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Viewing cable 06MANAGUA2225, NICARAGUAN PRESIDENTIAL POLLS -- WHAT DO THE
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VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHMU #2225/01 2800000
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 070000Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7825
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0786
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 002225
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2016
TAGS: EAID KDEM NU PGOV PINR PREL
SUBJECT: NICARAGUAN PRESIDENTIAL POLLS -- WHAT DO THE
NUMBERS MEAN?
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D).
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The presidential polls from March to the
most recent in September all point to the likelihood of a
runoff in the November 5 presidential election. From poll to
poll the candidates have gained and lost percentage points,
but none of the candidates has attained the level (40 percent
or 35 percent and 5 percent over the next closest candidate)
required to win on the first round. Although Sandinista
Liberation Front (FSLN) candidate Daniel Ortega was well in
the lead in June and July polls, Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance
(ALN) candidate Eduardo Montealegre has gained on him in the
past few weeks. The polls show that Ortega and Liberal
Constitutional Party (PLC) candidate Jose Rizo are still the
strongest players among the rural population. The Sandinista
Renovation Movement (MRS) suffered a setback after
presidential candidate Herty Lewites' sudden death, but the
party has gained back some points after an initial loss in
the polls and their numbers seem to have stabilized. Sample
sizes and methodologies vary for each poll and must be taken
into account when analyzing the results. The percentage of
voters who declare they are undecided remains high and these
are the voters who may determine the outcome of the November
5 election. END SUMMARY.
THE NUMBERS
- - - - - -
¶2. (C) Surveys -- intention for presidential vote
09/06 - M&R Consultants
Daniel Ortega -- 30.9%
Eduardo Montealegre -- 26.4%
Herty Lewites/Edmundo Jarquin -- 15.9%
Jose Rizo -- 16.3%
Undecided -- 9.6%
09/06 - Greenberg Consultants
Daniel Ortega -- 29%
Eduardo Montealegre -- 27%
Herty Lewites/Edmundo Jarquin -- 19%
Jose Rizo -- 16%
Undecided -- 7%
09/06 - M&R (phone)
Daniel Ortega -- 16.7%
Eduardo Montealegre -- 36.2%
Herty Lewites/Edmundo Jarquin -- 19.7%
Jose Rizo -- 11.7%
Undecided -- 16.2%
08/06 - Borges y Asociados (ByA)
Daniel Ortega -- 26.8%
Eduardo Montealegre -- 23.9%
Herty Lewites/Edmundo Jarquin -- 19.1%
Jose Rizo -- 16.4%
Undecided -- 13.3%
08/06 - New Link
Daniel Ortega -- 28%
Eduardo Montealegre -- 21%
Herty Lewites/Edmundo Jarquin -- 12%
Jose Rizo -- 15%
Undecided -- 23%
08/06 - CID Gallup
Daniel Ortega -- 28.7%
Eduardo Montealegre -- 22.8%
Herty Lewites/Edmundo Jarquin -- 14.2%
Jose Rizo -- 13.5%
Undecided -- 19.1%
08/06 - M&R
Daniel Ortega -- 32.1%
Eduardo Montealegre -- 25.0%
Herty Lewites/Edmundo Jarquin -- 19.9%
Jose Rizo -- 13.7%
Undecided -- 8.0%
O8/06 - ByA
Daniel Ortega -- 27.5%
Eduardo Montealegre -- 24.8%
Herty Lewites/Edmundo Jarquin -- 17.1%
Jose Rizo -- 18.6%
Undecided -- 11.1%
07/06 - ByA
Daniel Ortega -- 31.4%
Eduardo Montealegre -- 29.1%
Herty Lewites/Edmundo Jarquin -- 15.2%
Jose Rizo -- 15.7%
Undecided -- 7.6%
06/06 - ByA
Daniel Ortega -- 30.1%
Eduardo Montealegre -- 24.4%
Herty Lewites/Edmundo Jarquin -- 17.2%
Jose Rizo -- 21.6%
Undecided -- 5.8%
06/06 - CID Gallup
Daniel Ortega -- 23%
Eduardo Montealegre -- 17%
Herty Lewites/Edmundo Jarquin -- 15%
Jose Rizo -- 11%
Undecided -- 32%
05/06 - M&R
Daniel Ortega -- 27.2%
Eduardo Montealegre -- 27.9%
Herty Lewites/Edmundo Jarquin -- 13.3%
Jose Rizo -- 13.3%
Undecided -- 12.5%
05/06 - ByA
Daniel Ortega -- 28.7%
Eduardo Montealegre -- 27.0%
Herty Lewites/Edmundo Jarquin -- 13.3%
Jose Rizo -- 17.0%
Undecided -- 12.1%
EARLY POLLS
- - - - - -
¶3. (U) Early surveys, such as the Borges y Asociados
countrywide poll conducted in early May, showed a small gap
between Ortega and Montealegre -- Ortega leading with 28.7
percent, followed by Eduardo Montealegre with 27 percent.
Poll results when analyzed by department, showed that Ortega
was strong in Managua, Carazo, Nueva Segovia, Madriz,
Jinotega, Esteli, Chontales, the RAAN, Rio San Juan and
Matagalpa. In contrast, Montealegre was stronger in
typically Sandinista Leon, as well as in Masaya, Granada,
Rivas, Chinandega, Boaco and the RAAS.
¶4. (U) Ortega's numbers began to climb in June, while
support for other candidates dropped, as highlighted in the
CID Gallup poll, conducted June 16-23. Ortega,s numbers
rose to 23% versus 16% in April, while support for the other
candidates dropped: Montealegre 17% versus 22% in April;
Lewites 15% versus 18% in April; and Rizo: 11% versus 13% in
April. Support was also strong for the FSLN as a party. In
a Borges y Asociados countrywide poll conducted between June
20 and July 2 Nicaraguans were asked about their party
preferences (without using the names of the Presidential
candidates) and the FSLN was clearly ahead with 30.6%
followed by the PLC (24.2%), the ALN (17.7%), the MRS (11.3%)
and the AC (.78%).
¶5. (U) The earlier polls also showed preferences among
voters by education level and department that still hold true
in more recent surveys. The Borges y Asociados pollsters
compared education levels of the respondents, and among those
who supported the FSLN, 33.5% had only completed a primary
education in contrast to those who supported Lewites (11% had
a primary education and 22% has a university education).
Respondents with no education overwhelmingly favored Rizo and
Ortega. The poll also measured the candidates' popularity
among urban versus rural populations. Ortega, Montealegre
and the MRS led in urban areas, whereas Ortega and Rizo were
stronger in rural areas.
RECENT POLLS
- - - - - - -
¶6. (SBU) M&R, August -- According to the M&R Consultants
nationwide poll conducted August 4 - 10 (sample size 4,020)
Ortega was in the lead with 32.1%, followed by Montealegre
25.0%, Jarquin (19.9%), Rizo (13.7%) and Pastora (1.3%). If
the election goes to a second round, Montealegre would win
over Ortega, according to poll results. Of those polled, 8%
said they would not vote or declined to respond. If it is
assumed that those 8% would not vote, Ortega could win. The
adjusted figures (without the 8%) are: Ortega (34.9%),
Montealegre (27.2%), Jarquin (21.6%), Rizo (14.9%) and
Pastora (1.4%). According to regional breakdowns, Ortega is
still strongest in urban and rural areas. Montealegre has
the advantage on the Atlantic Coast and in the center of the
country. Also according to the poll, if the elections were
held tomorrow, none of the parties would win enough seats to
control the National Assembly.
¶7. (C) CID Gallup, August -- showed Ortega in the lead with
29%, followed by Montealegre with 23%, Rizo (14%), Jarquin
(14%) and Pastora (1%). The nationwide poll, conducted
August 16 - 19, had a sample size of 1,258 people, all with
cedulas. Of the people polled, 19% said they were undecided.
Of note is that on a second round, according to the poll,
Montealegre, Rizo and Jarquin would all beat Ortega.
(COMMENT: The press ran articles highlighting Ortega's lead
and declaring him the probable victor, but they were based on
the assumption that the 19% of undecided voters will either
abstain from voting or that some will vote for Ortega. In
the past, the undecided (or those who simply declined to
reveal who they plan to vote for) do not vote FSLN or PLC. A
majority of the 19% will go to Montealegre or Jarquin. END
COMMENT.)
¶8. (C) ALN Commissioned Poll, August -- A private poll
conducted by New Link Political (protect) for the ALN showed
FSLN presidential candidate Daniel Ortega with the highest
vote intention but with ALN candidate Eduardo Montealegre
winning in a second round. Ortega polled highest with 28% of
the vote, followed by Montealegre (21%), Rizo (15%), Jarquin
(10%), and Pastora (1%). Seventeen percent were undecided.
Montealegre, who the poll showed as being able to capture the
most votes from other candidates, would defeat Ortega in a
runoff election 35% to 32%, though the other candidates would
lose to Ortega. About 32% of respondents indicated that they
would consider voting for a presidential candidate and deputy
candidates from different parties, most preferring
Montealegre.
¶9. (C) MRS Commissioned Poll, September -- A private poll
commissioned by the MRS shows Montealegre a close second to
Ortega. MRS spokesperson Israel Lewites provided Poloff with
a copy of the latest Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research poll
(August 26 - September 2; 1,000 respondents, of them 746
likely to vote). Greenberg, which is providing consulting
serving to the MRS campaign, concluded the following: of the
1,000 respondents: 29% would vote for Ortega, 27% for
Montealegre, 19% for Jarquin, 16% for Rizo, and 6% undecided.
Of the 746 respondents most likely to vote: 32% would vote
for Ortega, 28% for Montealegre, 20% for Jarquin, and 18% for
Rizo. (COMMENT: Unlike other polls that the PLC can claim
are financed by Montealegre, the Greenberg poll, if anything,
should favor Jarquin, not Montealegre. The fact that this
poll tracks with the other polls lends credence to these
trends. END COMMENT.)
¶10. (C) PLC Commissioned Poll, September -- CID Gallup
fielded a small anonymous (without the CID Gallup name)
proprietary poll at the request of the PLC. The net results
of the poll, tracked fairly closely with CID Gallup,s last
poll, and in fact showed Montealegre consolidating and
improving, Rizo improving a bit, Jarquin slipping, and Ortega
holding at the same level. When asked who would they would
vote for right now, 28 percent of respondents indicated
Ortega. Montealegre garnered 24 percent, followed by Rizo
(16%), Jarquin (12%) and Pastora (1%). Nineteen percent were
undecided.
¶11. (C) M&R phone poll, September -- According to an M&R
poll released September 11 (poll conducted on September 7-8,
sample size 802 nationwide, 3.5% error), 35.2% of the
respondents believe Montealegre will be the next president of
Nicaragua; 22.3% think Ortega will win; 18.6% are uncertain
or did not respond; 12.5% believe Jarquin will win; 11.1%
think Rizo will be the next president; and, only .1% think
Pastora has a chance. Regarding voter preference,
Montealegre gained 36.2%, Jarquin 19.2%, Ortega 16.7%, Rizo
11.1% and Pastora .1%. Undecided/no response totaled 16.2%.
(COMMENT: The results of the poll are encouraging, however,
the sample size is very small and respondents polled outside
Managua were all queried by phone, thus limiting the type of
person who could respond, excluding poorer rural voters who
tend to favor Ortega or Rizo. It should also be noted that
this poll is an extreme outlier in relation to the other
polls. END COMMENT.)
LATEST POLL
- - - - - -
¶12. M&R, September -- According to the M&R poll released
September 29, Ortega (30.9%) and Montealegre (26.4%) are the
two leading candidates followed by Rizo (16.3%), Jarquin
(15.9%) and Pastora (0.9%). The percentage of people who
will not vote or are still undecided is 9.6%. The poll was
conducted between September 15 and 21, with a sample size of
4,204, and a margin of error of 1.5%. A majority of voters,
66 percent, declared themselves "anti-Ortega." In this poll,
Montealegre is gaining on Ortega, and the most likely outcome
is a second round runoff between these two candidates. In a
second round, Montealegre would win with 44.2% of the vote --
9 points over Ortega,s 35%. Jarquin,s numbers appear to be
slipping and Rizo is now in third place.
¶13. No party would have the 47 votes in the National
Assembly needed to pass a law, though the FSLN would still
enjoy the largest voting block, according to the results of
this poll. The FSLN would win 35 deputy seats, the ALN 29,
the MRS 14 and the PLC 12 (down from 40 currently).
Alliances would still be necessary in order to pass
legislation. The combined votes of the PLC and FSLN would
total 47 votes. Regarding the rural vote, the poll suggests
that the FSLN has gained considerable ground with this
segment of the population as Ortega leads with 34.9%,
followed by Montealegre 24.9%, and Rizo 21.5%. (NOTE:
Contacts tell us that Chavez, donation of fertilizer to the
FSLN has drawn more support for Ortega.)
THE HERTY FACTOR
- - - - - - - - -
¶14. (C) The MRS suffered a setback in the polls with Herty
Lewites' death, which they recouped in the following months
as Jarquin and Carlos Mejia Godoy began actively campaigning.
Recent polls, however, show their numbers may be slipping.
MRS spokesman Israel Lewites is convinced that the FSLN has
reached the peak of its support and that the poll numbers may
decline, which will provide the MRS with an opportunity to
gain ground. A bump in the polls in favor of Ortega occurred
in June and his numbers appeared to have crossed the 30%
threshold, though there are now indications that his numbers
are beginning to decrease. Lewites believes that Ortega's
numbers are overstated in the polls, because some people who
claim to be FSLN supporters may only be professing their
allegiance to avoid antagonizing local party members. The
MRS is now actively targeting FSLN supporters to try to win
their vote -- Lewites claims that they have much better
chance in pulling away FSLN voters than they do Montealegre
supporters. Recent advertisements speak directly to
Sandinistas and portray the MRS as party that is true to
Sandinista ideals. The MRS is working hard to increase its
support in urban areas and among students.
¶15. (C) Edmundo Jarquin was the clear winner in an M&R poll
measuring public reactions to the September 13 presidential
debate sponsored by CNN en espanol and Canal 2, a Nicaraguan
TV channel. According to the poll, 113,000 households in
Managua tuned in to watch Edmundo Jarquin (MRS), Eduardo
Montealegre (ALN), Jose Rizo (PLC) and Eden Pastora (AC) give
one-minute answers to a broad set of questions ranging from
economic growth strategies to Daniel Ortega,s absence from
the debate, to the candidates, views on abortion. Aided by
his large physical presence and deep voice, Jarquin,s
answers were concise and well-crafted and made an impact.
Although over made-up and visibly nervous at times,
Montealegre placed a solid second in the debate by delivering
clear, concise, on-message answers. Rizo and Pastora were
unable to use the forum effectively, offered few tangible
solutions, and frequently ran out of time. Lewites recently
told emboffs that Jarquin's performance during the debate has
resulted in several small campaign donations (around 20,000 -
30,000 each).
HAS MONTEALEGRE TURNED IT AROUND?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶16. (C) In the June polls, support for Montealegre declined,
possibly because of the internal divisions among individuals
and parties forming his alliance, and a poorly defined
campaign focus and message. Montealegre's numbers slipped
especially in rural areas, while Ortega and Rizo gained
strength. Ortega and Rizo are still the strongest players
among the rural population and Montealegre had not focused on
campaigning in rural areas. In recent polls, this trend
seems to have turned around. The most recent polls show an
upturn in Montealegre's numbers and an increased likelihood
that the race will go to a second round between Montealegre
and Ortega.
¶17. (C) The more positive poll results do not indicate
smooth sailing for Montealegre's campaign, however. Embassy
contacts have speculated that Montealegre's numbers could
still fall due to problems articulating his message and the
CENIS (debt bonds) smear campaign orchestrated by his
opponents. We continue to hear reports of problems with his
campaign, although fewer than before. Others have noted that
the divide between the center right is likely to remain
protracted because polls have undercounted the rural vote,
thus PLC numbers may increase in the run-up to the elections.
COMMENT
- - - -
¶18. (C) One of the most notable trends in the polls is large
number of undeclared or undecided voters, which may indicate
that the people polled do not want to discuss their party
affiliation or that they are undecided. The undecided vote
has varied from poll to poll, ranging from a low of 5.8% to
32%. The last two polls show an undecided vote of around 7
to 10 percent. This still large segment may reflect the
indecision on the part of traditional liberal voters who are
torn between party loyalty and Montealegre, but mostly do not
want to waste their votes, preferring to rally behind the
"winning horse" that will beat Ortega. These undecided votes
traditionally do not go to Ortega; they are potential votes
for Montealegre or Jarquin. However, if these voters abstain
from voting, Ortega could win. The next month will be
critical as Montealegre and Jarquin court the undecided
voters. The availability of funds, or lack thereof, may be
the determinant in whether they can reach these voters, who
will likely determine the outcome of the November 5 election.
The next few polls may give a more accurate prediction of
what will happen as these voters make their decisions.
¶19. (C) Recent polls continue to point toward two options:
a win by Ortega in the first round or a second round run-off
between Ortega and Montealegre. (NOTE: The INR-funded CID
Gallup poll also reflects this and fits within recent
trends.) At this point, an ALN-PLC alliance is unlikely.
Rizo does not appear willing to cede to Montealegre, whether
or not Aleman steps down. Even if Rizo did step down, the
additional votes for Montealegre would be minimal and he
could risk losing some of his anti-pact vote. An alliance
with Jarquin also seems unlikely, though something could
emerge closer to the election. When asked about a possible
alliance between Montealegre and Jarquin, Lewites denied the
possibility and pointed out the ideological differences
between the MRS and the ALN.
¶20. (C) What also seems clear from the polls is that
Montealegre is the best candidate to beat Ortega. Jarquin
might be able to win in a second round over Ortega, but most
likely Rizo would not. The independent vote will be key in
determining the outcome of the November 5 election; 60% to
70% of independent voters (depending on the poll) reject the
FSLN-PLC pact. According to recent polls, most voters
believe that the pact is alive and well -- 62.4% of those
polled by M&R in September. If Montealegre focuses on
winning Liberal voters to ensure a runoff election and
strengthens his campaign messages, he may be able to rally
the undecided voters and the "anti-Ortega" vote. The
September M&R poll showed that even among voters who align
themselves with other parties, Montealegre is a strong
candidate -- 55.2% of PLC voters and 47.% of MRS voters
believe Montealegre is the best candidate to beat Ortega.
Montealegre's campaign efforts should focus on the undecided
and "anti-Ortega" voters with strong, clear statements and a
simple refutation of the CENIS charges. END COMMENT.
TRIVELLI