Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06MANAGUA2384, NICARAGUA: RESPONSE TO LATIN AMERICA-CARIBBEAN

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06MANAGUA2384.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MANAGUA2384 2006-10-26 15:57 2011-06-21 08:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Managua
VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #2384/01 2991557
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 261557Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8017
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS MANAGUA 002384 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR: WHA/EPSC CORNEILLE, EB/ESC/IEC IZZO, S/P MANUEL, 
AND OES/STC PAMELA BATES 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG SENV ECON PREL PGOV NU
SUBJECT: NICARAGUA: RESPONSE TO LATIN AMERICA-CARIBBEAN 
BIOFUELS INITIATIVE 
 
REF: A. STATE 164558 
     B. MANAGUA 02051 
 
1. (U) Summary:  Nicaragua,s energy sector is heavily 
dependent upon imported oil for electricity production.  High 
oil prices and poor regulation of the energy sector have left 
electricity producers and distributors with empty pockets and 
consumers without electricity.  Nicaragua's climate and soil 
are well suited to sugar cane production and experts predict 
that within five years production will increase by 90% to a 
total of 100,000 hectares.  The country's first ethanol plant 
will begin operation in November 2006, producing 18 million 
liters of ethanol for export to Europe.  An African 
palm-based biodiesel will hit the local market within a year 
and a second biodiesel from oleaginous plants will be 
commercially available in 2008.  Experts worry, nonetheless, 
that market pressures will drive investors away from biofuels 
and into more profitable markets.  Without incentives from 
the GON to pursue alternative fuel sources and a regulatory 
framework to support the long-term growth and success of 
biofuels, the fledgling biofuels sector may never take hold. 
 End Summary. 
 
Energy Production, Distribution, and Use 
--------------------------------------------- 
2. (U) Nicaragua is heavily dependent upon imported petroleum 
for electricity production.  The country generates almost 70% 
of its electricity from heavy fuel oil or diesel.  Despite 
huge potential, hydro-power accounts for only 15% of 
electricity installed capacity, but production this year has 
fallen to 10% as a result of drought.  Other "green" energy 
sources such as geothermic and burning of bagasse (biowaste 
from sugar cane harvest) generate 15% of electricity 
production.  Most industrial enterprises and the heavy 
transportation sector are fueled by diesel.  Cars and light 
trucks use gasoline; ethanol is not available on the local 
market. 
 
3. (U) Nicaragua partially privatized its energy sector in 
2001 and privately-owned companies now account for 60% of 
production and almost 100% of distribution.  The regulator, 
INE (the National Energy Institute), a creature of the 
National Assembly and headed by a politician, has not managed 
the sector well, creating an inhospitable environment for 
growth.  INE administers electricity prices and issues 
tenders for power production, but has failed to adequately 
deal with rising oil prices, aging infrastructure, and 
growing local demand.  In addition, two-thirds of all 
customers qualify for free electricity through a subsidy that 
must be borne either by paying customers or the government. 
The National Assembly has not appropriated sufficient funds 
to subsidize the sector, putting great financial strain on 
the industry.  Compounding the problem this year has been 
unexpected maintenance on one power plant and low rainfall 
along the river basin behind the country's largest 
hydroelectric dam.  The result has been chronic blackouts and 
power rationing throughout the country. 
 
Sugar Production Booming with Great Potential to Expand 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 

4. (U) Nicaragua is the third largest sugar producer in 
Central America.  Its soil and climate are well suited to the 
task.  Annual rain falls provide most of the water needed for 
growing.  Production yields are among the highest in Central 
America at more than 119 metric tons of sugar cane per 
hectare with an average of 225 pounds of sugar per metric ton 
of sugar cane (compared to an average of 269 pounds per 
metric ton in the United States).  According to the Ministry 
of Labor, the sugar sector employs 35,000 people in the 
fields and supports an additional 100,000 jobs nationwide. 
Many consider Nicaragua's sugar industry to be the 
best-organized in the country. 
 
5. (U) Nicaragua,s four large scale sugar plantations and 
four sugar mills are concentrated along the Pacific Coast. 
San Antonio (of the Pellas Group) is the largest producer of 
sugar cane, with more than 28,800 hectares under production. 
The second largest producer, Monte Rosa, has 21,000 hectares 
under production.  The two remaining significant producers, 
Montelimar and Benjamin Zeledon, cultivate 5,000 and 3,000 
hectares, respectively.  The Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry (MAGFOR) estimates that an additional 42,000 
hectares of fallow land could potentially produce sugar cane. 
 Experts predict that within five years, a total of 100,000 
hectares will be utilized for sugar production, resulting in 
an almost 90% increase over current production levels. 
 
6. (U) The vast majority of sugar cane in Nicaragua is 
harvested by hand, using a method that involves the burning 
of sugar cane fields before harvest.  New MAGFOR technical 
norms, however, set burn limits to control pollution.  As a 
result, mechanized harvesting is becoming more prevelant. 
Industry insiders expect that within three years, 70% of 
sugar cane will be harvested mechanically and that this will 
increase the average yield per metric ton.  All four sugar 
mills burn bagasse to generate electricity.  Together, they 
sell 60 megawatts to a local, independent power producer. 
 
Technical Skills 
---------------- 

7. (U) Nicaragua,s total labor force, estimated at 2 million 
workers in July 2005, is largely rural and unskilled. 
Critical shortages of skilled technicians and managerial 
personnel present significant challenges to industry.  An 
estimated 30% of the employed population works in the 
agricultural sector, 52% in services, and 18% in 
manufacturing.  A senior engineer for a Spanish construction 
company working in Nicaragua told Econoff that his company 
delayed the start of a major project by three months to 
search for mid-level mechanical and industrial engineers, as 
well as project managers.  Eventually, the company filled 
half of the available jobs with workers from Spain.  A dearth 
of qualified individuals to work on biofuels development and 
ethanol plants could pose a problem for the advancement of 
alternative energy. 
 
Bio-Refineries and the Environment 
------------------------------------- 

8. (U) A 1994 environmental standards law requires that 
certain industries (i.e., leather, dairy, sugar, forestry, 
and meat processors) submit for approval environmental impact 
statements to the Ministry of Environment and Natural 
Resources (MARENA).  The list of industries is not 
comprehensive and many sectors, including bio-refineries, 
currently operate without environmental oversight.  A revised 
version of the 1994 law, which would require all industries 
to submit environmental impact statements, will go to the 
President in November for approval.  A MARENA insider doubts, 
however, that the President will ratify the proposed changes 
because they do not sufficiently centralize authority over 
the regulatory process. 
 
Infrastructure: Ports, Roads, and Transportation 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 

9. (U) Nicaragua has no major port on the Atlantic coast, so 
most shippers use Puerto Cortes in Honduras.  Ground 
shipments to and from Puerto Cortes, however, are 
increasingly at risk of being hijacked.  On the Pacific 
Coast, the small Nicaraguan Port of Corinto is capable of 
handling liquid cargo.  Ground transportation from east to 
west is extremely difficult.  There are few paved roads 
linking the Pacific and the Atlantic coasts and, those that 
exist are in poor condition.  Generally, ground 
transportation for heavy cargo to and from ports is readily 
available. 
 
Nicaragua to Produce Ethanol for Export 
------------------------------------------ 

10. (U) In November 2006, Nicaragua,s first ethanol plant 
will begin operation.  The Pellas Group, owner of Nicaragua's 
largest sugar plantation and the country's only sugar 
refinery, invested more than $4 million in the development of 
a Pacific coast ethanol plant.  The company holds a one-year 
contract with a single buyer in Europe, who will purchase all 
18 million liters produced.  A Pellas Group spokesperson 
suggested that Pellas is poised to expand production if the 
ethanol plant was successful in its first year.  To date, the 
company has no plans to distribute ethanol domestically. 
 
11. (U) Existing infrastructure could support the transport, 
storage, and export of up to three times the Pellas Group's 
estimated annual production of 18 million liters.  The 
ethanol plant is 18 miles from the Port of Corinto, which has 
a 7 million liter storage capacity dedicated to ethanol.  At 
current production levels, Pellas will need less than half of 
this storage capacity at any given time.  Pellas plans to 
transport ethanol from the plant to the Port of Corinto in 
28,000 liter tanker trucks, which it has no difficulties 
procuring. 
 
Biodiesels: Coming Soon 
------------------------- 

12. (U) Another private enterprise, Agroindustrias de 
Occidente (AGRINOSA), is venturing into the biofuels market 
with an African Palm-based biodiesel.  AGRINOSA has yet to 
commercialize its product and is months away from completing 
the paperwork needed to enter the local market.  AGRINOSA 
will sell the biodiesel to factories and heavy transportation  
vehicles (two industries that are almost 100% dependent on 
diesel consumption).  A 2005 AGRINOSA study of the energy 
market estimated current domestic demand for biodiesel at 5.6 
million liters per month.  AGRINOSA is capable of producing 
1.4 million liters per month, or 25% of current demand. 
 
13. (U) Grupo Cohen, a prominent Nicaraguan investment group, 
has visions of joining AGRINOSA in the biodiesel market. 
They are launching a pilot project to produce biodiesel from 
oleaginous plants (i.e. soybean, sunflower, and peanuts). 
Estimated production capacity is 1.8 million liters per year 
and pilot production should begin within the coming months. 
Grupo Cohen is not commited to a definite timeline, but hope 
to make its product available commercially by mid 2008. 
Neither AGRINOSA nor Grupo Cohen plan to export biodiesel. 
 
 
Challenges to Biofuel Development 
------------------------------------- 

14. (U) While the biofuel industry has attracted some private 
investment, a 2005 study by the Instituto Interamericano de 
Cooperacion para la Agricultura (IICA) and MAGFOR suggests 
that the GON will need to take a leading role in alternative 
energy production to sustain long-term production.  The study 
criticized the GON for its "lack of political will" to move 
ethanol or biodiesels forward, pointing to an absence of 
incentives for biofuel production or use. 
 
15. (U) Experts fear that investors will abandon biofuels for 
more profitable markets if the GON does not provide 
incentives for alternative fuel production.  In 2005, for 
example, the Pellas Group invested in a new distillery and 
alcohol dehydrator to produce ethanol on a trial basis and 
earmarked 8,000 metric tons of sugar cane for the project. 
When international sugar prices skyrocketed, the company 
stopped ethanol production and processed the cane for sugar 
export.  Without stable prices and incentives to stay in the 
ethanol market, the industry may never develop. 
 
16. (U) Pedro Silva de la Maza, project director for San 
Antonio, echoed these concerns.  He believes that cooperation 
among GON institutions is weak and that the biofuels industry 
needs "collaboration and joint planning between the forestry, 
agricultural, and energy sectors" if it is to materialize. 
The problem, he points out, is that "these ministries are 
challenged with immediate problems and have few resources to 
deal with advancing ethanol production." 
 
17. (U) Comment: Nicaragua is heavily dependent on imported 
oil and suffers when oil prices rise.  In July 2006, violent 
demonstrations erupted throughout the capital when rising 
fuel prices forced bus companies to increase fares.  Frequent 
and prolonged blackouts spurred protests throughout the 
country in August and September.  Ethanol production could go 
a long way toward alleviating the country's dependency upon 
foreign oil and reducing imports.  Nicaragua has a 
well-developed sugar industry, available fallow land, and 
existing private investment in ethanol and biofuels 
production.  Without incentives from the GON to pursue 
alternative fuel sources and a regulatory framework to 
support the long-term growth and success of biofuels, the 
fledgling biofuels sector may never take hold.  End Comment. 
TRIVELLI