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Viewing cable 06MADRID2583, SPAIN: VISIT OF VENEZUELA COORDINATOR DEBORAH

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MADRID2583 2006-10-13 14:24 2011-04-10 17:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Madrid
Appears in these articles:
http://www.eluniverso.com/2011/04/10/1/1355/cable-81813.html
VZCZCXRO8757
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMD #2583/01 2861424
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 131424Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1011
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA PRIORITY 2139
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0219
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 002583 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
WHA FOR HAZEL THOMAS AND LOURDES CUE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV SNAR UNSC SP VE
SUBJECT: SPAIN: VISIT OF VENEZUELA COORDINATOR DEBORAH 
MCCARTH...




id: 81813
date: 10/13/2006 14:24
refid: 06MADRID2583
origin: Embassy Madrid
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 06MADRID2564|06MADRID2583
header:
VZCZCXRO8757
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMD #2583/01 2861424
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 131424Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1011
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA PRIORITY 2139
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0219

----------------- header ends ----------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 002583 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
WHA FOR HAZEL THOMAS AND LOURDES CUE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV SNAR UNSC SP VE
SUBJECT: SPAIN: VISIT OF VENEZUELA COORDINATOR DEBORAH 
MCCARTHY 
 
REF: MADRID 2564 
 
MADRID 00002583  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: DCM Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C)   SUMMARY: Special Coordinator for Venezuela Deborah 
McCarthy met with representatives of the Spanish Foreign 
Ministry and National Security Council on October 4 to 
discuss U.S. policy on Venezuela and Latin America.  McCarthy 
also conducted interviews with two Spanish media outlets and 
one Latin American radio station, achieving layered media 
coverage on U.S. concerns in Venezuela.  GOS representatives 
shared USG concerns on narco-trafficking, the excesses of 
Chavez rhetoric, and the ongoing clash of ideologies in Latin 
America, but they expressed optimism that the upcoming 
Venezuelan elections would provide a reality check for 
Chavez.  MFA DG for Latin America Javier Sandomingo also 
informed McCarthy that the Spanish were seeking to help 
Guatemala's UNSC candidacy where possible, including in 
Africa, where Guatemala has almost no representation.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
//National Security Council// 
 
2. (C)   McCarthy met October 4 with Jose Javier Gomez-Llera 
and Maria Solanas Cardin, advisors to the Spanish National 
Security Council.  Gomez-Llera began by mentioning the 
Ecuador elections and told McCarthy that the Spanish have 
seen a lot of money flowing into the Correa campaign from 
Venezuela.  He said it was possible that both the Mexican and 
Peruvian governments might comment on this phenomenon. 
 
3. (C)   Gomez-Llera asked McCarthy whether the U.S. had 
considered the possibility of a compromise UNSC candidate 
should Venezuela and Guatemala reach a deadlock.  He said 
that the Peruvians might propose Uruguay as such a candidate. 
 McCarthy responded that the USG is not discussing it, and 
she outlined the strong case for Guatemala.  McCarthy 
acknowledged that GRULAC may eventually need to contemplate a 
third option, and she offered possibilities of Costa Rica, 
Trinidad, the Dominican Republic, or Uruguay.  McCarthy also 
said that some OAS countries are truly frustrated with 
Venezuela's obstinacy in international fora.  She also noted 
that Chavez' performance at UNGA appeared to have tipped some 
nations away from Venezuela. 
 
4. (C)   On the December presidential election in Venezuela, 
Gomez-Llera stated his belief that the opposition's chances 
are improving and that Rosales would put forth a good 
showing.  McCarthy agreed and stated that the U.S. objective 
is an opposition with the right and the will to participate - 
even if Chavez wins this election - whether in the Parliament 
or purely in civil society for the moment.  Solanas Cardin 
stated that this is Spain's position as well.  McCarthy also 
said that the U.S. is concerned about the potential for 
property seizures and a lack of respect for property rights. 
 
5. (C)   McCarthy also emphasized that the door remains open 
for dialogue with Venezuela, although the GOV has not 
accepted the standing offer for a visit from A/S Shannon. 
She noted that while it would be difficult to characterize 
current bilateral relations as a dialogue, the U.S. believes 
that expanded communication will be possible after the 
elections on matters such as drug trafficking, terrorism, and 
border control. 
 
6. (C)   Gomez-Llera mentioned Bolivia and statements made to 
the GOS by Kirchner and Lula that Chavez really does not 
exert as much influence over Morales as is reported. 
McCarthy noted that Castro has always been the primary 
influence on socialists in Latin America but that Chavez 
certainly has influence with Morales.  Gomez-Llera said he 
feels that Brazil should play a more active role in reining 
in Venezuela and noted that Colombia could do little given 
its long history with Venezuela.  On Colombia, McCarthy noted 
that there is concern that some of the enormous quantity of 
AK-47's purchased by the GOV might be making their way into 
the hands of the FARC, not through complicity of the GOV but 
through black market forces. 
 
7. (C)   McCarthy offered two final points on Venezuela, 
noting USG concern with the GOV's burgeoning relationship 
with Iran and with the potential role of Venezuela in 
post-Castro Cuba. Both Gomez-Llera and Solanas Cardin said 
they thought Cubans would not allow Chavez to assert himself 
in Cuba.  They said the Cubans view Chavez as a loyal student 
and practitioner of Castroism abroad, but not as a natural 
successor to Castroism in Cuba. 
 
 
MADRID 00002583  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
8. (C)   Gomez-Llera closed the meeting by stating that 
Europe and Spain are waking up to the puzzle of Latin America 
and have taken it upon themselves to attempt to promote a 
European integration model to Latin America.  Following the 
elections in Bolivia and Venezuela, and their adverse impact 
on European economic interests, European policymakers are 
keen to engage more actively in defense of those interests. 
 
//Director General Sandomingo// 
 
9. (C)   Director General for Iberoamerica Javier Sandomingo 
reiterated many of Gomez-Llera's points in his meeting with 
McCarthy later in the day.  Sandomingo began by mentioning 
the Latin America Working Group meeting at UNGA and A/S 
Shannon's proposal for Spain to craft some new assistance 
packages for Latin America on democracy building, poverty and 
education.  Sandomingo said that the GOS was looking at the 
idea and would probably produce something concrete in the 
next few months. 
 
10. (C)   Sandomingo then turned to Cuba, stating his belief 
that the transition will be faster and more turbulent than 
the Spanish transition, but that the GOS priority is that it 
not get out of hand.  He stated that if Raul Castro was the 
man to ensure such a transition the GOS would accept that. 
Sandomingo also felt that Chavez would have a minimal role in 
post-Castro Cuba. 
 
11. (C)   On Chavez, Sandomingo noted the possibility of a 
surprise in the December election.  While he would put most 
of his money on Chavez, Sandomingo said he would at least 
hedge his bet because he feels Rosales will do better than 
expected.  He believes a coherent opposition would arise in 
the aftermath of the election.  Sandomingo expressed 
reservations about the role for EU observers in the December 
election, noting that Chavez might set such strict conditions 
on the observer missions that it would be impossible for the 
EU to participate. 
 
12. (C)   Sandomingo offered GOS assistance in examining the 
Iran-Venezuela relationship, and he noted that this 
friendship (along with those of Belarus and Russia) would not 
help Chavez at the polls. 
 
13. (C)   McCarthy mentioned the Security Council vote and 
asked Sandomingo if Spain could help Guatemala.  Sandomingo 
replied that the Spanish had sat down with Guatemala at UNGA 
to go over the countries where they needed help (reftel). 
Sandomingo said that Spain would try to help in African 
countries where Guatemala has no representation, but he noted 
that Angola and others were almost certain to vote for 
Venezuela. 
 
14. (U)   Special Coordinator McCarthy cleared this report. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Visit Embassy Madrid's Classified Website; 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/madrid/ 
------------------------------------------ 
AGUIRRE 

=======================CABLE ENDS============================