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Viewing cable 06MEXICO6182, GOM INTERVENES IN OAXACA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MEXICO6182 2006-10-31 13:29 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Mexico
VZCZCXRO5170
PP RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #6182/01 3041329
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 311329Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3959
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USNORTHCOM
RHMFIUU/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MEXICO 006182 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV CONS MX
SUBJECT: GOM INTERVENES IN OAXACA 
 
REF: MEXICO 5771 
 
1. (SBU) Begin summary: The five month-old crisis in Oaxaca 
reached a critical juncture October 29 with the deployment of 
Mexico's Federal Preventive Police (PFP) to the embattled 
state following three October 27 fatalities, including the 
killing of American journalist Brad Will.  This cable 
assesses the immediate implications of the federal 
intervention, how it might impact the balance of power 
between the disputing parties, and possible scenarios for 
Oaxaca's near-term future.  The crisis is not over and, while 
there have been only limited confrontations between 
protesters and the PFP, the potential for violence will 
remain high for the coming days.  End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) After months of resisting broad-based public calls 
to intervene forcefully in Oaxaca, the Fox government decided 
over the weekend of October 28 to deploy federal police to 
the state capital in order to restore law and order.  The 
decision came in the aftermath of three killings October 27, 
including of an American journalist caught in the cross-fire 
between forces allegedly loyal to Governor Ulises Ruiz and 
APPO protesters.  Fox's decision to send in over 4,000 
federal police to the state capital also came on the heels of 
a vote taken October 26 by members of the state teachers' 
union to return to class this week. 
 
APPO Weakened by Intervention 
----------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) After six hours of slow and occasionally violent 
retreat on October 29, APPO members withdrew from their 
barricades and by nightfall had ceded the historic central 
square which they had occupied for months.  APPO reported the 
death of a 15-year old boy, who had been guarding one of its 
barricades, as a result of the federal intervention, as well 
as the detention of 50 of its members.  (Note: Some police 
sources told the media the boy was killed by explosives he 
had been handling.  End note.)  By October 30, the PFP 
appeared to have complete control of key access points to 
Oaxaca City and the Zocalo, while the APPO had retreated to 
the local university to regroup. 
 
4. (SBU) APPO is under increased pressure following the GOM's 
removal of its encampments in Oaxaca City and the teachers' 
decision to return to class.  Organization leader Zennen 
Bravo asked protest members not to confront the federal 
police and has called instead for "passive mobilization."  It 
is not clear how much pressure the APPO can wield as long as 
it is prevented by police forces from shutting off commercial 
and government activity in Oaxaca City.  As the teachers 
return to school and citizens regain control of their city, 
APPO members could feel increasingly isolated.  On October 
30, there were press reports that APPO members were 
conducting marches back to the Zocalo, had established a new 
encampment in Plaza Santo Domingo, and refused to continue 
negotiations with the Secretary of Government in protest of 
the PFP deployment. (Note: The U.S. Consular Agent's Office, 
which faces Plaza Santo Domingo, was closed today.  There 
have been reports of clashes this afternoon between PFP and 
APPO members in Plaza Santo Domingo.  End note.)  Teachers 
did not return to school today as a consequence of the latest 
events. 
 
Ruiz Similarly in a Corner 
-------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) At first glance, the federal intervention takes the 
heat off Ruiz by limiting the APPO's freedom of action in 
Oaxaca City.  Ruiz continues to insist that he will not leave 
office and has the full backing of the PRI, at least until 
December 1, which marks two years in office and the point at 
which the PRI-controlled state congress would be able to name 
a PRI successor as governor.  Yet Ruiz will be badly damaged 
by the events of the past few days, and it is hard to imagine 
how he could return to office under "business as usual."  An 
investigation into the October 27 killings could find him 
complicit, and there are early signs that paramilitary forces 
loyal to him were responsible for that day's fatalities. 
Whether or not he was behind the violence, his inability to 
provide security and, now, the presence of federal forces in 
the state capital are further proof of his inability to 
govern Oaxaca. 
 
 
MEXICO 00006182  002 OF 002 
 
 
6. (SBU) On October 30, Mexico's Chamber of Deputies 
overwhelmingly approved a resolution calling on Ruiz to 
resign or request a leave from office in order to restore 
peace and order in the state, with only deputies from the PRI 
and the Green Party voting against it. There are some signs 
that even Ruiz's support in the PRI is flagging: PRI Chamber 
of Deputies leader Emilio Gamboa was quoted today as saying 
that Ruiz needed to "make an act of conscience" and decide 
whether he could continue to govern the state. (Note: Only 
the national senate or state congress can vote to remove 
Ruiz.  End note). 
 
Next steps? 
----------- 
 
7. (SBU) With only one death confirmed since the PFP 
deployment to Oaxaca, the Mexican public will likely endorse 
President Fox's decision to launch a federal takeover of 
Oaxaca.  Fox has said that the PFP will remain until order is 
fully restored.  There is no immediate pressure on the PFP to 
withdraw, which should strengthen the GOM's hand in trying to 
resolve the crisis.  According to a well-respected professor 
of law, the Mexican constitution is vague about the duration 
of a federal intervention, but the cost of keeping the PFP in 
Oaxaca for more than two months may be prohibitive, and the 
GOM is likely to scale back its presence once the situation 
has stabilized.  The GOM will maintain the legitimacy of a 
continued federal police presence if that presence remains 
relatively peaceful and if the GOM successfully portrays this 
as the only way to maintain order and guarantee the safety of 
students and teachers returning to class. 
 
8. (SBU) The GOM will need to affectively contain the 
conflict.  For months, one of the biggest worries about 
Oaxaca's political crisis has been that it could spill over 
to other areas of the nation.  On October 29, APPO protesters 
in Mexico City seized two buses and used them to block 
traffic in the city center.  The same day, a large PRD 
motorcade filed through the capital's Zocalo festooned with 
placards referencing the crisis in Oaxaca and calling for 
Ruiz's resignation.  However, although many Mexicans have 
voiced support for Oaxaca's teachers, there are few outside 
Oaxaca who have rallied behind APPO's radical tactics.  In 
fact, some PRD leaders joined their colleagues from other 
parties to lend cautious support to the PFP deployment. 
Rumors that the PRD will capitalize on the crisis or link in 
some fashion to the APPO do not seem credible.  That said, 
failed presidential candidate Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador 
(AMLO) has criticized the federal intervention and called for 
the removal of Ruiz. 
 
9. (SBU) The Oaxaca crisis is complicated by the political 
interests involved.  Up until now, no actor has been willing 
to assume the political costs of pressuring the ouster of 
Governor Ruiz, which would serve to resolve the conflict. 
Fox's refusal to intervene with force had been a source of 
tension between the outgoing President and President-elect 
Calderon, who does not want to inherit this problem.  Now 
that he has intervened, President Fox will need to pressure 
parties to the conflict to reach a peaceful resolution as 
well as hold Ruiz accountable for acts of thuggery committed 
on his behalf (or at his behest).  The events of October 27, 
including the shooting of Brad Will, could well make it 
easier for federal officials to build a case against Ruiz and 
harder for the PRI to resist. 
 
 
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity 
GARZA