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Viewing cable 06TOKYO6125, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 10/20/06

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06TOKYO6125 2006-10-20 07:25 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO5314
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #6125/01 2930725
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 200725Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7626
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/COMPATWING ONE KAMI SEYA JA
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 1056
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 8521
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 1901
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 8200
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 9591
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4608
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0723
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2308
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 TOKYO 006125 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 10/20/06 
 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Interview with University of Shizuoka Prof. Shunji Hiraiwa -- 
How will the US respond to DPRK's nuclear test? (Part 2- 
conclusion): Military action taken if nuclear weapons were on verge 
of proliferation 
 
(2) Editorial: Japan, US, ROK should rally unity and pressure North 
Korea 
 
(3) Editorial: Nuclear debate must be conducted freely 
 
(4) Editorial: Foreign Minister Aso's Diet reply inappropriate 
 
(5) Diet debate on regional contingency: DPJ's Ozawa stresses Japan 
needs principles to take part in int'l contributions; Premier vows 
to use Japan-US alliance for int'l cooperation 
 
(6) Lower House by-election in Osaka No. 9 district is battle to 
take the enemy's camp between LDP and Minshuto 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Interview with University of Shizuoka Prof. Shunji Hiraiwa -- 
How will the US respond to DPRK's nuclear test? (Part 2- 
conclusion): Military action taken if nuclear weapons were on verge 
of proliferation 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 29) (Abridged) 
October 13, 2006 
 
Tsuyoshi Yamakawa, Yoichi Takeuchi 
 
SIPDIS 
 
-- What are your views on America's North Korea policy? 
 
Hiraiwa: "North Korea broke the 1994 Agreed Framework, a system 
calling on Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear programs and in return 
for that, Washington agreed to provide heavy oil to the North. But 
there were some early indications that the US allowed the North 
Koreans leeway to break away from the arrangement. It seems to me 
that the Bush administration wanted to find ways to raise objections 
to the US-DPRK agreement signed by the Clinton administration. 
Following the Agreed Framework, the six-party talks were put in 
motion, but the upshot of that is what we are now seeing. My 
conclusion is that although the Agreed Framework aimed at bringing 
the North's nuclear programs under control, it failed to function." 
 
-- Why is the US unwilling to respond to direct talks with the North 
Koreans? 
 
"President Bush detests General Secretary Kim Jong Il, so he is 
reluctant to deal directly with him. This comes presumably from the 
president's strong Christian sense of justice; he finds Kim, whose 
ambition is to develop a nuclear arsenal while his people are 
starving to death, completely unacceptable. Mr. Bush also seems to 
dislike being held responsible unilaterally for the framework, which 
was agreed on between the US and North Korea alone during the 
Clinton administration. (Mr. Bush) surely feels his country has been 
deceived by North Korea. 
 
-- The US launched an armed attack against Iraq citing the threat of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), even though it was found 
afterwards that no WMD had existed in Iraq. The US, however, does 
 
TOKYO 00006125  002 OF 010 
 
 
not strike North Korea, which declared it conducted a nuclear test. 
Isn't this a double standard? 
 
"The military balance in the Middle East affects Israel, a most 
important country for the US, and the Jewish lobby has a powerful 
influence in US politics. For the US, protecting Israel's interests 
is a top priority task. In contrast, when it comes to policy toward 
Asia, the US its relations with China and South Korea to worry 
about. If it were to take military action against the North, its 
relations with China and South Korea would collapse. (North Korea) 
is not that important for the US to take such a risk. 
 
"As a means of maintaining the military balance in East Asia, the US 
opted to have China take the lead and set up a framework for 
six-party talks. Washington wants to keep Beijing responsible to the 
end of this North Korea chapter, so it is trying to maintain the 
six-party framework. The consensus of the international community is 
to use heightened pressure to get North Korea back to the six-party 
talks and on the dialogue track." 
 
Effectiveness of Japan's solo sanctions questionable 
 
-- China and South Korea are vehemently opposing the use of armed 
force against North Korea. Why? 
 
"For China and South Korea, a weak North Korea is more of a threat 
than its aggressive nature. In other words, Pyongyang would never 
set off a nuclear weapon against China or South Korea, but if the 
military balance in East Asia were upset by a huge outflow of 
refugees in the wake of the collapse of North Korea, it would pose a 
threat to the security of China and South Korea. 
 
-- Do you think the US will rule out a military attack in the 
future, as well? 
 
"At this point, I don't think it will go that far. Should the North 
move to proliferate nuclear weapons, the case would grow similar to 
that of the Middle East. If Washington judges that nuclear weapons 
would be transferred to terrorists and that such would have a grave 
impact on the military balance in the Middle East centering on 
Israel, or if Washington judges that the US mainland will face a 
nuclear crisis, no doubt the US would use its military option." 
 
(2) Editorial: Japan, US, ROK should rally unity and pressure North 
Korea 
 
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 2) (Full) 
October 20, 2006 
 
North Korea's nuclear test has made concerned countries bustle about 
in a rush of international meetings. Chinese State Councilor Tang 
Jiaxuan (former foreign minister) visited North Korea, met with 
General Secretary Kim Jong Il to conveyed President Hu Jintao's 
views. Meanwhile, in Seoul, the foreign ministers of Japan, the 
United States, and South Korea confirmed in a meeting that the three 
countries would work together to implement United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1718 in order to pressure Pyongyang to give up 
its nuclear programs. 
 
What is important now is for Japan, the US, and South Korea to line 
up and go along with China. In this regard, the trilateral foreign 
ministerial session between Japan, the US, and South Korea would be 
viewed as a step forward, but the goal is to have the North abandon 
 
TOKYO 00006125  003 OF 010 
 
 
its nuclear programs. It must not be allowed at any price to make a 
half-baked compromise that could culminate in recognizing the North 
in effect as a nuclear power. 
 
US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, after meeting with Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe yesterday morning, headed for Seoul. The purpose 
of the trilateral foreign ministerial with Foreign Minister Taro Aso 
and South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Ban Ki Moon 
was first of all for the US to confirm it will meet the obligations 
to defend Japan and South Korea and also to have South Korea, which 
has adopted the engagement policy or the sunshine policy, share the 
sense of crisis with Japan and the US. 
 
Japan and South Korea are both allies of the US, and the two 
countries had held director-general-level talks for a while in the 
past, but after South Korea reacted sharply to former Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni Shrine, US Assistant 
Secretary of State Christopher Hill recently made a number of visits 
 
SIPDIS 
to Japan and South Korea. Prime Minister Abe's recent trip to South 
Korea, which helped improve relations with South Korea, and also the 
North's nuclear test have forced Japan, the US, and South Korea to 
reaffirm trilateral unity. 
 
The key lies in South Korea. An unconditional return by North Korea 
to the six-party talks is among the items called for by UNSC 
Resolution 1718. The resolution also demands that North Korea 
comprehensively abandon nuclear and missile development programs in 
an unconditional, verifiable, and irreversible manner. 
 
Japan and the US will not accept North Korea's return to the 
six-party talks unless it vows to do so. The two countries fear that 
the North will simply continue to play with the international 
community -- as it repeatedly did before -- by using its 
participation in the six-party talks as a diplomatic card, while 
maintaining its missile and nuclear technology. 
 
An unconditional return by the North to the six-party talks is a 
means to have it abandon its nuclear programs, but that is not the 
goal at all. This matter does not need to be confirmed between Japan 
and the US, because it is self-evident for the two countries, but it 
is essential for South Korea to go along with Japan and the US on 
this matter in order to resolve the current crisis. 
 
Ban, who is to take office as UN secretary-general, told Rice that 
he would assume a tough stance toward the North and suggested, for 
instance, a review of the Mount Kumgangsan tourism project, but 
President Roh Moo Hyun's way of thinking remains open to question. 
Rice will travel to China today. China, as evidenced by Tang's 
recent moves, is feeling a rising sense of crisis. Japan, the US, 
China, and South Korea need to further tighten the cordon around 
North Korea, involving Russia. 
 
(3) Editorial: Nuclear debate must be conducted freely 
 
SANKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
October 20, 2006 
 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe indicated that government and Liberal 
Democratic Party panels would never discuss the option of possessing 
nuclear weapons. He also said: "Individual lawmakers may discuss the 
matter. Freedom of speech is guaranteed in Japan." 
 
Facing the threat from North Korean, which has conducted a nuclear 
 
TOKYO 00006125  004 OF 010 
 
 
test, Japan's peace and stability hinges on the United States' 
nuclear umbrella. 
 
US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated: "The United States 
will fulfill its responsibility (of defending Japan under) the 
US-Japan Security Treaty.  The United States has the will and the 
capability to meet the full range of its deterrent and security 
commitments to Japan." We welcome Rice's statement that declared at 
home and abroad that America's deterrent for the security of Japan 
is effective. 
 
But looking into its future, Japan still needs to discuss a variety 
of options. The idea of possessing nuclear weapons was actively 
discussed at the Diet in the past. 
 
In March 1959, Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi said before the Upper 
House Budget Committee: "As policy, Japan will not possess nuclear 
weapons, but under the Constitution, the country is allowed to 
posses nuclear weapons of the minimal level for self-defense." There 
has been no change in the government's position that possessing 
small nuclear weapons was constitutional. 
 
Japan subsequently adopted the three non-nuclear principles of not 
producing, possessing or allowing nuclear weapons on Japanese soil, 
closing the door to nuclear polity. Questions would naturally arise 
if Japan is safe as it is. 
 
In September, the Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS) 
chaired by former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone released a set of 
proposals urging Japan to remain firm as a non-nuclear power, make 
efforts to boost the NPT system, and study the nuclear issue in 
preparation for future international sea-change. The IIPS proposals 
apparently reflect public concern. 
 
LDP Policy Research Council Chairman Shoichi Nakagawa also called 
for earnest discussion on how Japan can counter North Korea without 
possessing nuclear weapons. There is no doubt that Nakagawa proposed 
it from the same context. 
 
Nakagawa's statement has drawn fire mostly from opposition party 
members, saying that discussing a nuclear option itself would cause 
the international community to harbor doubts about Japan. 
 
Freedom of speech must not be suppressed. Nuclear debate is not an 
absolute taboo. As long as freedom of speech is suppressed, Japan 
will not be able to grow into a normal country. 
 
(4) Editorial: Foreign Minister Aso's Diet reply inappropriate 
 
ASAHI (Page 3) (Full) 
October 20, 2006 
 
How reckless and thoughtless was his remark! We find what Foreign 
Minister Taro Aso said in the Diet about Japan considering the 
possession of nuclear weapons to have been utterly unacceptable. 
 
Here is what he said: 
 
"When a neighboring country has come to possess (nuclear weapons), I 
think it is important to conduct a variety of discussions, as one 
idea." 
 
"Rather than staying ignorant, one option might be to consider 
 
TOKYO 00006125  005 OF 010 
 
 
thoroughly whether we want to determine to possess (nuclear weapons) 
or not." 
 
Does he want to see Japan begin discussing the option of going 
nuclear? Does he want to be the one setting off the debate? 
 
The matter needs no prompting from him, for it is already being 
discussed freely. A nuclear deterrent is one of the central themes 
in debates on international politics. 
 
Needless to say, the predominant view among the Japanese public 
rejects a nuclear option. But some scholars believe that just 
discussing the option helps Japan check China, the United States, 
and other countries. 
 
But a foreign minister making remarks to give a boost to the nuclear 
debate is a different story altogether. 
 
The government's consistent stance has been to uphold the three 
non-nuclear principles of not possessing, producing, or allowing 
nuclear weapons on Japanese soil. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe himself 
said, "We are through with the matter." 
 
A mention of the nuclear debate by the country's top diplomat might 
make other countries speculate Japan would change its policy, 
sending out the wrong message to the international community. 
 
When LDP Policy Research Council Chairman Shoichi Nakagawa made a 
similar statement earlier, news whirled around the world. Amid 
growing global concern for such countries as Japan and South Korea 
going nuclear following North Korea as part of a "nuclear domino 
effect," there is every reason for such remarks to draw attention. 
 
Does Aso want to add fuel to global concern? We doubt the common 
sense of the foreign minister, who repeatedly has made controversial 
remarks on the one hand, while voicing support for the three 
non-nuclear rules on the other. 
 
The international community is united to apply pressure on North 
Korea to make it get rid of its nuclear programs in compliance with 
the UN resolution. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is on a 
whirlwind tour of Japan, South Korea, and China. Chinese State 
Councilor Tang Jiaxuan traveled to Pyongyang to try to persuade 
North Korean leader Kim Jong Il to abandon nuclear ambitions. 
Earnest diplomatic efforts are underway. 
 
Japan's foreign minister must discuss why Japan does not possess 
nuclear weapons and why it is committed to nonproliferation rather 
than to make comments fueling the nuclear argument. 
 
Coming under criticism, Aso said, "I don't subscribe to the idea of 
suppressing freedom of speech." He must not shift the focus of the 
argument. The point here is that those remarks are inappropriate for 
persons in key positions in the government and the ruling coalition. 
It is not about freedom of speech. 
 
The government and the ruling coalition must not send out the wrong 
message when the rest of the world is trying to come up with 
convincing ideas to make North Korea abandon its nuclear ambitions. 
 
(5) Diet debate on regional contingency: DPJ's Ozawa stresses Japan 
needs principles to take part in int'l contributions; Premier vows 
to use Japan-US alliance for int'l cooperation 
 
TOKYO 00006125  006 OF 010 
 
 
 
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 6) (Full) 
October 19, 2006 
 
The following is a gist of one-on-one debate between party leaders 
in the Diet from yesterday's joint meeting of the House of 
Representatives and the House of Councillors on Japan's fundamental 
policies. 
 
Democratic Party of Japan (Minshuto) President Ichiro Ozawa: North 
Korea's recent nuclear test tramples on the international 
community's desire for peace, and it's a challenging act. I have no 
objection at all to taking resolute, severe counteractions against 
such conduct. In my eyes, however, the government appears to be 
playing it by ear in a makeshift manner. Such a way of doing things 
is confusing the government's counteractions. What's the basic 
nature of action to be taken in response to situations that are 
anticipated in the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Japan's Peace 
and Security in the Event of Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan 
(or the so-called "regional contingency law"), and what's the basic 
nature of action to be taken in conformity with the international 
community's consent? 
 
Prime Minister Abe (president of the ruling Liberal Democratic 
Party): The "situations" stipulated in the regional contingency 
security law are defined as situations which, if left unattended, 
are feared to result in an armed attack against Japan, and the 
government has exemplified six cases. The regional contingency law 
stipulates how Japan-based on its bilateral alliance with the United 
States as the bedrock of Japan's foreign and security policies-will 
respond to such situations in areas surrounding Japan. At the same 
time, the United Nations (Security Council) has now adopted an 
enforceable resolution that incorporates severe steps against North 
Korea's challenging conduct. In order to have the resolution 
translated into action, Japan will cooperate in the international 
community. We're studying what Japan can do while teaming up and 
consulting with other countries concerned. We shouldn't think 
separately of the Japan-US alliance and the international 
community's efforts as two different things. Instead, we should 
utilize the Japan-US alliance in our cooperation with the 
international community. In the international community's concerted 
efforts, we need to have North Korea understand that the situation 
will go from bad to worse if that country fails to answer the 
international community's concern and takes even more provocative 
action. Japan is expected to work together with the international 
community while keeping in close touch with the United States, which 
is an ally of Japan. 
 
Ozawa: The regional contingency law anticipates emergencies in 
Japan. The UNSC resolution is for the international community to 
impose sanctions against conducts that disturb the peace of the 
international community. There's something difficult about the idea 
of applying the law-which is for emergencies in Japan-to the act of 
imposing sanctions in conformity with Article 41 of the United 
Nations Charter's Chapter 7. Some people may ask, "Then, what do you 
think we should do?" That's simple and clear. The government has 
only to make it a basic principle for Japan to participate in the 
international community's joint efforts. The government doesn't have 
anything like that principle, so the government will try to apply 
the notion of a regional contingency just because Japan was asked by 
the United States. The Japan-US alliance is important, of course. 
However, Japan and the United States alone cannot defend the global 
peace. The Japan-US Security Treaty has its own limit. Its 
 
TOKYO 00006125  007 OF 010 
 
 
operational scope is limited to the Far East. But you may say that 
when America goes to deal with a problem on the other side of the 
globe, Japan will go together. That's not what the law means. The 
Constitution of Japan's idea is, if and when there is such a 
problem, each member of the United Nations is to comply with the 
United Nations' consent and participate in the international 
community's efforts to defend peace, as far as each member of the 
United Nations can do under its circumstances. The United Nations 
Charter also allows both the right of individual self-defense and 
the right of collective self-defense in each region as natural 
rights. If Japan and the United States come under attack before the 
United Nations makes a decision, then Japan and the United States 
will fight back to defend themselves. However, the security pact 
says Japan and the United States will terminate their joint efforts 
when the United Nations has made a decision. Then, the question is 
what role Japan will play in the international community. It's 
important to establish basic principles. You may want to say that's 
just because something happened or just because Japan was asked by 
America. Such a makeshift way of doing things will mislead the 
nation. Japan should also work together with the international 
community in its joint efforts if Japan is requested by the United 
Nations to do so. What is your view? 
 
Abe: You're just guessing my view. I've never said Japan will follow 
US forces to the other side of the globe. Also, I've never said 
Japan must go there just because Japan was asked by America. The 
United Nations (Security Council) unanimously adopted the 
resolution. Japan is one of the parties concerned and presides over 
the UN Security Council, and Japan is responsible for the adoption 
of this resolution. So I take it for granted that we should think 
about what Japan can do. Also, I take it for granted that we should 
cooperate closely with US forces since the United States is our 
ally. I'm not saying I will apply the regional contingency law at 
once. The situation is changing every moment. I'm thinking about 
what Japan should do on its part. North Korea fired missiles, and 
it's highly possible that North Korea conducted a nuclear test. In 
such a situation, I have a critical responsibility to protect the 
Japanese people's lives and assets. It's only natural to check into 
every possible law and ordinance on my responsibility. 
 
Ozawa: The United Nations Charter's Article 41 provides mandatory 
economic sanctions. It also provides sea inspections and land 
blockades that are mandatory. For example, they are not sending 
fishing boats for ship inspections. They are sending warships that 
will halt ships to inspect their cargoes on board. Ship inspections 
relating to the regional contingency law are to be conducted with 
consent obtained from ships to be inspected. But this is logically 
strange. If we think economic sanctions fall under the category of 
peaceful means, that's wrong. The government has to make it a basic 
rule for Japan to participate in operations based on the United 
Nations' decision, or Japan will only end up finding a way out of 
the situation each time. That's not good at all for the future of 
Japan. 
 
Abe: Japan's basic principles are very clear-cut. Japan initiated 
this resolution on its responsibility. So, in order to make it 
effective, it's only natural for Japan to do whatever it can within 
the bounds of its laws and ordinances. Each member of the United 
Nations is also required to do so. This doesn't mean we will choose 
to do nothing or that we will have to do something forcibly. It's 
important that Japan will act on its responsibility and play its 
role as far as possible. 
 
 
TOKYO 00006125  008 OF 010 
 
 
Ozawa: You said Japan will do whatever it can within the bounds of 
its laws and ordinances. However, the biggest problem of Japan's 
national security is the Constitution. The Constitution will always 
crop up whenever there are various problems. I'm not telling you to 
do anything or whatsoever. We should let the people know if that's 
possible under the Constitution. 
 
(6) Lower House by-election in Osaka No. 9 district is battle to 
take the enemy's camp between LDP and Minshuto 
 
ASAHI (Page 4) (Slightly Abridged) 
October 20, 2006 
 
Senior LDP member conducts "walk-in sale" with house map in hand 
 
By-elections will be conducted in the Osaka No. 9 and Kanagawa No. 
16 districts to fill House of Representatives seats. All the more 
because the outcomes of the two elections will affect the management 
of Diet affairs, both the ruling and opposition parties have sent 
senior lawmakers to the two constituencies to support their 
respective candidates. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is 
doing its best to garner organized votes by relying on industrial 
associations and local assembly members, while the leading 
opposition party Minshuto (Democratic Party of Japan) is trying to 
gather votes by sending out party member to recruit supporters. The 
showdown between the LDP and Minshuto will come in the Osaka No. 9 
constituency. 
 
On the afternoon of Oct. 15, a senior LDP lawmaker was walking 
through shopkeepers row in the Osaka No. 9 electoral district. The 
lawmaker is a former cabinet member who has no interest in Osaka. He 
was looking for the house of the head of an association of shop 
owners holding a street map in hand. The party's election taskforce 
called such a way of election campaigning a "walk-in sale." 
 
Around the same time, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, using his strong 
character in the election, was speaking passionately before an 
audience of about 5,000. 
 
Following Abe, New Komeito Chief Representative Akihiro Ota called 
out to the audience, saying, "Hello to all of you who have long 
supported the New Komeito!" Small flags were waved like ripples 
through the crowd. A senior LDP Election Bureau official, who was 
mingling in the crowd, detected that most of the audience were New 
Komeito supporters. He departed from the scene before Abe finished 
his speech. 
 
Four days before Abe and Ota came to Osaka to stump, LDP Election 
Bureau chief Yoshio Yatsu visited companies listed on the first 
section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange and subcontractors in the No. 9 
district. The reason was that leading companies do not necessarily 
support the LDP. 
 
At Kansai Electric Power Co., Yatsu met with its adviser Yoshihisa 
Akiyama, who serves also chairman of the Kansai Economic Federation. 
Yatsu asked him for cooperation. Akiyama then gave his promise, 
saying, "I will call at KEF member companies in the electoral 
district." 
 
At a hotel in Ibaragi City on Oct. 18, Mikio Aoki, chairman of the 
LDP caucus in the House of Councillors, and 24 LDP Upper House 
members gave a pep talk to about 500 individuals connected with LDP 
support groups, including construction, agriculture, commerce and 
 
TOKYO 00006125  009 OF 010 
 
 
industry, and nursing care. The 500 immediately headed to the No. 9 
constituency. 
 
One senior LDP member said: "Mr. Ozawa also often visits companies 
and organizations. This election is like a battle to take the 
enemy's camp. 
 
Ozawa carries out election campaign on own way; Asks LDP support 
organizations for recommendation 
 
Minshuto's election strategy is similar to the LDP's. 
 
At a meeting of an association of restaurants in Minoh City, a 
senior association member said: "There are Minshuto supporters in 
our association. I think we can give our recommendation to (Minshuto 
candidate)." After consulting on the matter, the association decided 
to recommend both candidates on the LDP and Minshuto tickets. A 
source familiar with the association was surprised at the result of 
the discussion, saying, "We have supported the LDP for a long time, 
but we were able to arrive at this decision smoothly for the first 
time." 
 
Ozawa has personally led the effort to slice down the number of LDP 
support groups. After appearing on a television program in Osaka on 
Aug. 5, Ozawa called on the Minshuto candidate-to-be at his office 
to hear from office staff their election strategy. He also secretly 
visited Osaka one month later to meet the heads of municipal 
assemblies and assembly members. 
 
In order to carry out the Ozawa-style election strategy, Minshuto 
leadership ordered its members to send letters asking 
recommendations to organizations to which the main opposition party 
had never before sought such support. The association in Minoh City 
is one such organization. 
 
In the No.9 district, there are a number of subcontractors of 
leading companies, including Daihatsu Motor Co., headquartered in 
Ikeda City, related offices and factories. After calling on Daihatsu 
labor union officials, Ozawa met on the 11th with Rengo (Japan Trade 
Unions Confederation) Osaka Chairman Fumio Ito at a hotel in Ibaragi 
City. 
 
Ozawa than urged some 20 local assembly members to support the 
campaign, with his mind the April Lower House by-election in the 
Chiba No. 7 constituency, which his party won even though it was 
said that it would be difficult for its candidate to win. 
 
On the night of Oct, 18 at a Chinese restaurant in Tokyo, Ozawa told 
30 Minshuto Upper House members, who are serving in their first-term 
in the Diet: "I want to win the by-elections in order to bring about 
a political change. I will do my best, so I want you to do your 
best, as well." 
 
He is expected to give a street corner speech in Ibaragi City along 
with Acting President Naoto Kan and Secretary General Yukio Hatoyama 
on the evening of Oct. 20. 
 
Candidates for the Lower House by-election for Osaka No. 9 district 
 
Name              Age       Party       Career 
Kenji Harada       58        LDP        Ex-Osaka prefectural 
                                        assembly member 
Nobumori Otani     43       Minshuto    Minshuto Osaka chapter 
 
TOKYO 00006125  010 OF 010 
 
 
                                        executive board member 
Kuniaki Fujiki     48        JCP        Lawyer 
 
SCHIEFFER