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Viewing cable 06TOKYO6222, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 10/25/06

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06TOKYO6222 2006-10-25 08:27 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO9350
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #6222/01 2980827
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 250827Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7770
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/COMPATWING ONE KAMI SEYA JA
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 1105
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 8571
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 1957
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 8247
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 9637
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4651
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0766
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2344
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 11 TOKYO 006222 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 10/25/06 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) US taking passive-aggressive approach to North Korea 
 
(2) Former South Korean President Kim Yong Sam: China, South Korea 
should apply harsh sanctions, like Japan 
 
(3) Fallout from DPRK's nuclear test: China troubled about eruption 
of anti-North Korea public sentiment 
 
(4) UN Security Council resolution and PSI: US expects third 
countries to inspect North Korean vessels while in their ports in 
order to block nuclear proliferation 
 
(5) Editorial: Okinawa minister's remark -- Fangs hidden behind her 
flowery words? 
 
(6) LDP wavering over whether to let former postal rebels rejoin the 
party; LDP Upper House expects their cooperation in next election, 
while Secretary General Nakagawa concerned about public opinion 
 
(7) Editorial: Arrest of ex-Fukushima governor - Reform needed to 
eradicate corruption 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) US taking passive-aggressive approach to North Korea 
 
(Yoshichi Funabashi, Asahi Shimbun columnist) 
 
ASAHI (Page 3) (Full) 
October 25, 2006 
 
In reaction to North Korea's nuclear test, even members of the 
Republican Party began to call on the Bush administration to review 
its North Korea policy. 
 
James Baker, who served as secretary of state in the administration 
under President George H. W. Bush, the father of the current 
president, said, "Talking with one's enemy is not appeasement." 
Senator Chuck Hagel (Nebraska) also reiterated the need for direct 
talks between the US and North Korea. 
 
One official in charge of East Asian affairs in the US Department of 
State indicated that when influential officials from the 
administration of Bush senior offer advice, the current 
administration tends to become stubborn, as was the case with the 
Iraq war. 
 
State Secretary Rice said that Washington has rejected direct talks 
with Pyongyang, citing the experience it had in the bilateral talks 
with the North over dinner prior to the six-party talks in the 
summer of last year. She said: "They (North Korean officials) want 
to talk only with the US. They usually take the approach of reaching 
an agreement with the US, violating it, and then blaming the US." 
 
Why does the Bush administration despise direct talks with North 
Korea so much? 
 
In his meeting with President Bush in late June, then Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi strongly called for direct talks between the US 
and North Korea. But the president did not assent. 
 
 
TOKYO 00006222  002 OF 011 
 
 
Bush even said, "We don't have any good options for if that fails." 
Unable to use military power, the US administration doesn't want to 
be in North Korea's pocket. 
 
The US still remembers that it had to pay a high price over the 1994 
Agreed Framework. Although Pyongyang promised to freeze its nuclear 
development program, it was secretly pushing ahead with a uranium 
enrichment program. The US has a sense of distrust toward North 
Korea, deeming talking and reaching any agreements with such a 
nation as meaningless. 
 
The fallout of 9/11 is also behind Washington's negative stance 
toward bilateral talks with the North. 
 
The Bush administration has little room for diplomacy as a result of 
the growing presence in the administration of "sheriffs" in charge 
of preventing WMD proliferation and terrorism, as well as "sheriffs" 
in charge of cracking down on money laundering related to such 
operations. 
 
Former Deputy Secretary of State Armitage has said that at a time 
when the US has no military options and is bogged down in a 
quagmire, a skillful diplomatic course is needed more than ever, but 
Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld blocked his 
efforts out of the belief that diplomacy is an expression of 
weakness. 
 
On the North's nuclear development, as well, the US has demonstrated 
neither leadership nor diplomatic capability. In describing the 
features of "Cheney politics," a senior US military officer called 
the US stance "a passive-aggressive approach." This description can 
be applied to the Bush administration's stance toward North Korea. 
 
Without taking the initiative, the US has launched a passive attack 
intended to prompt the other side to make a response and have it 
suffer losses caused by its own negligence or to overreact and drive 
itself to destruction. 
 
Such a passive attack might be a stance or a political approach, but 
is not a strategy or a policy. 
 
(2) Former South Korean President Kim Yong Sam: China, South Korea 
should apply harsh sanctions, like Japan 
 
ASAHI (Page 7) (Full) 
October 25, 2006 
 
In an interview with the Asahi Shimbun, former South Korean 
President Kim Yong Sam, 78, said in reference to North Korea's 
nuclear test, "As long as the North continues to call for direct 
talks with the United States, that nation is expected to show up at 
the six-party talks, which is the solo arena for discussion." 
Regarding moves by the international community to apply sanctions on 
the North, Kim said: "It is essential (for the international 
community) to apply pressure (on the North) while suspending its 
economic cooperation (to the nation) for the time being. China and 
South Korea should apply the same level of harsh sanctions to those 
by Japan and cooperate with it." 
 
Kim served as president from 1993 through 1998. He takes a 
conservative stance critical of the Sunshine Policy taken toward 
North Korea by President Kim Dae Jung and later by President Roh Moo 
Hyun. While in office as president, Pyongyang announced its decision 
 
TOKYO 00006222  003 OF 011 
 
 
of withdrawing from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
received a visit by former US President Carter, and the 1994 
framework accord reached between the US and North Korea. He thus 
experienced the tense "first nuclear crisis." Recalling back in such 
days, Kim said: 
 
"We were in an touch-and-go situation, with a number of US military 
vessels deployed in the surrounding sea areas. I made a phone call 
to President Clinton as many as 20 times asking him to refrain from 
taking military action. . . . Reaching the US-North Korea accord was 
an unavoidable option, but North Korea told a lie and forged ahead 
with nuclear development. The result was its major failure." 
 
He then stressed the need for tenacious efforts by countries 
concerned, saying 
 
"The North has called for direct talks with the US from before. It 
might be difficult to reach a settlement as long as the US continues 
to refuse bilateral talks, but the six-party talks should be 
continued even if no results are produced. Holding talks itself is 
significant." 
 
Further, Kim expressed concern about North Korea's reckless acts and 
stressed that the focus should be on China's future moves, saying: 
 
"The North might have believed that once the nation had nuclear 
weapons, it would be treated on a footing of equality, but no 
countries recognize the North as a big power, and its economic 
plight will not be improved even by holding nuclear weapons. . . . 
Japan's ban on North Korean ships from entering Japanese ports and 
restrictions on trade are effective sanctions. China and South 
Korea, major support nations for North Korea, should also cooperate 
with Japan. South Korea must immediately suspend such projects as 
constructing an industrial complex in Kaicheng and tours to Mr. 
Kumgan. It also should stop financial support for the North and 
carry out talks, taking advantage of the South Korea-US alliance." 
 
On talks of nuclear option in Japan, Kim made the following remark: 
 
"Considerable strong reactions will inevitably erupt, some 
speculating that Japan, which caused WWII, might be aiming to 
control the world again. South Korea should never go nuclear, 
either." 
 
(3) Fallout from DPRK's nuclear test: China troubled about eruption 
of anti-North Korea public sentiment 
 
SHUKAN ASAHI (pp 140-141) (Slightly abridged) 
November 13, 2006 
 
Kohei Koizumi, Hideo Sato 
 
"A silly Kim Jong Il is pushing his country into hell step by 
step... (omitted portion) The North Korean people can't live in 
their own way until the myth of the Kim family disappears." 
 
"North Korea is a rogue state. Their possession of nuclear weapons 
is an enormous threat to China. They may threaten us with nuclear 
weapons to get food from us." 
 
"Kim Jong Il lacks the guts, so he can't start a revolution." 
 
"Frankly speaking, I want to spank Kim Jong Il." 
 
TOKYO 00006222  004 OF 011 
 
 
 
A slew of strident verbal attacks against North Korean leader Kim 
Jong Il like the above were posted recently in the blog "Sina," one 
of the three major portal sites in China. 
 
North Korea conducted a nuclear test on Oct. 9 and met with strong 
objections from the rest of the world. On Oct. 14, the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted a sanctions resolution 
against that country. Although China prohibits its people from 
criticizing its government, when it comes to North Korea, there are 
entries that are as blistering as anti-Japanese ones. 
 
The relationship between China and North Korea is always portrayed 
as a "blood alliance" in view of the two countries having fought 
side by side in the Korean War. But the Chinese public's discontent 
with North Korea is growing so strong behind the scenes at present 
that even the government seems unable to bring it under its 
control. 
 
When we look at the series of recent movements of China from that 
point of view, we can see China has been driven to its wits' end 
about what to do about North Korea. 
 
Satoshi Tomisaka, a journalist familiar with the Chinese situation 
and the author of the book "Iradatsu Chugoku" (Irritating China), 
gave this explanation about rising anti-North Korea sentiment among 
the Chinese public: 
 
"Discontent tends to be voiced particularly in three northeastern 
provinces (Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang). Trade between this 
region and North Korea has been flourishing since 2002, but North 
Korean dealers have a tendency to shirk their payments, and they 
frequently have taken part in criminal activities, such as smuggling 
narcotics and using fake bills. The Chinese government, however, has 
not come down hard on such activities, fueling public discontent 
instead. Even an incident occurred that a local municipality took 
the liberty of stopping a freight train carrying government aid 
supplies bound for North Korea." 
 
There is no end to smugglers and defectors from North Korea in the 
region near the China-North Korea border. Last year, in China's 
Yanbian, there was an incident in which a North Korean resident, 
armed with a gun, shot and killed a Chinese People's Liberation Army 
soldier. 
 
In China, criticizing North Korea had been taboo for many years in 
part because of the blood-cemented alliance between the two 
countries. The first complaint against the North was not voiced 
until two years ago, according to Tomisaka. 
 
In 2004, China's leading opinion journal "Strategy and Management" 
in its 4th edition published in August of that year carried an essay 
titled "The Korean Issue and the Northeast Asian Situation from a 
New Angle." The paper unusually rebuked the Kim Jong Il regime this 
way: 
 
"North Korea is trying to develop nuclear weapons in defiance of its 
public's life or death issues and without making efforts to raise 
the living standards. 
 
"It has shown no appreciation for China's political support and 
economic assistance, and it has lacked understanding toward and 
support for China at a crucial moment." 
 
TOKYO 00006222  005 OF 011 
 
 
 
Soon after the release of this edition, the sale of the journal was 
banned by the Chinese government, and all copies of that edition 
were rounded up. China, encountering vehement protest from North 
Korea, did so, reportedly out of fear that that could affect the 
six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear issue. 
 
However, the situation is changing after the North's missile 
launches this July and its nuclear test just recently. 
 
Tomisaka said: 
 
"Media that do not come under the government's control carry 
articles critical of North Korea. Even a newspaper affiliated with 
the state-run New China News Agency indirectly criticizes North 
Korea, commenting, 'If this goes on, Japan will go nuclear.' The 
Chinese government presumably deems it difficult to put more 
restraints." 
 
China remains unable to contain a rise in anti-North Korea public 
sentiment at home. In addition, China is under strong pressure from 
the international community. Sakai Tanaka, journalist well versed on 
international issues, explained: 
 
"The United States has regarded itself as the 'world's policeman,' 
but it has been exhausted by the Iraq War, so it definitely can't 
afford another war. Washington apparently wants China to play a part 
in bringing stability to East Asia. Perhaps reflecting this desire, 
the US has begun frequently using the expression 'stakeholder' since 
the summer of last year to portray China. Washington is prompting 
Beijing to behave as a 'responsible big power' instead of seeing a 
rising China as a threat. Washington in this context has been 
consistent in its attitude of entrusting China with persuading North 
Korea not to set off a second nuclear test." 
 
Aside from America's desire, Tomisaka said China is now placed in a 
very difficult situation, noting: 
 
"China is perhaps in the most difficult situation in dealing with 
the North Korean issue, because its 'kid brother' has now become out 
of control. Yet, if this issue were to be resolved by other 
countries, for instance, the US or Russia, China would lose its face 
as a big power and diminish its influence over the Korean Peninsula. 
It must persuade the North somehow on its own." 
 
On Oct. 19, a Chinese delegation led by State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan 
visited Pyongyang and met with Kim Jong Il for the first time after 
the North conducted a nuclear test. On Oct. 20, Tang met with US 
Secretary of State Rice, who was on the tour of Northeast Asian 
 
SIPDIS 
countries, and told her: "(My visit to North Korea) was of some 
service." Tang is said to have made Kim Jong Il pledge "not to set 
off a second nuclear device." 
 
China, using its "blood alliance" with the North, appears to have 
saved its face somehow for now, but there are few who take that 
pledge "not to set off a second nuclear device" at face value. 
 
"The rest of the world is our enemy." This kind of instruction was 
reportedly given by General Secretary Kim Jong Il at a meeting in 
Pyongyang of ambassadors assigned to other countries. Kim did not 
attend the meeting, but this instruction blasted not only the US 
favoring the UNSC resolution but also China and Russia by naming 
them this way: "They are untrustworthy." 
 
TOKYO 00006222  006 OF 011 
 
 
 
"There's more," said Tomisaka, "More than 10 North Korean Embassy 
officials repeatedly protested against China in front of the 
(Chinese Foreign Ministry) in Beijing, shouting, 'Betrayer!'" 
 
Is it possible for China to topple the Kim Jong Il regime? 
 
Tomita added: 
 
"That's impossible. If the current regime were to be toppled and if 
two Koreas were to be reunified, China would face a big power with a 
population of more than 60 million people and nuclear arsenals. 
China's real feeling would be that North Korea remains divided as it 
is. In addition to that, given that one million or so Chinese were 
killed or injured in the Korean War, and given that their bereaved 
families still live in the country, if China were to allow the North 
to collapse now, there would emerge an eruption of discontent in the 
country like, 'What did the sacrifice made at the time mean?'," 
 
(4) UN Security Council resolution and PSI: US expects third 
countries to inspect North Korean vessels while in their ports in 
order to block nuclear proliferation 
 
YOMIURI (Page 13) (Abridged slightly) 
October 25, 2006 
 
A cargo ship has departed from North Korea. How will the UN 
resolution be implemented? 
 
The Defense Agency and other relevant government offices have 
learned from the US military that a cargo vessel that left Nampo, a 
seaport southwest of Pyongyang, on Oct. 20. has gone south in the 
East China Sea. Although the vessel's destination and what it is 
carrying are unknown, a cargo boat was used in the past to transport 
weapons to the Middle East. The boat is reportedly under 
surveillance by US military satellites. 
 
On Oct. 14, the UN Security Council adopted a sanctions resolution 
mandating all member countries to conduct cargo inspections under 
their domestic legislation and international law to prevent the 
illegal trade in weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, 
and chemical weapons) and ballistic missiles to deliver them. This 
can explain why the North Korean cargo is drawing much attention. 
 
Three years ago, the United States unveiled the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI) to deal with new threats, such as the 
"rogue states" and the potential danger of nuclear proliferation to 
terrorist groups. Over 75 countries, including Japan, Britain, 
Germany, France, Singapore, and Spain, have endorsed the initiative 
and repeatedly conducted cargo inspection training at sea. 
 
But international law does not provide the authority or ground for 
inspecting foreign vessels simply because they are suspected of 
carrying weapons of mass destruction. In December 2002, the Spanish 
Navy ordered a North Korean ship loaded with a large number of Scud 
missiles to halt in waters off Yemen for failure to display its 
nationality. The vessel was eventually allowed to deliver the 
missiles to Yemen as they were proven to be purchased by the country 
for defense purposes. 
 
The latest UN resolution against North Korea mandates an embargo on 
weapons of mass destruction and missile-related materials, 
effectively giving a seal of approval to the PSI. The UN also 
 
TOKYO 00006222  007 OF 011 
 
 
adopted a WMD nonproliferation resolution two years ago prohibiting 
member countries from trading in nuclear weapons. 
 
Oct. 22, Hong Kong maritime authorities inspected a North Korean 
vessel -- the first since the UN resolution was adopted -- under its 
domestic port safety management legislation. It is not known, 
however, whether the inspected vessel is the same as the one under 
US watch. 
 
The US is expected to continue conveying satellite data on North 
Korean vessels suspected of carrying military materials to coastal 
countries, such as Japan, China, and Indonesia so that they can 
conduct ship inspections in accordance with their respective 
domestic legislation. 
 
The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) also intends to step up guard 
and surveillance activities in waters near Japan by P3C patrol 
aircraft under Defense Agency Establishment Law Article 5 (on 
defense and security duties). 
 
The absence of the phrase "under the authority of the UN Security 
Council" from the UN resolution has raised questions about the 
effectiveness to conduct cargo inspections. In Japan, focus was on 
whether on not the MSDF would carry out cargo inspections in 
compliance with the UN resolution specifying weapons of mass 
destruction, WMD-related materials, luxury goods, and military 
equipment, such as tanks, as subject to inspection. 
 
"America's aim is to block nuclear proliferation. Inspecting cargos 
to prevent luxury goods and other items from flowing into North 
Korea in Japan's vicinity is low on the US list of priorities," a 
senior Defense Agency official said, although things depend on how 
North Korea moves. 
 
The US is especially on the lookout for the transport of weapons of 
mass destruction and related materials to Iran. North Korean ships 
headed for the Middle East are certain to make port calls in third 
countries for refueling. Attention is focused on whether third 
countries will inspect North Korean vessels in their ports, as the 
US expects. 
 
(5) Editorial: Okinawa minister's remark -- Fangs hidden behind her 
flowery words? 
 
OKINAWA TIMES (Page 5) (Full) 
October 24, 2006 
 
After assuming her post, Minister of State for Okinawa Sanae 
Takaichi recently visited Okinawa Prefecture for the first time. 
Referring to interactions between the issue of relocating the US 
Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station and the government's economic 
package of economic development measures for the northern region of 
Okinawa's main island, Takaichi stated as follows: "It's incorrect 
to think that these two matters are not linked to each other." 
 
Takaichi further remarked: "It's also wrong to say the government 
will undertake all (of the economic package) even if there's no 
progress in the relocation issue." With this, she indicated that the 
relocation of Futenma airfield and the implementation of the 
economic package for the northern region were linked to each other. 
 
In other words, Takaichi's remarks can be taken to mean that the 
government would show its "utmost consideration," in her words, if 
 
TOKYO 00006222  008 OF 011 
 
 
Okinawa accepts the government's plan to lay down a V-shaped pair of 
airstrips in a coastal area of Camp Schwab in Nago City but that the 
government would suspend its economic package if Okinawa opposes the 
relocation plan. 
 
The Defense Agency has been pressuring Okinawa Prefecture and its 
municipalities since last year with incentives for them according to 
progress in the construction of a new base. 
 
The Okinawa minister's remarks this time are in line with such an 
incentive payment formula. This time around, the Defense Agency and 
the Cabinet Office, coupled with each other, came to pressure 
Okinawa. 
 
The Cabinet Office has so far placed its emphasis on how to 
alleviate Okinawa's base-hosting burden, while distancing itself 
from the Defense Agency, which gives priority to improving 
deterrence. We wonder if there were some hidden "fangs" behind the 
Cabinet Office's flowery words about alleviating Okinawa's burden. 
 
In late August, the Japanese government launched a consultative body 
with Okinawa Prefecture and its municipalities, including Nago, to 
talk about the issue of relocating Futenma airfield. They supposedly 
agreed not to link the new base plan and the economic package. It's 
only natural that Okinawa's prefectural and municipal governments 
are now at a loss. 
 
Okinawa Governor Keiichi Inamine asked Takaichi for government aid 
to Okinawa so that it can utilize five US military facilities 
located south of the Kadena Air Base, including the Makiminato 
Service Area, Naha Port Facility, and Camp Kuwae (i.e., Camp 
Lester), once they are vacated. 
 
According to the logic of linking, the five facilities will not be 
actually returned as long as Futenma airfield is not relocated 
elsewhere in Okinawa Prefecture. 
 
However, the Japan-US Special Action Committee on Facilities and 
Areas in Okinawa (SACO) agreed in December 1996 to return the sites 
of these five facilities. It is unreasonable to link their reversion 
to Futenma relocation along with the realignment of US forces in 
Japan. 
 
If the economic package is to be implemented in exchange for 
Okinawa's burden of hosting more bases, an Okinawa with no bases 
will never be achievable. 
 
(6) LDP wavering over whether to let former postal rebels rejoin the 
party; LDP Upper House expects their cooperation in next election, 
while Secretary General Nakagawa concerned about public opinion 
 
ASAHI (Page 4) (Full) 
October 25, 2005 
 
The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has been shaken by Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe's remarks about bringing back into the party some former 
party members -- the postal rebels -- who left or were removed from 
the LDP because they had voted against the government's 
postal-privatization bill. A tug of war has come to the fore between 
Mikio Aoki, chairman of the LDP caucus in the House of Councillors, 
who has called for unconditionally letting them join the fold at an 
early date, and the party's Secretary General Hidenao Nakagawa, who 
takes it for granted that the rebels should agree to the 
 
TOKYO 00006222  009 OF 011 
 
 
government's plan to privatize the postal services as a 
precondition. The more heated the debate becomes, the more difficult 
it will be for the LDP to let them return, if consideration is given 
to public opinion. 
 
Nakagawa, who is in charge of this issue, stressed yesterday at a 
press conference: "I do not think the prime minister favors 
completely the idea of letting the rebels rejoin the party, even 
though some party members say so." The reason why Nakagawa spoke for 
Abe is that when the prime minister told reporters on the night of 
Oct. 23, "I want the secretary general and other party executives to 
discuss the issue," his remark was taken "approval of the return of 
rebels to the party." 
 
Asked anew about his view by reporters on the night of Oct. 23, Abe 
corrected his previous remarks, responding, "We will consider the 
issue once we obtain the understanding of the public. I will make a 
final decision after hearing the party's opinion." A person close to 
the prime minister explained: 
 
"Strict conditions are needed for their return to the party. The 
leadership should obtain a signed agreement from each rebel that 
they now approve the postal-privatization program and that they will 
not seek any corrections." 
 
However, it is difficult for Abe to retract his remarks favoring the 
idea of letting the rebels return to the LDP. The reason is that Abe 
is the person who shifted his position to allow them to come back. 
Appearing on a TV talk show during the September presidential race, 
Abe was adamant, saying: "We conducted the Lower House election in 
which we asked voters about whether they agreed to the 
postal-privatization program or not. But I think that was over. I 
will let many party members take part in my vision of creating a new 
country (if I become LDP president and prime minister). 
 
Abe's remark strengthened expectations in the party of an early 
return to the fold of the rebels. 
 
LDP Upper House Secretary General Toranosuke Katayama underscored 
yesterday to reporters: 
 
"I want the prime minister to let those who approve his vision and 
policy rejoin the party. In order to deal with major political 
issues, it is necessary to increase the number of party members." 
 
In a meeting of the secretaries general of the six LDP factions, 
some participants raised views favoring the rebels returning to the 
party. Pressure on Abe has increasingly become stronger. 
 
LDP Upper House Chairman Mikio Aoki's opinion is that in order to 
insure a victory in the next year's Upper House election, 
cooperation of the rebels, who have influence in their single-seat 
constituencies, is absolutely necessary. Abe and Nakagawa are 
concerned about whether voters accept such an idea. 
 
Former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi yesterday told former 
Secretary General Tsutomu Takebe: "If we rely on votes from the post 
 
SIPDIS 
office masters and other vested interests, we will lose the Upper 
House election." He meant that if the LDP allowed the rebels to 
return to it unconditionally, voters would see this as inconsistent 
with last year's dissolution of the Lower House to call a snap 
election and the LDP would lose the race. 
 
 
TOKYO 00006222  010 OF 011 
 
 
One of Abe's aides said: "If we accept the Upper House's hard-line 
argument, the party will come under fire from the public." 
 
Yet, of the 12 independent lawmakers, who are rebels in question, 
only Takeo Hiranuma, former international economy, trade and 
industry minister, voted against the postal bill after last year's 
Lower House election. All rebels, including Hiranuma, however, voted 
for Abe in the prime ministerial election. Therefore, the dominant 
view in the LDP is that the rebels will be able to return to the 
party. The last obstacle is whether the LDP can secure the public's 
understanding, as Abe said yesterday. 
 
(7) Editorial: Arrest of ex-Fukushima governor - Reform needed to 
eradicate corruption 
 
MAINICHI (Page 5) (Full) 
October 24, 2006 
 
Former Fukushima Gov. Eisaku Sato was arrested by the special 
investigation squad of the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office 
on suspicion of receiving bribes. Sato stepped down as governor in 
September, taking moral responsibility for the arrest of his younger 
brother on charges of involvement in a bid-rigging scandal. The 
former governor claims that he is totally innocent, saying, "I am 
completely clean." If his hands are dirty, however, it would be a 
serious breach of trust to the prefectural residents. Was his image 
of being "a clean governor" a fabrication? 
 
Sato is charged with taking a large amount of money from a general 
construction company, a bid-winner for the Kido dam construction 
project that the prefecture plans. The contractor purchased land -- 
well above market value -- belonging to a menswear company run by 
Sato's brother. This is seen as a reward to Sato for helping win the 
bid. His brother has been rearrested on additional charges. 
 
By taking advantage of the governor's authority, Sato's brother ran 
the show in rigging bids in the construction industry on public 
works projects ordered by the prefectural and selected bid-winners. 
In return for this, the brother received kickbacks. These 
bid-rigging practices appear to have been conducted under the lead 
of the then governor. It is outrageous if it is true that Sato, 
known as an incorruptible governor, engaged in wrongdoings while 
serving five terms or 18 years in office, taking advantage of his 
brother's services. 
 
In 1976, 30 years ago, then Fukushima Gov. Kimura was arrested on 
charges of bribery. It is unprecedented to have two governors of the 
same prefecture arrested. Former Gov. Sato must have known how that 
earlier scandal created serious turmoil and stalemate in the 
prefectural administration. Sato was regarded as one of the 
governors promoting decentralization efforts. He is doubly guilty 
for having disappointed people looking forward to "the age of the 
regions." 
 
Construction firms always crowd around governors, who have authority 
over public works projects, and offer bribes at high levels so that 
they will be chosen as successful contractors by a rigging of the 
bids. The construction industry continues its bid-rigging practices. 
In 1993, the arrests of the governors of Ibaraki and Miyagi 
prefectures brought to light the collusive ties they had with 
construction firms. Learning from this lesson, local governments 
have made efforts to reform the bidding system to prevent illegal 
practices. However, the breeding ground of corruption has yet to be 
 
TOKYO 00006222  011 OF 011 
 
 
eliminated. 
 
In 2000, Fukushima Prefecture introduced a system to make public bid 
ceilings in advance in order to improve bidding transparency. 
Ironically, however, the Kido dam project was a showcase public 
works project for the fiscal year. By disclosing the estimated 
price, companies could set their bidding prices at a high-level, but 
there was also an aspect of the set up making bid-rigging practices 
by construction firms easier. Therefore, the bidding price for the 
Kido dam project reached 97% of the bid ceiling. 
 
Another problem was the fact that the prefectural assembly, which 
has oversight over prefectural administration, did not do its work. 
Far from that, many prefectural assembly members reportedly received 
cash from Sato's brother. The practices were indeed deep-rooted. 
 
In Wakayama Prefecture, too, the chief of the disbursements office 
was recently arrested on suspicion of involvement in a government 
office-led bid rigging on a project ordered by the prefecture. The 
two bid-rigging scandals have suggested the urgent need for a 
drastic reform of the bidding system of public works projects. 
 
The official campaign for the Fukushima gubernatorial election will 
kick off on Oct. 26. Candidates should come up with a bidding system 
to prevent future corruption. 
 
SCHIEFFER