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Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM2443, DARFUR - MASS DISPLACEMENT NOT ANTICIPATED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KHARTOUM2443 2006-10-04 06:38 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO9083
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #2443/01 2770638
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 040638Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4848
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 002443 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR JBRAUSE, NSC/AFRICA FOR TSHORTLEY 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID EAGR PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI SU
SUBJECT:  DARFUR - MASS DISPLACEMENT NOT ANTICIPATED 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 2254, B) KHARTOUM 2225, C) KHARTOUM 2223, D) 
 
KHARTOUM 2167, E) KHARTOUM 2382 
 
KHARTOUM 00002443  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  Despite the reported fighting and reduced access for 
humanitarian assistance, none of the sources available to USAID's 
Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) anticipate 
massive population movements within Darfur, towards other states in 
Sudan, or across the border to Chad, as of September 28.  The UN 
Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC) and the UN World Food Program (WFP) 
reported that as of mid-September warehouses in Darfur and other 
states had stocks to assist up to 100,000 people.  However, the 
prevailing sentiment of the humanitarian community in Sudan is that 
the current and anticipated levels of fighting will not cause 
100,000 new displacements.  The situation in the three Darfur states 
remains unpredictable with reports of improvement followed by other 
information indicating deteriorating conditions.  End Summary. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Major Concerns for All Three States 
----------------------------------- 
 
2.  According to the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Sudan, 50,000 
people have been displaced since the Darfur Peace Agreement was 
signed in May 2006.  In September, a new round of fighting erupted 
between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and other armed groups, 
causing many to fear that more displacements were to come.  However, 
the Humanitarian Aid Department of the European Commission (ECHO), 
the U.K. Department for International Development (DFID), and 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Khartoum paint a picture of 
general concern but do not anticipate mass displacements within 
Darfur, to neighboring states within Sudan, or to Chad. 
 
3.  In USAID/OFDA led contingency planning sessions (REF D), staff 
of UN agencies and NGOs in Khartoum and Darfur stated that they do 
not see any indications on the ground that mass population 
displacements either to Chad or to neighboring states in Sudan will 
occur in the near future.  Experience shows that continued localized 
fighting and violence may cause populations to migrate towards urban 
areas, internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, or further up into 
the mountains, in the case of Jebel Marra.  IDPs perceive camps as 
relatively safe places because witnesses are present in the camp, 
including UN agencies, NGOs, as well as other IDPs.  IDPs are not 
expected to move from camps to rural communities.  (Comment: One NGO 
representative noted that Arab groups who have taken over control of 
land that previously belonged to farmers would not attack a camp 
because they would rather hold on to the land they are occupying. 
End Comment.) 
 
4.  Insecurity is the predominant apprehension expressed by 
humanitarian agencies in all three Darfur states.  Lack of road 
access limits the ability of humanitarian organizations (REF C) to 
reach remote populations and significantly increases program 
expenses due to the high costs of helicopter transport.  In areas 
with a high concentration of beneficiaries, runway rehabilitation 
for fixed wing aircraft could improve service delivery, reduce 
costs, and expand air services into new areas.  NGOs noted that in 
the unlikely scenario of "total melt-down" in Darfur, people might 
move towards Northern Kordofan State, Southern Kordofan State, and 
Khartoum.  The NGOs commented that contingency plans for this type 
of mass population movement have not been well coordinated or 
recently discussed.  USAID/OFDA has taken steps internally to 
develop contingency plans for this scenario by coordinating Darfur, 
Southern Sudan, and northern Sudan programs.  In a September 28 
meeting, USAID inventoried potential NGO responders by sector and 
location, and outlined a contingency plan for the scenario described 
above. 
 
5.  Both UN agencies and NGOs consider the availability of 
commercial ground transport as a good indicator for conditions on 
the ground.  Agencies noted that if private transporters are no 
longer willing to take on contracts, communities will be truly 
inaccessible.  Another concern voiced by NGOs is that the rising 
fuel prices and surcharges for deliveries to insecure areas will 
affect program costs. 
 
6.  The Darfur Humanitarian Access Map that is published regularly 
by the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 
indicates an improvement in humanitarian access from August to 
 
KHARTOUM 00002443  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
September.  This access has enabled NGOs, particularly in North 
Darfur, to reach vulnerable populations who have not received food 
for over three months. 
 
------------ 
North Darfur 
------------ 
 
7.  Considerable achievements in humanitarian coverage made up to 
April 2006 are currently threatened by the deterioration of 
security, reduced access to target populations (REF A), and the 
likelihood of reduced funding in 2007. 
 
8.  Aerial bombardments on non-SAF held territories have created an 
unstable environment.  Lack of access to many areas in August and 
September 2006 (REF A) resulted in a lack of credible estimations of 
new displacements.  From September 23 to 27, German Agro Action 
(GAA) negotiated with commanders from the National Redemption Front 
(NRF) safe passage to Kutum and Mellit localities from El Fasher. 
GAA distributed food rations to target communities on the road 
between Kutum and Um Baru, and in Sayeh and Mellit towns, reaching 
100 percent of the NGO's 271,000 targeted beneficiaries.  GAA had 
not been able to reach any of these beneficiaries for three months. 
IDPs in Fata Borno and Kassab camps received the standard one month 
ration, beneficiaries living in communities, not camps, received a 
half-ration.  NRF senior commanders assured the humanitarian 
community that its workers and assets would be safe and invited them 
to resume work in the areas they control, which currently include 
Muzbat, Birmaza, Abu Shakur, and Um Sidir. 
 
9.  According to GAA, the communities reached did not show 
infrastructure damage and the population did not appear to have 
suffered visibly during the period of isolation from the 
humanitarian community.  Although GAA reported that humanitarian 
assistance was needed, they did not see signs of malnutrition or 
extreme deprivation.  In the coming days, GAA will travel to Disa 
and Birmaza, which are located north of Kutum town, to continue 
distribution of general food rations for WFP.  To access this area, 
GAA will again have to negotiate with commanders of the NRF. 
 
----------- 
West Darfur 
----------- 
 
10.  Save the Children/US (SC/US), a USAID partner that has operated 
in West Darfur since 2004, informed USAID staff that in their 
opinion the worst case scenario does not include migration out of 
state or into Chad.  In general, population movements as a result of 
localized fighting are anticipated from small rural communities 
towards urban centers or IDP camps.  Attacks on IDP camps and urban 
centers are not expected and mass displacement from those areas 
towards rural communities or across state lines or into Chad are not 
anticipated.  In late 2005, UN predictions for population movements 
of 50,000 to 100,000 persons in West Darfur did not materialize. 
According to SC/US, only 6,000 persons were eventually displaced 
during this time period. 
 
11.  The operating environment for humanitarian actors varies 
significantly within the state.  Despite recent access restrictions 
(REF C), some NGOs are able to negotiate with local sheiks safe 
passage when the sheiks want assistance for their communities. 
Other NGOs, however, reported that the current tensions around the 
proposed UN peacekeeping force deployment has mobilized IDPs and 
communities, particularly in Zalingei, against the humanitarian 
community. 
 
12. Both NGOs and UN agencies based in El Geneina, West Darfur, 
reported a high level of coordination, collaboration, and experience 
in operating under the tight security restrictions of UN Phase Four. 
(Note: The UN lowered West Darfur from Phase Four to Phase Three in 
September. End Note.)  UN and NGO partners expressed concern that 
contingency plans for displacement to Zalingei are not well 
understood, coordinated, or planned, and stocks have not been 
pre-positioned in sufficient quantities.  NGOs reported that they 
will work together to address these concerns.  Pending resolution on 
the current 25 mile limitation on travel by U.S. Government (USG) 
staff (REF E), USAID staff plans to follow-up with a site visit to 
Zalingei in October. 
 
13.  In contingency planning meetings with USAID, NGOs noted that 
they would consider any unilateral decision taken by the UN or the 
U.S. to bring in a peacekeeping force, blockade Port Sudan, or 
 
KHARTOUM 00002443  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
establish a no-fly zone as triggers for NGOs to withdraw their staff 
and scale back programs.  In that context, they noted that program 
implementation solely based on community volunteers (i.e. relief 
committees) is a viable option for only two to three months after 
which time the quality of programs would deteriorate rapidly. 
 
------------ 
South Darfur 
------------ 
 
14. Following several months of relative calm, South Darfur is 
currently experiencing a renewed spate of violence against non-Arab 
civilians by the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and Arab militias. 
Intra-Arab violence could also resume on a larger scale, potentially 
destabilizing South Darfur.  Low-level conflict within the ranks of 
the SLA appears to be occurring along ethnic lines, as SLA fighters 
belonging to other ethnic groups attempt to reject the domination of 
Zaghawa in areas under control of SLA/MM.  This appears to be a 
probable explanation of recent fighting in Gereida and Muhajariya. 
These incidents have significantly curtailed access for humanitarian 
actors but have not generated significant civilian casualties or 
displacements. 
 
15. SC/US noted that Arab ethnic groups felt betrayed by the Abuja 
negotiations and have no reason to attack IDP camps.  However, Arab 
militia violence against villages continues, causing displacement of 
civilians such as the approximately 10,000 IDPs that gathered in Al 
Amud Al Akdar on August 29 as the result of Arab militia destruction 
of approximately 35 villages.  This population was then attacked 
again and fled to a number of locations including Buram town, 
Seisebana village, and Nyala town camps.  Renewed intra-Arab ethnic 
conflict-including the recent Habaniya/Reizegat conflict and 
Habaniya/Fullata conflict-could also have a destabilizing effect in 
South Darfur (REF B). 
 
-------------------------- 
WFP Food Stocks for Darfur 
-------------------------- 
 
16.  As of September 12, 2006, WFP reported a total of 135,300 
metric tons (MT) of assorted commodities for Darfur stored in 
warehouses in Sudan.  The most significant amounts are located in 
Port Sudan with 52,617 MT, El Obeid has 14,197 MT, Khartoum has 
13,091 MT, and Kosti has 11,423 MT.  In Darfur, the most significant 
amounts are located in Nyala with 18,783 MT, El Geneina has 11,562 
MT, El Fasher has 8,528 MT, and Mornei has 2,204 MT.  WFP stated 
that this stock would cover an additional 100,000 persons for two to 
three months. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
UNJLC Non-Food Item (NFI) Stocks for Darfur 
------------------------------------------- 
 
17.  While the amount of NFI stocks for Darfur varies greatly among 
items, UNJLC stated that up to 100,000 new displacements could be 
covered with in-country stocks.  Additionally, UNJLC expects to 
receive 102,500 blankets, 47,000 pieces of plastic sheeting, and 
68,883 sleeping mats at the end September. 
 
-------- 
Comments 
-------- 
 
18.  The recent success of GAA in Kutum and Mellit in reaching all 
targeted beneficiaries with food rations for October illustrates 
that some improvements in humanitarian deliveries are possible 
despite the unpredictability of the security situation.  USAID will 
closely monitor to see if this improved access in North Darfur 
holds. 
 
19.  UN agencies and NGOs have made substantial progress in their 
contingency planning in all three states. 
 
20.  Air assets continue to be critical for assessments and service 
delivery in West and North Darfur and are becoming increasingly 
important in South Darfur. 
 
21.  South Darfur is considered stable relative to the other two 
states with no likely substantial displacements in the near future. 
 
HUME