Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06PRAGUE1253, CZECH POLITICS: TOPOLANEK LOSES VOTE OF

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06PRAGUE1253.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06PRAGUE1253 2006-10-09 12:23 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Prague
VZCZCXRO3501
RR RUEHAG RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHPG #1253/01 2821223
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 091223Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8071
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 001253 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR EUR/NCE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV EZ
SUBJECT: CZECH POLITICS:  TOPOLANEK LOSES VOTE OF 
CONFIDENCE; PRESIDENT APPEARS TO FAVOR TECHNOCRATIC 
GOVERNMENT 
 
REF: A. PRAGUE 1207 
     B. PRAGUE 1239 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. As expected, the Topolanek government 
failed to win the vote of confidence and will formally resign 
on October 11, although it will continue serving until a new 
cabinet is named.  President Klaus has said this will not 
happen until after the Senate and municipal elections later 
this month.  The President is sending strong signals that he 
prefers to appoint a technocratic government that would rule 
until early elections next spring, although former PM 
Paroubek continues to insist that he deserves a chance.  The 
next month is likely to produce numerous twists and turns, 
both following election results and as a result of struggles 
for leadership among ODS and the Christian Democrats. 
Meanwhile, Parliament has essentially stopped working for a 
month and the Czech public is increasingly fed up and losing 
interest in national politics. END SUMMARY 
 
2. (SBU) To the surprise of no one (Ref A), the Topolanek 
government failed to win the vote of confidence on October 4, 
four weeks after taking office and 17 weeks after 
inconclusive general election.  The vote was 96-99, with all 
Social Democrat (CSSD) and Communist (KSCM) deputies voting 
against (one CSSD deputy was in the hospital; in a 
widely-appreciated sign of fair play, Topolanek himself left 
the chamber during the vote to balance the ill deputy). 
Topolanek's cabinet won the support of all ODS members, all 
the Greens, and 10 of 13 Christian Democrats (KDU-CSL). 
Three KDU-CSL deputies left the chamber, including former 
KDU-CSL Chair Kalousek.  Most post-vote discussion focused on 
the motives of the KDU-CSL deputies, which is likely what 
Kalousek had hoped.  Speculation grew that Kalousek was 
sending a sign that he and his fellow travelers were 
available to split ranks with KDU-CSL and support a CSSD 
minority government that would depend on KSCM -- exactly the 
scenario that forced a revolt within KDU-CSL in August and 
cost Kalousek his position as party leader (and lost the 
party considerable public support).  In the end Acting Party 
Chair Jan Kasal got each of the 13 KDU-CSL deputies to sign a 
statement pledging not to support or join a government that 
relies on KSCM. 
 
3. (SBU) Immediately following the failed vote, PM Topolanek 
announced that his government would resign, as required by 
the constitution.  This will happen on October 11, following 
the cabinet's weekly meeting.  With that announcement, all 
focus shifted to the President, who has the task of 
appointing a new cabinet.  Even before he returned to Prague 
from an extended visit to Asia on October 5, Klaus had 
announced that he would not appoint a new cabinet until after 
the conclusion of the Senate and local elections (October 
20-21, with the second round of Senate voting October 27-28). 
 Likewise, even before his return officials close to Klaus 
(primarily his political advisor Ladislav Jakl) began making 
noises about the need for a technocratic government and early 
elections.  Over the weekend Prague Mayor Pavel Bem (an ODS 
vice chair and known confidant of Klaus) announced that if 
Topolanek was again chosen by Klaus to form a government, it 
would have a technocratic character and Topolanek himself 
would not insist on becoming Prime Minister.  The President's 
efforts appear to be having success:  even KSCM has announced 
that it would be in favor of a "national unity government" 
and early elections. 
 
4. (SBU) There are two problems with this scenario.  First, 
it is not clear how Klaus proposes to get to early elections. 
 The simplest way is for three attempts to form a government 
to fail.  Topolanek's was the first.  If the second attempt 
fails, the Speaker of Parliament, not the President, gets to 
select the prime minister.  A vote to dissolve the current 
parliament is possible but not certain since many deputies 
can reasonably expect not to regain their seats.  And that 
leads to the second problem:  CSSD is not yet on board. 
Paroubek continue to insist that he can form a government and 
should be given the chance (indeed, he insists that Klaus 
promised him the second chance, something Klaus denies). 
 
5. (SBU) Speculation is already rampant about who could lead 
a technocratic government, with many reaching back to leaders 
from the early 1990s.  The press on October 9 focused on 
former Czechoslovak PM Jan Stransky.  Former Czech Minister 
of Economy Vladimir Dlouhy has been mentioned.  Other 
candidates include well-respected regional leaders.  The 
governor of Northern Moravia, Evzen Tosenovsky, made a 
surprise announcement last week that he would consider 
 
PRAGUE 00001253  002 OF 002 
 
 
running for ODS Chairman at the party's November Congress, 
but only if Topolanek did not run (Tosenovsky has long said 
he had no interest in national office); he subsequently 
announced he would not be interested in serving in a limited 
mandate government.  Accepting that an ODS member would not 
be suitable at the head of a technocratic government, some in 
ODS have suggested the only non-ODS governor:  Stanislav 
Juranek of Southern Moravia. 
 
6. (SBU) The coming weeks will see many names floated for 
prime minister, and likewise much speculation about new 
leadership in ODS and KDU-CSL (ODS's party congress is 
November 14-17; KDU-CSL on December 9).  Both are vulnerable 
in the upcoming Senate and local elections.  ODS is defending 
ten of the 27 Senate seats being contested this round, as 
well as many of the mayoral seats across the country; KDU-CSL 
has seven Senate seats to defend (by contrast, CSSD has only 
one).  Topolanek is known to be losing support within his 
party, and the defeat in the vote of confidence will not 
help.  At least one local party chapter has already called 
for him to be replaced.  However, most debate is going on 
behind closed doors. 
 
7. (SBU) Reaction to the collapse of the Topolanek government 
and the prolongation of the political stalemate has been 
muted.  The economy remains untouched by the political 
"crisis" (Ref B).  Business leaders are not yet concerned by 
the fact that the Parliament has done no work since June, and 
will not do any before November (the Parliament has canceled 
its October sessions to permit deputies to campaign for their 
parties).  Of greater concern to observers is the toll the 
stalemate is taking on society.  The Czech public seems to be 
losing its interest in politics entirely:  at a lunch on 
October 5, editors of the main national dailies told us that 
they are all anxious to find something other than political 
news to run on their headlines as a way of boosting lagging 
circulation.  An early sign of political disaffection will be 
the upcoming elections.  While local elections tend to bring 
out voters, the second round of the Senate election generally 
sees turnout of less than 20%, and some fear that this year 
it could be much lower.  That raises concerns as well about 
what could happen in new national elections next spring, as 
low voter turnout will tend to favor disciplined parties like 
KSCM. 
GRABER