Croatian generals.  Djapic demanded a strong 
 
ZAGREB 00001260  002 OF 002 
 
 
reaction from the government, or threatened that the HSP would ask 
for a parliamentary debate on cooperation with the ICTY.  Similarly, 
commenting on the expected release of Zvonimir Busic from a U.S. 
prison where he is serving time for hijacking a commercial airliner 
and killing a U.S. policeman in the 1970s (while attempting to 
promote Croatian independence), Djapic said that Busic should be 
welcomed home as a Croatian freedom fighter.  At the same time, 
Djapic continues to balance such rhetoric with more progressive 
ideas and projects, such as helping the Moslem community build a 
mosque in Osijek where he currently serves as the mayor.  While hot 
rhetoric is used to attract voters, the moderate moves are intended 
for the international community, which is still skeptical about the 
depth of changes this former ultra-nationalist party has undergone. 
 
 
COURTING THE U.S. 
 
7. (U) In his public appearances, Djapic continues to promote the 
need for closer ties with the United States.  After visiting the 
U.S. in March, Djapic returned to Washington in September where he 
met with Stephen Rademaker, former Assistant Secretary of State. 
During his meeting with Rademaker, Djapic argued that Croatia should 
sign an Article 98 agreement with the United States. According to 
Djapic, this would help Croatia join NATO more easily, and could 
also generate U.S. assistance in the defense of former Croatian 
General Ante Gotovina, who is currently being tried in the ICTY for 
alleged war crimes committed in 1995 during Operation Storm. It is 
generally believed that the main purpose of initiatives like this is 
to secure full American recognition for his party.  Without such 
recognition, some believe it would be difficult for the HDZ to enter 
a national-level coalition with the HSP. 
 
DELAWIE