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Viewing cable 06SEOUL3492, REACTION TO DPRK TEST: ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06SEOUL3492 2006-10-12 08:45 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #3492/01 2850845
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 120845Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0700
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1364
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1455
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7552
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 1373
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFIUU/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RHMFIUU/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHMFIUU/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP//
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SEOUL 003492 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MNUC PREL PGOV KS KN
SUBJECT: REACTION TO DPRK TEST: ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (SBU) Local academic observers in South Korea provided 
the Embassy on October 10 and 11 with their takes on the DPRK 
nuclear test.  Professor of Korean Studies and DPRK cultural 
analyst Brian Myers argued that the DPRK conducted the test 
primarily for internal reasons to recover from failed missile 
launches in July.  University of North Korean Studies 
Professor Ryoo Kihl-jae thought that the North's desire for 
bilateral talks with the USG was the key factor.  Historian 
Andrei Lankov had expected the North to wait longer before 
testing in order to ratchet up tensions, but assessed that 
UNSC sanctions would be relatively short lived because China, 
South Korea, and Russia would look for reasons to return to 
non-confrontational policies.  END SUMMARY. 
 
PROFESSOR MYERS: NUKE TEST TO RECOUP FROM MISSILE FAILURE 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
2.  (SBU) Dr. Brian Myers, Professor of Korean Studies at 
Busan's Dongseo University, on October 10 opined that the 
DPRK probably conducted a nuclear test to remedy a loss of 
face suffered from a less-than-impressive missile launch 
display in July.  For the DPRK, a failure often provided the 
impetus for an even bigger provocation.  The 1968 DPRK 
seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo, for example, shortly followed a 
failed DPRK commando raid on the Blue House.  The nuclear 
test, Myers argued, was not a DPRK negotiating ploy because 
North Korean leader Kim Jong-il (KJI) did not seek talks with 
the USG as much as he sought to bolster his own cult by being 
seen as intimidating the USG.  The North's quick test shortly 
after its announcement of its intention to test underscored 
that the DPRK was not seriously interested in trading a test 
for negotiations.  (NOTE: An occasional contributor to the 
Atlantic Monthly and the New York Times, Myers teaches 
courses on North Korea propaganda, media, and culture.  An 
American, Myers received his Ph.D. in Korean Studies from the 
University of Tuebingen in Germany. END NOTE.) 
 
3.  (SBU) Myers speculated that KJI would be discouraged that 
the USG made statements after the test indicating it was more 
worried about DPRK proliferation than the danger posed by 
North Korea to United States.  This would signal that the USG 
did not take the North Korean threat seriously.  The North, 
Myers postulated, would not sell nuclear technology to others 
and lose the credit to someone else for attacking the United 
States. 
 
4.  (SBU) Myers was not surprised China was unable to prevent 
a DPRK nuclear test because North Korean propaganda 
consistently argued that Koreans were the superior race and 
therefore had little reason to listen to the Chinese.  China, 
he said, always had limited influence, even during the Korean 
War when a beleaguered DPRK refused PRC efforts to control 
train station operations in North Korea to reinforce troops 
fighting UN forces.  USG officials should pay more attention 
to DPRK propaganda because it reflected official DPRK culture 
and was not just a cynical tool used by the DPRK leadership, 
Myers said. 
 
5.  (SBU) Asked about ROK perceptions, Myers thought the 
nuclear test would be a "turning point" for South Koreans who 
were becoming tired of North Korean provocations.  His 
students indicated to him over the past few days that South 
Korean patience would end as soon as the North acted in a way 
that negatively affected the ROK economy. (See Myers' NYT 
piece.) 
 
PROFESSOR RYOO: DPRK FOCUSED ON USG 
----------------------------------- 
 
6.  (SBU) University of North Korean Studies professor Ryoo 
Kihl-jae told poloff on October 10 what he thought of the 
possible nuclear test by the North.  (NOTE: Ryoo is an expert 
on North Korea and particularly specializes in the study of 
the regime.  END NOTE.)  He said that while there were 
internal factors that contributed to the North,s decision to 
test a nuclear device, the relationship with the U.S. was the 
most important factor. 
 
7.  (SBU) According to a recent defector Ryoo had talked to, 
the test was an extreme measure intended to improve relations 
with USG by ending the Six Party Talks and moving to direct 
talks with the United States.  According to the defector, 
unless the USG accepted the DPRK as a nuclear state, the 
North could move further toward a policy of extreme 
brinksmanship that could lead all the way to war.  The recent 
defector said that if the USG accepted the North as a nuclear 
state, the DPRK could give the USG all it wanted in strategic 
terms. 
 
8.  (SBU) Professor Ryoo thought there was room for 
negotiation but not through the Six Party Talks format.  He 
said during multilateral talks the DPRK felt it could not be 
open and frank.  He said he hoped that the USG and DPRK would 
find a way to move beyond the current stalemate and that he 
thought the North wanted better relations with the USG. 
 
HISTORIAN LANKOV: UNSC SANCTIONS UNLIKELY TO ENDURE 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
9.  (SBU) Russian historian and author Andrei Lankov, who has 
focused on Korea for over two decades and writes a column for 
the Korea Times, on October 11 said he was not surprised that 
the DPRK announced its intention to test on October 3, but he 
was surprised that the test came so soon, expecting the DPRK 
to wait one or two years, all the while ratcheting up the 
tension.  As for the changes brought by the test, Lankov said 
the fundamental situation had not changed, given the DPRK's 
clear prior determination to possess nuclear weapons.  Lankov 
dismissed the chances that UNSC sanctions would have much 
effect.  The sanctions will be in place for one or two years, 
he estimated, and then China, Russia and the ROK will find a 
reason to return to non-confrontational and aid policies. 
VERSHBOW