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Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM2420, DARFUR - FIGHTING IN GEREIDA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KHARTOUM2420 2006-10-02 14:32 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO6724
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #2420/01 2751432
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 021432Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4821
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 002420 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR JBRAUSE, NSC/AFRICA FOR TSHORTLEY 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: MOPS EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI SU
SUBJECT:  DARFUR - FIGHTING IN GEREIDA 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 02225 
 
KHARTOUM 00002420  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) On September 29, unknown assailants attacked the Sudan 
Liberation Army (SLA)/Minawi faction based in Gereida, South Darfur. 
 Despite hosting the largest concentration of internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) in Darfur, the humanitarian impact of the attack in 
Gereida appears to be minimal at this time.  Non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) working in the area have not reported 
significant casualties or displacements.  Most NGOs, however, have 
evacuated Gereida and temporarily suspended humanitarian activities. 
 The ability of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), which is the 
Gereida camp coordinator, to operate in Gereida is directly 
threatened by the evacuation, as many expect that the Sudanese 
government Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) will not allow the NGO 
to return. 
 
---------- 
Background 
---------- 
 
2. (U) Gereida is a town of 30,000 to 50,000 people located 105 km 
south of Nyala, South Darfur, that is currently host to 131,000 IDPs 
- making Gereida the largest IDP camp in all of Darfur.  Gereida is 
in an area dominated by the non-Arab Massalit ethnic group and is 
controlled by the Minni Minawi faction of the SLA (SLA/MM), 
affiliated primarily with the Zaghawa ethnic group.  Gereida lies 
along the Nyala to Buram road, an area the Sudanese Armed Forces 
have previously pledged to clear of all SLA presence. 
 
------------------- 
Conflict in Gereida 
------------------- 
 
3. (U) UN sources report that an attack by unidentified assailants 
resulted in heavy fighting in Gereida town from approximately 0630 
to 1630 on September 29.  The violence was concentrated on the 
northern side of town near to the wadi, and appears to have targeted 
the SLA/MM compound.  According to USAID partners, the fighting is 
believed to have involved heavy machine gun and mortar fire. 
 
4. (SBU) The identity and motives of the attackers have not yet been 
confirmed.  Initial reports indicated that Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM) forces perpetrated the attack; however, this 
explanation is unlikely given that JEM was not known to have a 
presence in the area and has no plausible motivation for attacking 
Gereida. 
 
5. (SBU) The most likely scenario is that the recent fighting in 
Gereida was between Massalit and Zaghawa portions of the SLA 
controlling the area.  The first report of this tension between 
these groups was on September 1, when the Massalit attacked the 
Zaghawa motivated by the belief that the Zaghawa were sidelining the 
Massalit within the movement and not acting in the interests of the 
local population.  Such reports have continued to accumulate since 
that time.  The tensions are reportedly due to frustration among the 
Massalit that the Zaghawa-dominated SLA is not protecting the people 
of Gereida effectively from attacks by Arab nomads on the outskirts 
of town. 
 
6. (SBU) According to UN sources, other possible explanations 
include attacks by Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatories, 
such as National Redemption Front (NRF) or SLA Free Will.  Finally, 
SLA/MM representatives have alleged Sudanese government involvement 
in, or support for, the attack. 
 
----------------------- 
The Humanitarian Impact 
----------------------- 
 
7. (U) Solid information about the humanitarian impact of this 
skirmish is not yet available.  The UN Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is working with the UN Department of 
Safety and Security (UNDSS) to organize an assessment mission as 
soon as safety permits. 
 
8. (SBU) According to one NGO, no war wounded have been seen in 
either the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) clinic or 
 
KHARTOUM 00002420  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
the local hospital, and this may suggest an active attempt to 
conceal the facts of the situation from international actors.  While 
another NGO staff member reported seeing one dead and two injured, 
USAID has received no reports of large numbers of civilians or 
combatants injured by the fighting. 
 
9. (SBU) No lasting displacements appear to have occurred as a 
result of the skirmish.  Indications are that civilians residing on 
the north side of Gereida near the scene of conflict temporarily 
moved closer to the center of town for safety.  UN sources also 
report that Gereida town residents moved into IDP centers in the 
eastern and southern portions of town to avoid the fighting.  It is 
worth noting that the people of Gereida are primarily Massalit and 
support the Massalit SLA forces.  If this group is in fact 
responsible for the military offensive against the Zaghawa SLA, it 
is not expected to create displacement among either the Gereida town 
or camp population. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Implications for Humanitarian Programs 
-------------------------------------- 
 
10. (SBU) On September 29, a combination of UN Humanitarian Air 
Service (UNHAS) and UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) helicopters 
transported 55 NGO and UN staff from Oxfam, American Refugee Council 
(ARC), ZOA Refugee Care, Merlin, Action Contre la Faim (ACF), NRC, 
the International Organization for Migration, the UN Food and 
Agriculture Organization, and the UN Population Fund.  The UN sent 
an additional flight on September 30 to relocate two remaining 
Merlin staff members and some employees of the Sudanese government 
Office of Water and Environmental Sanitation (WES).  The UN followed 
up with a final evacuation flight on October 1 for the remaining WES 
staff. 
 
11. (SBU) The September 29 to October 1 evacuation of Gereida left 
only two agencies with response capacity on the ground.  ICRC has 
retained its full team in Gereida, and ACF has left a smaller team 
of approximately nine people.  ZOA and Oxfam evacuated Gereida and 
temporarily suspended activities.  Staff members of the three UN 
agencies were only visiting the area, as the UN does not maintain a 
presence in Gereida.  Program status on each of the three USAID 
Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance partners is as follows: 
 
--ACF-- 
 
12. (SBU) ACF conducted only a partial evacuation on September 29, 
leaving a team of two expatriate and seven national staff.  The 
agency reports the intention to return all staff as soon as local 
SLA commanders give the agency an assurance of safety.  As the UN 
World Food Program cooperating partner in Gereida, ACF reports 
having adequate stocks for October rations, but has delayed plans to 
conduct general food distributions from October 1 - 8. 
 
--ARC-- 
 
13. (SBU) ARC withdrew seven staff members that were originally from 
Nyala.  While ARC has 32 locally recruited clinic staff still in 
Gereida, ARC management reports that the ability for the program to 
continue will depend on the general security situation.  ARC will 
participate in the upcoming OCHA-led humanitarian assessment mission 
and make a determination to return based on mission findings. 
 
--Merlin-- 
 
14. (SBU) Merlin withdrew all of the agency's 17 staff members, 
leaving the program in a state of complete suspension.  Security 
permitting, Merlin is planning to send in an advanced team by road 
on October 3 to assess the situation and depending upon the team's 
findings will return a medical team on October 9 via the next 
regularly scheduled UNHAS helicopter flight. 
 
------------------------- 
Gereida Camp Coordination 
------------------------- 
 
15. (SBU) In late August, NRC officially assumed camp coordination 
responsibilities for Gereida.  On September 19, however, the HAC 
announced that the suspension of NRC's camp coordination role in 
Kalma camp (reftel) also extends to Gereida.  Since that time, HAC 
has prevented the movement of NRC staff and supplies into Gereida, 
but has not had the authority to force the departure of NRC staff 
 
KHARTOUM 00002420  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
because the area is under the control of the SLA/MM. 
 
16. (SBU) Since NRC evacuated Gereida with other NGOs on September 
29, the HAC may use this opportunity to prevent NRC from returning 
to Gereida.  Therefore, it is probable that NRC will be unable to 
continue camp coordination activities in Gereida.  USAID field staff 
will monitor NRC's ability to return, the humanitarian implications 
of the lack of camp coordination, and the response of the 
international community. 
 
HUME